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Abstract 
This thesis presents an interpretation of the significance of Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophical position in Phenomenology of Perception in the face of two tendencies 
in recent Anglophone scholarship to mischaracterise his position. The first tendency 
comes from the recent movement for an embodied cognitive science, which reads his 
phenomenology of the lived body as convergent with a scientistic version of 
naturalism. The second concerns a set of readers who, while grasping the 
transcendental dimension, read him either too closely to Kant, as a new kind of 
transcendental idealist, too closely to Husserl, when interpreting his conception of 
the phenomenological reduction, or too closely to Hegel, due to his use of an 
‘existential dialectic’. In place of these readings I present an interpretation of 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological ontology as a form of liberal naturalism that 
rejects the scientism of the embodied cognitive science movement and puts in its 
place a methodology that is both phenomenological and transcendental.  
My critical analysis of Merleau-Ponty’s existentialist position argues that 
recent readings of him as a transcendental idealist are mistaken and that he is 
correctly read as a liberal naturalist who advocates a transcendental methodology, 
eschewing a transcendental metaphysics.  Further, I argue that recent scholars have 
not adequately understood the way in which he combines the Hegelian concept of 
dialectics with an existential ontological framework, presenting an alternative view 
that identifies three principal and connected uses of ‘dialectic’ in Phenomenology of 
Perception. I also argue that Merleau-Ponty’s conception of phenomenological 
reduction has been mischaracterised in some of the recent literature, and argue for a 
view of the reduction as a ‘purgative operation’ that seeks to eliminate the 
objectivism of the natural attitude at its root in the structure of perception itself. 
Finally, some criticisms of Merleau-Ponty’s thesis of ‘the primacy of 
perception’ are advanced, and a way around them is sketched. I argue that, in not 
satisfactorily working out his position on the perception/language relation, Merleau-
Ponty fails to account for the structuring role of deep linguistic/cultural contexts that 
shape our perceptual experience. The upshot of this is that while Merleau-Ponty’s 
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position represents a powerful critique of, and viable alternative to, scientistic 
naturalism, the ‘philosophical status’ that he attributes to our ‘direct and primitive 
contact with the world’ ought to be modified to incorporate the full implications of 
the hermeneutic depth that sustained phenomenological analysis itself has enabled us 
to see.
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Introduction 
1. Introduction 
This thesis presents a reading of Merleau-Ponty as a liberal naturalist 
philosopher. Liberal naturalist positions reject supernatural entities, for example 
spirits or Cartesian minds, and supernatural faculties of knowing, such as mystical 
insight and spiritual intuition. However, they also reject a view that they refer to as 
‘scientism’. Scientism claims that the experimental and theoretical methods of the 
natural sciences are our most reliably knowledge-conducive practices, and that, 
therefore, any viable ontological claims must be formulated in terms of the entities, 
forces and causal processes that the natural sciences posit in their theories. Merleau-
Ponty’s philosophy represents a deeply principled rejection of this scientistic form of 
naturalism, arguing that the sciences are incapable, in principle, of providing us with 
a philosophical understanding of the nature of human experience and of existence 
generally. For this, he argues, we need to undertake a comprehensive and painstaking 
phenomenological analysis of our lived experience1. The ‘lived and perceived world 
… must be described for itself’ because by doing this ‘philosophy rediscovers a 
“thickness” and a relation with concrete problems it had lost when it became pure 
reflection on science’2.  
                                                
1 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge, 2002), p.ix. 
2 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ‘The Contemporary Philosophical Movement’ in The Merleau-Ponty 
Reader, Ted Toadvine and Leonard Lawlor (eds.) (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 
2007), p.85.  
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The purpose of this analysis is to bring to light just those all-pervasive aspects 
of ‘the human order’ – the human level of consciousness, intentionality, meaning and 
normativity – that scientistic naturalism ‘represses’3. And it is Merleau-Ponty’s view 
that scientistic naturalism must ‘repress’ lived consciousness in its pursuit of the goal 
of what he calls an ‘objectivist’ account of the world of nature and of the objects it 
contains, such as human beings. This ‘objective thought’4 is so-called because it 
takes as its ontological model the ‘world of objects’, which it understands as 
ultimately consisting of mutually exterior parts. Merleau-Ponty, in reference to 
Descartes, often uses the Latin phrase partes extra partes as shorthand for the idea 
that the parts that comprise the wholes that we experience are understood as having 
an external independent existence – without interdependence. They are thus subject-
independent and atomistic. ‘The definition of the object’, he says, ‘is … that it exists 
partes extra partes, and that consequently it acknowledges between its parts, or 
between itself and other objects only external and mechanical relationships’5. The 
idea that the world is comprised of mutually exterior parts is one of the two key 
components of what Merleau-Ponty calls ‘objective thought’ (also ‘objectivism’6). 
The other key idea is what he calls ‘the prejudice of determinate being’7. To hold the 
prejudice of determinate being is to unjustifiably presuppose the existence of a 
determinate world – a world consisting of a totality of determinate three-dimensional 
spatio-temporal objects with determinate properties and their relations. On this view, 
to use Joseph Margolis’ phrase, the world is both ‘determinate and knowable as 
                                                
3 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.339. 
4 Ibid. p.407. 
5 Ibid. p.84. 
6 Ibid. p.xxii. 
7 Ibid. p.59. He also calls it the ‘prejudice in favour of an objective world’, p.7. 
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such’8. Merleau-Ponty argues that this is an unjustified ‘prejudice’ about what the 
world is like that results from a mischaracterisation of the lived world of our 
perceptual experience. 
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy runs fundamentally counter to this ‘objectivism’ 
and it is his goal in Phenomenology of Perception to convince his reader of the deep 
conceptual confusion at the core of the scientistic project. Merleau-Ponty argues in 
favour of a methodology that is both phenomenological, in the sense of a systematic 
description of the structure of lived experience, and transcendental, in the sense of 
asking fundamental questions about the conditions of possibility for our lived 
experience.  He also argues for an ontology that is ‘existential’, in the sense of 
articulating the concrete structures of being that such a methodology uncovers. What 
this position amounts to is the subject of the subsequent chapters of this thesis.  
Merleau-Ponty’s version of liberal naturalism is, in one sense, as liberal as a 
version of naturalism can get. For example, he has a conception of the sciences that 
is broad enough to include the human sciences (e.g. sociology and linguistics), but 
nevertheless holds that a transcendental perspective is the only way to get a sufficient 
understanding of the human level and to formulate plausible ontological claims. 
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy is anti-reductionist and anti-objectivist in a way 
that repudiates the traditional formulation of the mind-body problem and thus its 
erstwhile solutions: dualism and monism. Scientistic thinkers in the cognitive 
sciences and in philosophy of mind are motivated by the problem of ontological 
                                                
8 Joseph Margolis, Pragmatism’s Advantage (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), p.26. 
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dualism. Traditional dualists argue that ‘the mind’ and the material world are two 
fundamentally different substances (substance dualism)9. Contemporary dualists, by 
contrast, argue that the material world somehow has two fundamentally different 
types of properties: mental properties and physical properties (property dualism)10. 
Monists argue that there exists only one fundamental type of substance: physical 
substance (physicalists)11. Occasionally, in opposition, it is argued that everything 
that exists is in some degree mental (panpsychism)12. Merleau-Ponty rejects all of 
these ‘solutions’ and the Cartesian problematic that gives rise to them, arguing that 
the phenomenology of embodied perceptual experience demonstrably undermines 
any sharp subject/object dichotomy.     
Merleau-Ponty’s ontology might be described as ‘post-objectivist’. This is 
demonstrated in his view that the commitment – either explicit or implicit – to an 
ontology modelled on the ‘world of objects’, understood as consisting of ‘mutually 
exterior parts’, is fundamentally incoherent. This objectivist ontology, he argues, 
underpins any philosophy that models itself on the natural sciences, as well as being 
the implicit ontology of the natural sciences themselves. The fundamental 
incoherence lies in the fact that it is unable, in principle, to cope with the phenomena 
                                                
9 The canonical statement of this position is: Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, 
(London & New York: Penguin, 1999). 
10 e.g. David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1997). 
11 See: A. Melnyk, A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003). D. Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993). A 
development of the attempt to work out the physicalist view is the idea of ‘supervenience’. The 
intuitive idea is that even if mental states are not identical to physical states then it must be the case 
that there can nevertheless be no change in a ‘supervening’ mental state without a change in its 
‘subvening’ physical one. See: B. P. McLaughlin, ‘Varieties of Supervenience’. In Supervenience: 
New Essays, E. E. Savellos and U.D.Yalçin (eds) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 
12 e.g. Galen Strawson, ‘Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism’, Journal of 
Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11) (2006). 
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of meaningful lived experience within its conceptual framework. As such, Merleau-
Ponty’s position is a deep-rooted anti-scientism, whilst at the same time being a 
principled rejection of any kind of super- or extra-natural theoretical moves. It is for 
this reason that the position that he calls ‘existential phenomenology’, which 
embodies a genuinely phenomenological approach to ontology (a ‘phenomenological 
ontology’), qualifies as a liberal naturalism.         
Merleau-Ponty’s fundamental critique of ‘objectivism’ is at odds with the 
scientistic naturalism that arises out of the attempt to transform the insights of the 
natural sciences into naturalistic positions in philosophy. His appraisal of the role of 
the sciences shares some important common ground with the Deweyan pragmatist 
account. Chiefly, it shares the view that it is not the explicit theoretical content of the 
various sciences that is of most importance but rather the general experimentalist 
approach that they all share13. To be experimentalist in this general sense is to 
appreciate the open-endedness and the interpretative dimension of enquiry. This is 
evident, says Merleau-Ponty, in the fact that when we focus on our experience we 
find that it is necessarily situated in a context, or ‘world’. This necessary situatedness 
is what he calls a fundamental ‘existential structure’. Enquirers are invited by this 
most basic structure of our experience to be experimentalist because in any attempt 
to deepen knowledge our necessary situatedness in a context means that we must 
attempt to grasp a world that always in principle exceeds our total grasp. This is 
                                                
13 This point has been argued in: Sandra Rosenthal and Patrick Bourgeois, Pragmatism and 
Phenomenology: A Philosophic Encounter (The Netherlands: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 
1980). 
  Introduction 
 
  8  
because it is only in our exploration of the world via the finite and limited capacities 
of our perceiving body that we can come to know anything about it.  
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological epistemology in Phenomenology of 
Perception rests on the view that he famously refers to as ‘the primacy of 
perception’14. This view holds that being is revealed to us directly in our pre-
objective lived perceptual experience and that it is this primordial level of experience 
that we need an account of, giving it a ‘philosophical status’, as he puts it15. The 
provision of this account will thus enable us to articulate a phenomenological 
ontology. Such an ontology will draw on a ‘transcendental attitude’16 – that is a 
transcendental methodology – whilst eschewing a transcendental metaphysics.  
Scientific theorising, both in the sciences and in scientistic naturalist 
philosophy, argues Merleau-Ponty, is unable to cope with the fundamental 
phenomena of our intrinsically and irreducibly meaningful intentional consciousness. 
This is because it involves a way of theorising that rests on a process of progressive 
abstraction away from the very basis on which such abstraction is built – lived 
perceptual experience – and from which it derives its meaning17. Thus, he argues that 
this kind of theorising is not just reductionist at times. Rather, it is intrinsically 
reductionist at an ontological level as it must inevitably empty our lived experience 
                                                
14 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ‘The Primacy of Perception and its Philosophical Consequences’ in The 
Primacy of Perception: And Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, 
History and Politics (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p.12. 
15 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. vii. ‘By these words, the “primacy of perception”, 
we mean that the experience of perception is our presence at the moment when things, truths, values 
are constituted for us; that perception is a nascent Logos; that it teaches us, outside all dogmatism, the 
true conditions of objectivity itself …’: Merleau-Ponty, ‘The Primacy of Perception and its 
Philosophical Consequences’, p.25. 
16 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.69. 
17 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behaviour (Boston: Beacon, 1963), pp.201-220. 
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of its intentional content in order to fit it into an abstracted theoretical framework – 
the ‘objectivist’ framework of scientistic naturalism18.  
In contrast to objectivist accounts that attempt to explain perception in terms 
of atomistic ‘sense data’19, Merleau-Ponty proposes a phenomenological theory of 
the irreducibility of meaningful perceptual experience. This thesis is coupled with a 
claim about the inability of a scientific approach to address the problem of 
consciousness without destroying the very phenomenon they seek to understand 
through the application of scientific methods to it. In Phenomenology of Perception 
he puts the point in the following unequivocal way: 
How significance and intentionality could come to dwell in molecular 
edifices of cells is a thing that can never be made comprehensible … But 
there is, in any case, no question of any such absurd undertaking. It is simply 
that the question of recognizing the body as a chemical structure or 
agglomeration of tissues, is formed by a process of impoverishment from a 
primordial-body-for-us20.  
                                                
18 I will be exploring Merleau-Ponty’s views on this issue in subsequent chapters, especially Chapter 
2.   
19 Sense-data theories hold that ‘sensations’ are the basic element in perception and go on to postulate 
some type of psychological process involving learning, memory and association in order to account 
for the perception we have on the basis of the sensations. Merleau-Ponty argues that 
phenomenological description exposes these theories as making a fundamental ‘experience error’. 
That is, they attribute to experience what their theoretical commitments antecedently commit them to 
find here. But such atomistic pure sensations are not what we find in experience, they are a theoretical 
construct that is superimposed onto the irreducibly holistic structure of perceptual experience. See: 
Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, pp.3-14. 
20 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.409. 
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The body is the crucial focal point that Merleau-Ponty believes demonstrates 
the intrinsic limits of scientistic naturalism. Our ‘primordial-body-for-us’ is not the 
body conceived of as just another object in a world understood as a ‘totality of 
objects’ but rather is our phenomenologically ‘lived through’ body21. The primary 
and foundational perceptual experience of our ‘lived through’ body is abstracted 
away from in order to conceptualise it scientifically as an object like any other. 
However, this move undermines the possibility of accounting for the structures of 
meaning that have their basis in that very primary and foundational perceptual 
experience. Thus, as Scott Aikin aptly puts it: 
… we not only do damage to those structures as structures of meaning (in 
that it becomes unclear how they mean), but we also strip them of meaning 
altogether (in that they no longer are intentional). The mind, intentionality, 
our structures of meaning must be understood from the inside22. 
In its attempt at a fully scientific theory, the kind of naturalism that Merleau-Ponty 
resists requires that we view our bodies and practices from a third-person point of 
view. They thus fail to account for the intentional phenomenological perspective, 
what Merleau-Ponty discusses in terms of the ‘internality’ of intentional relations23, 
and so fail to explain this essential dimension of the human24.  
                                                
21 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.177. 
22 Scott Aikin, ‘Pragmatism, Naturalism and Phenomenology’. Human Studies 29 (2006), p.324. 
23 e.g. ‘To the degree that the motivated phenomenon comes into being, an internal relation to the 
motivating phenomenon appears …’: Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.58. 
24 I will be describing Merleau-Ponty’s account of intentional consciousness in Chapter 1 and 
especially in Chapter 2. 
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2. A Note on Methodology 
The scope of my study of Merleau-Ponty extends from the period of his first 
book, The Structure of Behaviour (written 1938, published 1942), through to the end 
of the ‘Sorbonne period’ in 195225. In the thesis I will focus primarily on his major 
work, Phenomenology of Perception (1945), as this is his sustained statement of his 
existential phenomenological position. Some would argue that the Phenomenology of 
Perception does not represent Merleau-Ponty's fully matured philosophical views, 
and thus it is unfair to him to treat the theory of perception and ontology developed 
there to the exclusion of his later ontology of the ‘flesh’. To this I respond that the 
position that Merleau-Ponty adopts in his later writings is not independent from that 
adopted in the Phenomenology of Perception. And this is the case in such a way that, 
as regards the debate between scientistic naturalism and phenomenological ontology, 
the relevant moves have already been made in the period up to 1952. Thus, despite 
his taking of a second – again Heidegger-inspired – ‘turn’, the position outlined in 
the Phenomenology is the appropriate place to focus the debate vis-à-vis the 
relationship between phenomenology and scientistic naturalism. 
The challenge I have set myself in this thesis is to explicate Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophical position on its own terms in order to explore the full significance of its 
challenge to a group who, even when interested in his phenomenology of 
                                                
25 I have taken this periodisation from Ted Toadvine and Leonard Lawlor, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, in 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Merleau-Ponty Reader, Ted Toadvine and Leonard Lawlor (eds.), 
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2007), p.85. 
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embodiment, stand in either explicit or implicit opposition to his existential ontology 
– namely scientistic naturalists. Interpreting Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy is 
notoriously difficult. This difficulty can be highlighted in the following way. If asked 
what problems Phenomenology of Perception addresses, it is impossible to deny that 
it is intended to directly address issues in phenomenology, epistemology and 
metaphysics, and, slightly less directly, in ethics. But it is also hard to deny that it is 
intended to have a relevance to literally everything, including politics, history, 
aesthetics and logic. It is a holistic philosophy and as such there is nothing that it 
leaves untouched. This is because it is, in the tradition of post-Kantian Continental 
philosophy, proposing not just a new theory within a more or less established set of 
parameters for theory construction. Rather, it seeks to reconfigure those very 
parameters, thus proposing a new approach to doing philosophy.  
Consequently there is no shortage of large claims and large goals in 
Phenomenology of Perception, but how are we to assess their achievement? The 
answer to this question must be the same as to any other philosophy that takes 
rationality seriously, and that is via comprehensive argumentative demonstration. 
Despite his lyrical style, Merleau-Ponty clearly understands his philosophy to 
involve arguments, and the arguments for his main claims can be extrapolated from 
his texts – even at points where they are not fully provided. And Merleau-Ponty 
scholars have self-consciously and systematically used this kind of approach in the 
interpretation of his work26.  
                                                
26 They do not, however, always arrive at the same general interpretation. In this regard compare 
Stephen Priest’s book Merleau-Ponty, (London: Routledge, 1998) with Michael Hammond, Jane 
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One potential problem of relevance to the methodology of the present project 
comes from a concern Dermot Moran raises in his review of Stephen Priest’s 
Merleau-Ponty, written for the ‘Arguments of the Philosophers’ series. In critiquing 
the analytical nature of Priest’s presentation of Merleau-Ponty’s position, Moran 
asserts that ‘reading Merleau-Ponty through the prism of his “arguments” may not 
necessarily do full justice to his ambiguous, evolving thought’27. The basic problem 
to which Moran draws our attention is that ‘if individual sentences are abstracted 
from Merleau-Ponty’s limpid prose and treated as categorical assertions in a chain of 
arguments, then much of his subtlety and ambiguity is lost’28. The result is that our 
attempted extrapolations might instead turn out as ‘wooden reductions’, even 
‘misrepresentations’29.  
Now doing ‘full justice’ to Merleau-Ponty’s ‘ambiguous, evolving thought’ is 
indeed a tall order. For if it is the case that reading him with an eye for the content of 
his claims, and the argumentative demonstration for them, is not enough to give him 
a just exposition, then it is not clear that any philosopher could ever achieve this. 
However, it is obvious that a philosopher who attempts to reconfigure the very 
meaning and practice of philosophy in the fundamental way that Merleau-Ponty does 
is under a particularly serious obligation to provide argumentation for such radical 
manoeuvres. In light of this obligation, the question of whether or not that individual 
                                                                                                                                     
Howarth and Russell Keat’s Understanding Phenomenology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991) and Monika 
Langer’s Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception: A Guide and Commentary, (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1989).  
27 Dermot Moran, ‘New Books on Merleau-Ponty’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 7 
(3) (October 1999), p.397. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. This is Moran’s charge against Priest’s attempt to cast Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy into a 
more formal style of argument. 
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or his followers feel that they have been done full justice is not the crucial issue. This 
is because those individuals adhere to the radically reconfigured conception of 
philosophy that those views instantiate. Now to those for whom the status of this new 
conception is not a fait accompli, the important point is that the author is given an 
attentive and thorough reading before any assessment is undertaken. For, if we seek 
to undertake such an assessment, it is incumbent upon us to give these views a 
sufficiently attentive and cognisant reading, or else that assessment cannot 
meaningfully claim to be of the relevant views in question. Thus, reading Merleau-
Ponty for his arguments is surely the appropriate way to proceed if we wish to assess 
the meaning and validity of his philosophical claims. However, in doing so we must 
constantly be aware that he has a style of expressing his arguments that is not 
straightforwardly translatable into a more formal style of argument. It is, therefore, 
unreasonable to assume that his philosophy ought to be reconstructable in the 
rigorous logical style that analytical philosophers like Priest favour. To emphasise, 
this is firstly because Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy is principally descriptive, and 
secondly because he holds that what is fundamentally uncovered via his descriptive 
procedure – the level of pre-objective perception – is intrinsically ambiguous and, 
therefore, not capable of being ‘further clarified by analysis’30. 
Thus, in order to fully capture Merleau-Ponty’s meaning, it will not be 
enough to read Merleau-Ponty ‘from the outside’, as Monika Langer puts it.  This is 
a process that ‘merely serves to confirm us in our prejudices’ as we ‘sift out and 
translate ‘the interesting bits’ into unambiguous philosophical terminology before 
                                                
30 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.xx. 
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submitting them to closer scrutiny’31. This modus operandi inevitably ‘misses the … 
essence of the Phenomenology altogether32. Instead, in reading Merleau-Ponty’s 
thought we must, as Langer advises, render ‘ourselves genuinely present to its 
presence in the text itself’, leaving our ‘various assumptions behind’ as we ‘open 
ourselves to the text’33. Given this, I seek to be mindful of the way in which 
Merleau-Ponty’s position emerges throughout the text as a result of the ‘wide-
ranging nature of [his] presentation’ and ‘his complicated dialectical writing style’34. 
As such, I take the view that his position is, strictly speaking, contained in a network 
of statements that build up to an overall general picture – like a painting or a 
symphony – rather than in an explicit chain of logically connected propositions that 
develop in a linear fashion displaying unambiguously what he is really committed to. 
It follows from this view that, in the interest of giving a fair-minded 
presentation of Merleau-Ponty’s views, we must be careful not to distil the meaning 
of particular assertions or strands within his thought in such a way that we create a 
reductive ‘analytical’ Merleau-Ponty35. In this thesis I seek to create a Merleau-Ponty 
that is constructed out of the general patterns of his theoretical claims and his 
arguments for them (and their general patterns). 
                                                
31 Langer, Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception, p.155. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. p.156. 
34 Duane Davis, ‘Review of Merleau-Ponty by Stephen Priest’, The Review of Metaphysics 59 (1) 
(September 2005), p.192. 
35 This concern has been raised about Priest’s book by both Dermot Moran and Duane Davis: Duane 
Davis, ‘Review of Merleau-Ponty by Stephen Priest’, p. 192. It has also been voiced by Jack 
Reynolds, in relation to The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty, who argues that the book 
‘privileges the aspects of Merleau-Ponty's work that are most capable of recuperation within the 
analytic tradition’. Jack Reynolds, ‘Review of The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty’, Notre 
Dame Philosophical Reviews (September 2005), http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/24859-the-cambridge-
companion-to-merleau-ponty/ 
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The problem with an analytical approach is in the particular way that it distils 
the arguments, not that it attempts to distil them. For without such extrapolations 
how could we suppose that, for example, scientistic naturalists might come to see the 
incoherence of their scientism and the validity of an existential phenomenological 
approach on rational grounds?  
Finally, as Moran has observed, it can be ‘exceptionally difficult to be precise 
about what Merleau-Ponty is actually defending’36. In his words, this is because 
Merleau-Ponty’s ‘emphasis on the ambiguity and dialectics of our relation with the 
world is mirrored in the ambiguity and vagueness of his own writing’37. Merleau-
Ponty himself is not always precise about what he is defending. And this fact, 
therefore, necessitates an exegetically cautious and attentive approach in order to 
further clarify just what that amounts to. 
 
3. My Critical Targets: Recent Misreadings 
In attempting an attentive and cautious exegesis I have necessarily consulted 
the secondary literature on Merleau-Ponty. One of the problems with this literature is 
the marked tendency to read him through, and thus too closely to, other thinkers. For 
example, his key theoretical claims are sometimes read through Kant38 or Husserl39. 
                                                
36 Moran, ‘New Books on Merleau-Ponty’, p.397. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Thomas Baldwin, ‘Editor's Introduction’, in Merleau-Ponty: Basic Writings, Thomas Baldwin (ed.) 
(London & New York: Routledge, 2004); Sebastian Gardner, ‘Merleau-Ponty's Transcendental 
Theory of Perception’, (2007) University of Edinburgh, 
http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/events/seminars/documents/Gardner_Ponty.pdf; Vincent Descombes, 
Modern French Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). 
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The practice of reading Merleau-Ponty through other thinkers indicates a view of 
him – either explicitly or implicitly held – as essentially a thinker who builds on the 
work of others in a derivative fashion40. However, I contend that this view is 
mistaken and results from his confusion-courting practice of appropriating the 
terminology of other thinkers without fully explicating the nature of that 
appropriation. For example, we seldom see in Merleau-Ponty’s writings an explicit 
account, in terms of the similarities and differences between the original and the 
appropriated usage, of key terms like ‘transcendental’ or ‘dialectics’.  
In the secondary literature Merleau-Ponty has been most commonly read as 
an existentialist; however, it is my contention that fleshing out exactly what this 
means for him is yet to fully be done. This can be seen by the fact that there is not 
really an orthodox reading of Merleau-Ponty’s basic philosophical position but rather 
a tendency to construct ‘Merleau-Pontys’ for particular purposes. For example, one 
strand emphasises the social and historical dimension of Merleau-Ponty’s thought, 
often in contrast to Sartre’s claims about absolute freedom and his account of the 
master/slave dialectic in social relations41. Another strand emphasises his 
phenomenological account of perception and of the ‘lived body’ as a way to 
                                                                                                                                     
39 Joel Smith, ‘Merleau-Ponty and the Phenomenological Reduction’, Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary 
Journal of Philosophy, 48 (6) (2005), pp. 553-571; A.D. Smith, ‘The Flesh of Perception: Merleau-
Ponty and Husserl’ in Reading Merleau-Ponty: On “Phenomenology of Perception”, Thomas 
Baldwin (ed.) (London & New York: Routledge, 2007).  
40 See in this regard Robert Solomon’s characterisation in: Robert Solomon, Continental Philosophy 
Since 1750: The Rise and Fall of the Self (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 
pp.173-193; Mary Warnock, Untitled review of Phenomenology of Perception by M. Merleau Ponty, 
Colin Smith (trans.), The Philosophical Quarterly 14 (57) (October 1964), p.372. 
41 See e.g. John O’Neill, Perception, Expression and History (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press, 1970); J. Schmidt, Maurice Merleau-Ponty (London: Macmillan, 1985); A. Rabil, Merleau-
Ponty: Existentialist of the Social World (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967). 
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overcome representationalist epistemology42. Still others emphasise that his 
phenomenological account of embodied perception is precisely what is needed to 
rescue the project of the cognitive sciences from their overly mentalistic and 
disembodied models of human cognition43. 
Merleau-Ponty’s work has often been presented as an extension of Husserl, 
Heidegger and Sartre, as the fourth placeholder of the canonical classical 
phenomenologists – the one who properly brings the body into the picture, building 
on Heidegger’s existential critique of Husserl and Sartre’s phenomenology of 
concrete embodied social relations. While this is not an unfair characterisation, I 
want to argue that Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical position is emphatically more than 
a straightforward extension. This is because in his appropriation of key technical 
terms from Kant, Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger he transforms those terms, 
synthesising them into a unique theory that is sufficiently original to merit treatment 
as a separate and distinct position. This treatment must not interpret his claims 
simply through Heidegger, Husserl or Sartre but rather on their own terms as 
comprising a unique phenomenological ontology.  
Merleau-Ponty’s appropriation of the technical terms of preceding canonical 
figures encourages, quite understandably, the reading of him through the figures who 
                                                
42 See e.g. Charles Taylor, ‘Merleau-Ponty and the Epistemological Picture’, The Cambridge 
Companion to Merleau-Ponty, T. Carman and M. B. N. Hansen (eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005); Hubert Dreyfus, ‘Merleau-Ponty’s Critique of Husserl’s (and Searle’s) 
Concept of Intentionality’, in Rereading Merleau-Ponty, L. Hass and D. Olkowski (eds.) (Amherst, 
MA: Humanity Books, 2000). 
43 See e.g. Shaun Gallagher, 'Body Schema and Intentionality', in The Body and the Self, José Luis 
Bermúdez, Anthony Marcel, and Naomi Eilan (eds.) (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998); Francisco 
Varela, Evan Thomson and Eleanor Rosch, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human 
Experience (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991); Alva Noë, Action in Perception, (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2004).   
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innovated the key terms that he appropriates. However, to do this is to fail to see the 
way in which the terms have been transformed and thus to misread him. The 
tendency to read him through preceding canonical figures contributes to the 
secondary literature being a plural and contested space44. This is no bad thing in 
itself; in fact it can be seen as evidence of the creative and vivifying power of 
Merleau-Ponty’s work. However, there are certain interpretations in some of the 
recent secondary literature that misunderstand his central theoretical claims and, 
thus, ought to be corrected. These interpretative errors cannot be remedied by 
reading Merleau-Ponty through other canonical figures but only by reading him as an 
original and groundbreaking thinker in his own right. 
The argument of this thesis has two critical targets. The first is the most 
striking illustration of a confusion that develops due to the pattern of reading 
Merleau-Ponty for a particular purpose rather than on his own terms. This target 
comprises a set of theorists who use Merleau-Ponty in the cognitive sciences. These 
theorists argue for an embodied approach to cognitive science, and see recent work 
in the cognitive sciences as standing in a relationship of convergence and 
complementarity with Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological work. What I argue 
against my first target is that these uses involve a tacit ‘scientisation’ of his 
phenomenology. That is, they tacitly morph Merleau-Ponty’s view to fit within the 
objectivist framework that necessarily underpins their project for an embodied 
cognitive science. As a result of this they miss the philosophical significance of his 
phenomenological claims, which is to argue that his phenomenology of perceptual 
                                                
44 See e.g: Reynolds, ‘Review of The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty’. 
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experience, rather than being convergent with the project of the cognitive sciences, in 
fact demonstrates its inability to deal with the phenomenon of consciousness.  
The second target is largely an instantiation of the pattern of reading 
Merleau-Ponty through other canonical thinkers rather than on his own terms. This 
target comprises a set of recent readings of Merleau-Ponty that understand that he is 
explicitly and deeply critical of the philosophical presuppositions of the cognitive 
sciences, and that instead he offers a transcendental philosophical account. Despite 
this, they misunderstand key aspects of his account. For example, Stephen Priest, 
Taylor Carman45 and Joel Smith fail to properly grasp Merleau-Ponty’s unique 
conception of the phenomenological reduction, reading him through – and too 
closely to – either Husserl (Priest and Smith) or Heidegger (Carman).  Sebastian 
Gardner and Thomas Baldwin, for their part, misinterpret Merleau-Ponty’s unique 
conception of a transcendental method, reading him through – and too closely to – 
Kant. 
Some authors attempt to explicate Merleau-Ponty without mention of the 
central role of dialectics in his thinking46. Others acknowledge, but struggle to 
articulate, his relation to Hegel and dialectics, failing to properly grasp Merleau-
Ponty’s complex conception of an existential dialectic (Sebastian Gardner, John 
                                                
45 Taylor Carman, Merleau-Ponty (London: Routledge, 2008). 
46 See, for example: Hammond, Howarth and Keat, Understanding Phenomenology; Komarine 
Romdenh-Romluc, Merleau-Ponty and Phenomenology of Perception, (London: Routledge, 2010); 
Christopher Macann, Four phenomenological philosophers: Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-
Ponty (London: Routledge, 1993); David Cerbone, Understanding Phenomenology (Chesham: 
Acumen, 2006). 
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Russon47, Taylor Carman, Stephen Priest). In each case, I will argue, these 
misunderstandings result from the reader’s failure to comprehend the originality of 
Merleau-Ponty’s existential position.  
 The process of exploring where and why the authors that comprise our 
two critical targets go wrong will necessarily involve an exegetical clarification of 
the meaning of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. The goal of this exegesis is to present a 
reading of Merleau-Ponty that will serve to demonstrate, via textual explication, the 
claims that I assert as to what Merleau-Ponty’s position amounts to, and why these 
recent scholars have missed crucial aspects of this position. On the whole then, this 
exegetical and critical work will help to provide us with a clear picture of: 
a) the nature of Merleau-Ponty’s deep challenge to scientistic naturalism; and 
b) the nature of Merleau-Ponty’s contribution to contemporary debates in the 
area of epistemology and ontology. 
 
3.1 Misreading Merleau-Ponty for Cognitive Science 
The best place for me to start the exploration of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy 
is with a preliminary discussion of the recent use of his phenomenology in the 
context of the new interdisciplinary projects of the cognitive sciences. The purpose 
of this discussion is to provide a strong motivation for a deeper exploration of his 
                                                
47 John Russon, ‘Dialectic, Difference and the Other: The Hegelianizing of French Phenomenology’ in 
The History of Continental Philosophy Volume 4. Phenomenology: Responses and Developments, 
Leonard Lawlor (ed.) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010). 
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position by sketching a use of his work that, I will argue, runs in diametrical 
opposition to his considered theoretical stance. Starting with his use in the cognitive 
science field, I will indicate precisely why a fuller exploration of his philosophical 
commitments is required.  
Theorists in the new interdisciplinary projects of the cognitive sciences take 
themselves to be in the business of constructing the first plausible scientific theory of 
consciousness. There has been a recent increase of interest in the role of the 
phenomenology of embodied perception by a group of theorists referred to as ‘post-
cognitivists’. The term ‘post-cognitivism’ refers to a group of approaches in the 
cognitive sciences that argue for a vindication of the role of embodiment in the 
understanding of cognition. As Paco Calvo and Toni Gomila put it: 
At a minimum, all these approaches conceive of cognition and behaviour in 
terms of the dynamical interaction (coupling) of an embodied system that is 
embedded into the surrounding environment48. 
The key themes are ‘embodiment’ and environmental ‘embeddedness’. For our 
purposes, this enthusiastic use of Merleau-Ponty’s work raises important questions 
about these readings and the philosophical import they take Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology to have. In cognitive science, and in much philosophy of mind, 
Merleau-Ponty is read as offering a theory of perception consisting of a set of 
phenomenological descriptions, and a set of arguments derivable from them, that 
                                                
48 Paco Calvo and Toni Gomila (eds.), Handbook of Cognitive Science: An Embodied Approach 
(Oxford: Elsevier, 2008), p.7. 
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converges with work in the empirical cognitive sciences and in contemporary 
philosophy of mind – for example regarding the intimate interdependence of 
perception and action, the non-conceptual content of perceptual experience and the 
irreducibility of bodily perception49.  
These readers of Merleau-Ponty are often said to be involved in what is 
referred to as a ‘naturalisation of phenomenology’. The term ‘naturalisation of 
phenomenology’ refers to the project – however tentative – of attempting to bridge 
the ‘explanatory gap’ that exists between phenomenological accounts and scientific 
models of consciousness. The basic problem, as they see it, is that an account of 
neurobiological processes from the third-person perspective seems to be 
fundamentally irreconcilable with a phenomenological account from the first-person 
point of view. This project is driven by the view that, as Roy et al. propose, 
phenomenology has to be ‘integrated into an explanatory framework where every 
acceptable property is made continuous with the properties admitted by natural 
science’50. These theorists hold, either explicitly or implicitly, that achieving this 
integration is the way to overcome the untenable ontological dualism that persistently 
haunts the philosophy of mind and is reproduced in the cognitive sciences.  
                                                
49 On non-conceptual content see: G. Evans, Varieties of Reference (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1982); 
S. D. Kelly, ‘The Nonconceptual Content of Perceptual Experience: Situation Dependence and 
Fineness of Grain’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2001), pp. 601-608; C. 
Peacocke, ‘Perceptual Content’ in Themes from Kaplan, J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein (eds.) 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). On ‘enactive’ perception see Noë, Action in Perception. 
And on the irreducibility of perception see: Taylor Carman, ‘On the Inescapability of 
Phenomenology’ in Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Mind, A. Thomasson and D. W. Smith 
(eds.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
50 Jean-Michel Roy, Jean Petitot, Bernard Pachoud and Francisco Varela, ‘Beyond the Gap: An 
Introduction to Naturalizing Phenomenology, in Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues In 
Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, Petitot et al. (eds.) (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1999), p.1. 
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Let us illustrate this with a few examples of the kind of moves that are being 
made. The first example is to be found in recent work by Hubert Dreyfus. Although 
Dreyfus’s suggestions in this direction are tentative, and his general attitude to 
scientistic naturalism is sceptical, he nevertheless affirms a potential continuity 
between Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and cognitive science. The structure of the 
argument is typical. Asserting that ‘cognitive scientists have much to learn from 
Merleau-Ponty’51, Dreyfus incorporates Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology in his 
critique of representationalism in cognitive science. Dreyfus strongly attacks the 
view that ‘intelligence consists in the acquisition and manipulation of internal 
symbols that stand for [or ‘represent’] salient features of the environment’52.  
In explaining the flaws in this view, and in his proposal of an alternative, 
Dreyfus suggests that we might equate Merleau-Ponty’s notion of an ‘intentional arc’ 
with the notion of a ‘feedback loop’ in cognitive science. In Phenomenology of 
Perception Merleau-Ponty claims that: 
… the life of consciousness—cognitive life, the life of desire or 
perceptual life—is subtended by an ‘intentional arc’ which projects round 
about us our past, our future, our human setting, our physical, ideological and 
                                                
51 Hubert L. Dreyfus and Stuart E. Dreyfus, 'The Challenge of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of 
Embodiment for Cognitive Science’ in Perspectives on Embodiment: The Intersections of Nature and 
Culture, Gail Weiss and Honi Fern Haber (eds.) (London: Routledge, 1999), p.103. 
52 Justin Tauber, Invitations: Merleau-Ponty, Cognitive Science and Phenomenology, (Germany: 
VDM Verlag Dr Müller Aktiengesellschaft & Co., 2008), p.23. 
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moral situation, or rather which results in our being situated in all these 
respects53. 
Dreyfus takes this concept to represent a certain kind of dialectical relationship 
between the active subject and its milieu. He explains that: 
… the notion of a dialectic of milieu and action is meant to capture 
the idea that, in learning, past experience is projected back into the perceptual 
world of the learner and shows up as affordances or solicitations to further 
action. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, a ‘person’s projects polarize the world, 
bringing magically to view a host of signs which guide action …’54 
Dreyfus articulates the intentional arc in the process of skill acquisition as a 
‘feedback loop between the learner and the perceptual world’55. Understanding 
Merleau-Ponty's notion of the ‘intentional arc’ in this way then allows him to argue 
for a convergence between it and the non-representationalist theory of neural 
networks. This theory, also known as ‘connectionism’, utilises simulated systems of 
neurons called ‘neural networks’. The artificial neurons or ‘nodes’ are programming 
constructs that mimic the properties of biological neurons. Whereas ‘GOFAI’ (good 
old-fashioned AI) employs the sequential processing of information according to 
specified rules, neural net or ‘connectionist’ approaches take the brain as their model. 
                                                
53 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.157. 
54 Hubert L. Dreyfus, ‘Merleau-Ponty and Recent Cognitive Science’ in The Cambridge Companion 
to Merleau-Ponty, Taylor Carman and Mark B. N. Hansen (eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), p. 132. Merleau-Ponty quote from Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.129. 
55 Dreyfus, ‘Merleau-Ponty and Recent Cognitive Science’, p.132. 
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This attempt to simulate the brain means that the processing of information within a 
neural network is distributed throughout the entire network. As such, neural networks 
are said to be capable of ‘learning’. And they do so in such a way that in dealing with 
a new ‘situation’ they do not have to rely on a stored memory or a rule in order to 
cope. Thus, they are said to simulate what Merleau-Ponty describes as our basic non-
representational bodily coping in everyday human performance. The logic of the 
argument is that neural-network theory and Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of our 
basic bodily coping with the world can be claimed to stand in a relationship of 
mutual support in demonstrating the implausibility of representationalism. 
Dreyfus argues that ‘the representationalist accounts of our most basic and 
pervasive forms of learning and skillful action are mistaken’ and ‘require a different 
account’. This claim, he says, can be defended ‘not only on phenomenological 
grounds, but on neuroscientific grounds as well’56. Merleau-Ponty holds the view 
that ‘consciousness is in the first place not a matter of ‘I think that’ but of ‘I can’57, 
an intentional bodily relation to the world whereby the world is revealed to us by and 
through our bodily capacity to interact with it. Dreyfus suggests that ‘Merleau-
Ponty's account of the “I can” must be “supplemented” with a scientific theory of 
how the body – conceived objectivistically as an “actual body-structure” – conditions 
competence and cognition’58. To say this, however, is to suggest that Merleau-
Ponty’s philosophical claims are straightforwardly subject to empirical correction. A 
claim that ought to strike us as suspect given that Merleau-Ponty asserts that 
                                                
56 Ibid. p.142. 
57 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.159. 
58 Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 'The Challenge of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Embodiment for 
Cognitive Science’, p.118. 
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‘perception is not an event of nature’59, ‘the descriptive method can acquire a 
genuine claim only from the transcendental point of view’60, and that the 
‘transcendental attitude is already implied in the descriptions of the psychologist’61.    
A second motivating example can be seen in the work of Sean Gallagher. 
Gallagher makes the same kind of move as Dreyfus when he interprets Merleau-
Ponty as addressing the issue of ‘bodily systems that operate on a subpersonal, 
automatic level’, and goes on to argue that the role of the body schema is 
‘impenetrable to phenomenological reflection’ and must be ‘worked out conceptually 
with the help of the empirical sciences’62. Suggesting that Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophical claims are straightforwardly subject to empirical correction, he claims 
that empirical research can produce evidence that, in supporting Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology of lived experience, also demonstrates a convergence between the 
two bodies of theory. 
A third motivating example is provided in the work of Francisco Varela, 
Evan Thomson and Eleanor Rosch. In their work, The Embodied Mind, the authors 
argue for what they call an ‘enactive approach’ to cognition. Like Dreyfus they argue 
against representationalism and for the view of perception as a process essentially 
bound up with action. Alva Noë captures the main thrust of this ‘enactivist’ view of 
perception in the following passage from his book Action in Perception: 
                                                
59 Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behaviour, p.145. 
60 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.8. 
61 Ibid. p.69. 
62 Gallagher, 'Body Schema and Intentionality', p.233. For Merleau-Ponty the body functions as ‘the 
subject of perception’ by means of what he calls the ‘body schema’. The body schema is that which 
provides an a priori structure to human experience of the world. It manifests as a set of basic bodily 
capacities that are geared into an experiential world which calls on those capacities in a kind of 
‘dialogue’ between body and world. 
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Perception is not something that happens to us, or in us. It is something we 
do. Think of a blind person tap-tapping his or her way around a cluttered 
space, perceiving that space by touch, not all at once, but through time, by 
skillful probing and movement. This is, or at least ought to be, our paradigm 
of what perceiving is. The world makes itself available to the perceiver 
through physical movement and interaction … [A]ll perception is touchlike in 
this way: Perceptual experience acquires content thanks to our possession of 
bodily skills. What we perceive is determined by what we do (or what we 
know how to do); it is determined by what we are ready to do … we enact our 
perceptual experience; we act it out63. 
This is an approach which seeks to ‘open a space of possibilities in which the 
circulation between cognitive science and human experience can be fully appreciated 
…’64 However, as in the claims of Dreyfus and Gallagher, Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology is being invoked in the name of a scientific project that is at odds 
with the main thrust of his philosophical convictions. Those who are enlisting 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological analyses in this way are assuming that his 
philosophy does not need to undergo a process of ‘naturalisation’ before being 
applicable in the field of the cognitive sciences65. This, however, is an unjustified 
assumption because Merleau-Ponty holds that there is a fundamental difference 
                                                
63 Noë, Action in Perception, p.1. 
64 Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, The Embodied Mind, p.xviii. 
65 I am using the term ‘naturalisation’ here in the sense it is used in the ‘naturalisation of 
phenomenology’ debate that I introduced earlier (i.e. the attempt to bridge the ‘explanatory gap’ that 
exists between phenomenological accounts and scientific models of consciousness within the 
framework of the cognitive sciences). I will argue later that this use of the term involves the reduction 
of the term ‘naturalism’ to that of ‘scientism’. Thus, I will be using ‘scare quotes’ for the remainder of 
this chapter in order to indicate that the usage is theirs, and not one that I endorse.  
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between philosophical and scientific enquiry.  At base, Merleau-Ponty takes his 
philosophy to be ‘critical’ and ‘radical’ in the Kantian sense, as involving a 
transcendental reflection that seeks to understand the very possibility of the sciences, 
not simply to contribute to their stock of knowledge. In Phenomenology of 
Perception Merleau-Ponty talks about the taking up of a ‘transcendental attitude’, 
which for him means that we refuse to simply take the subject matter ‘nature’ for 
granted. Instead he holds that a philosophical phenomenology must take up a 
transcendental perspective with respect to empirical experience and the scientific 
objective world that it purports to discover ‘out there’ wholly independent of human 
enquirers. Taking up this ‘critical’, ‘radical’ or ‘transcendental’ perspective enables 
us to ask genuinely philosophical questions about the foundations of experience and 
of scientific theorising. By asking questions about the conditions of possibility for 
the perceptual field of our everyday experience, says Merleau-Ponty, we uncover the 
very basis of this experience and of scientific knowledge – what makes them 
possible. As a result of this we understand their ontological significance anew.   
That Varela, Thomson and Rosch are not clear about this transcendental 
dimension of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology can be seen, for example, when they 
assert: 
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For Merleau-Ponty, as for us, embodiment has this double sense: it 
encompasses both the body as a lived, experiential structure and the body as 
the context or milieu of cognitive mechanisms66.  
This is a conception of Merleau-Ponty’s view that fails to grasp why he criticised 
Adhemar Gelb and Kurt Goldstein – neuroscientists of his day – for not seeing that 
the lived body is the ‘third term between the psychic and the physiological’67. Varela, 
Thomson and Rosch are reading Merleau-Ponty for inspiration and guidance in their 
project of arguing for the importance of embodiment for cognitive science. Their 
‘double sense’ conception of embodiment, although inspired by Merleau-Ponty, is 
different from Merleau-Ponty’s view, which holds that the ‘lived body’ is an 
ontological category that is intended to explicate not just phenomenological 
experience but a kind of being.  
These misconstruals of his key claims indicate a type of problem in the 
literature that can only be sorted out via an attentive exposition of Merleau-Ponty’s 
view. Such an exposition aims to show that, when properly explicated, his 
philosophy indicates that the project we now call cognitive science is fundamentally 
incapable of theorising consciousness. As I will demonstrate in the following 
chapters, Merleau-Ponty holds that the ‘naturalisation of phenomenology’ project is 
fundamentally misguided due to its tacit acceptance of Cartesian assumptions about 
the nature of the world. And, therefore, despite its attempts to incorporate versions of 
his insights into a science of consciousness, it necessarily loses the core features of 
                                                
66 Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, The Embodied Mind, p.xvi. 
67 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.140, n.55. 
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the phenomenon of consciousness as it attempts to accommodate them within an 
objectivistic scientific account.   
These recent and tacit ‘naturalisations’ of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology 
lack a substantial discussion addressing the kinds of problems an importation of 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology into the cognitive sciences might raise. For 
example, there is no attempt to justify it in the face of Merleau-Ponty’s argument that 
‘perception is not an event nature’ and that, therefore, we must ‘take up a 
transcendental attitude’, or that his philosophy is ‘beyond realism and idealism’. This 
lack of critical reflection and the occlusion of Merleau-Ponty as philosopher in 
relation to the ‘naturalisation’ of phenomenology debate provide us with a powerful 
motivation to put Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology back into the context of his 
philosophy proper. This will help us to see why Merleau-Ponty would view the use 
to which he has recently been put as missing the true significance of his work. 
In the interest of making explicit the nature of his contribution to 
contemporary debates in the area of epistemology and ontology, and thus the nature 
of his deep philosophical challenge to scientistic forms of naturalism, it is a main 
goal of the thesis to present a reading of Merleau-Ponty’s position that seeks to 
explicate his philosophy on its own terms. That is, as an existential phenomenology 
that draws its inspiration from Heidegger’s conception of ‘fundamental ontology’ 
and the ‘existential analytic of Dasein’ in Being and Time. The successful 
achievement of this goal will involve a close reading of Merleau-Ponty and an 
explication of the way in which he uses a methodological phenomenology in the 
context of an existential ontology. Our purpose here is to illustrate how, in fact, 
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Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical position is intended to refuse the possibility of 
‘naturalisation’ – if naturalisation means the explicit or implicit advocacy of a 
scientific realist ontology, which he holds as being premised on a philosophical 
mistake.  
Now it might be said that many of the theorists working in the area of 
cognitive science are not attempting to advance philosophical positions but are rather 
in the business of formulating explanatory theories within the sciences themselves. 
This is true in most cases and it is also the case that even the more philosophical 
thinkers, such as Dreyfus and Gallagher, are, when discussing these issues, doing so 
in a way that is not intended to be drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s epistemological and 
ontological claims but rather just his phenomenological claims. Now this is 
defensible up to a point, but there is a sense in Gallagher and Dreyfus that they are 
deliberately engaged in exploring new theories that might bridge the ‘explanatory 
gap’. This implies that there may arise new conceptual frameworks that might 
integrate the presently sharply divided phenomenological and neurobiological levels.  
The recent projects in the cognitive sciences are self-consciously 
interdisciplinary and incline to the view that they are converging towards the creation 
of a new kind of integrated scientific approach – an ‘intrinsically human science’ as 
Ron McClamrock has referred to it68. However, despite this, Varela’s claim that 
‘disciplined first-person accounts should be an integral element of the validation of a 
                                                
68 Ron McClamrock, Existential Cognition: Computational Minds in the World (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1995), pp.186-187. 
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neurobiological proposal, and not merely coincidental or heuristic information’69 
implies that, although there are new and more subtle theories on the horizon, these 
theories are not fundamentally different in kind from those out of which they grow. 
Their principal difference is precisely their interdisciplinarity. But interdisciplinary 
science is still science and the participation in a ‘scientific enterprise’, as Gallagher 
has put it, is emphatically not what Merleau-Ponty takes himself to be doing. On the 
contrary, Merleau-Ponty argues in Phenomenology of Perception that any current or 
future theory that the post-cognitivists or others might advocate rests necessarily on 
an implicit commitment to scientific realism – an ontological commitment.  
 
3.2 Problems in Recent Anglophone Merleau-Ponty Scholarship and the Need 
for a Corrective ‘Counter-Reading’ 
If I motivate the thesis, as I have done, with the example of the misreading of 
Merleau-Ponty for cognitive science, and if, finding the criticism of those readings 
persuasive, a philosopher or cognitive scientist sympathetic to a scientistic version of 
naturalism wants to understand the full philosophical import of Merleau-Ponty’s 
views, then I am obliged to provide a careful and patient reading of his work in order 
to explain this. However, Merleau-Ponty’s work is notoriously complex and requires 
of its reader not only a solid grasp of the discipline of psychology but also a grasp of 
the tradition of philosophy from Descartes through Kant to Husserl and Heidegger. 
Given the daunting nature of this task, it might then seem advisable to read 
                                                
69 Francisco J. Varela, ‘Neurophenomenology: A Methodological Remedy For The Hard Problem’, 
Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (4) (1996), p.344. 
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secondary literature on Merleau-Ponty in order to help one to come to terms with his 
subtle views.  
However, a danger lurks for the unwary in some of the recent literature, as 
there is a tendency amongst Anglophone philosophers who discuss Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology as an explicitly philosophical position to misunderstand his views. 
And this brings us to our second critical target. This target is recent readings in the 
Anglophone scholarship that misunderstand key aspects of his position. Three 
aspects I have identified that are in need of a corrective reading are his account of the 
phenomenological reduction, the nature of his transcendentalism and his conception 
of dialectics. Let us introduce the problems that will be addressed. 
 
3.2.1 Problem 1: Phenomenological Reduction 
In recent Anglophone literature there has been a variety of interpretations of 
Merleau-Ponty’s account of the phenomenological reduction, making the secondary 
literature on the subject at times confusing. In order to dispel this confusion I will 
subject some of these readings to criticism. Explaining why they go wrong will help 
to clarify Merleau-Ponty’s conception. The alternate reading that I present both 
avoids these errors and is, I shall argue, more consistent with Merleau-Ponty’s 
characterisation in Phenomenology of Perception. 
Taylor Carman and Stephen Priest, for example, argue that Merleau-Ponty's 
account of human existence as ‘being-in-the-world’ necessitates a rejection of the 
epoché as a core part of his method. However, as I will argue, this view is mistaken 
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and a close reading indicates that Merleau-Ponty does not reject the epoché or 
phenomenological reduction; rather, he reconceives them and advances his own 
modified version intended to overcome the problems he see as inherent in Husserl’s 
version.  
Likewise, Joel Smith and Stephen Priest interpret the epoché as consisting of 
a ‘second-order act of parenthesising, or neutralising’, performed on ‘the general 
thesis of the natural attitude’, which is a ‘first-order judgement’70. Against this view I 
argue that Merleau-Ponty does not hold that the natural attitude rests only on the 
positing of a propositional ‘general thesis’ that might be ‘neutralised’ in this fashion. 
Rather, his view is that although the ‘putting in abeyance’ of ‘the assertions arising 
out of the natural attitude’ is a necessary condition for overturning the natural 
attitude, it is not a sufficient one. This is because this approach alone does not 
identify the unique status of our natural attitude as a ‘kind of “faith”’ – a kind of 
primitive perceptual understanding that is so fundamental that it is the condition of 
the possibility for us either holding, denying or bracketing any of our propositional 
beliefs.  
 
3.2.2 Problem 2: Transcendentalism 
A mistake that some philosophers make is that they tend to be misled by the 
fact that Merleau-Ponty uses a transcendental methodology and also denies realism, 
claims that prompt their misreading of his work as form of idealism. This misreading 
                                                
70 Smith, ‘Merleau-Ponty and the Phenomenological Reduction’, p.559. 
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allows them to misrepresent the nature of his phenomenological ontology and thus to 
misrepresent the nature of its challenge to scientistic naturalism. For example, some 
scientistic naturalists have hastily characterised his position as a ‘traditional’ 
idealism. This view can be seen, for example, in John Searle’s recent suggestion that 
Merleau-Ponty ‘is an idealist in a rather traditional sense’71.  
Unlike Searle, others give Merleau-Ponty an attentive reading and claim that 
his position must be understood through its relationship to Kant’s and that it is, as 
Sebastian Gardner puts it, ‘a new kind of transcendental idealism’72. In this vein 
Thomas Baldwin claims that Merleau-Ponty’s transcendental approach to philosophy 
‘is not that of a “pure” subject of consciousness’ but is instead ‘an idealism which 
gives a special status to the body as that for which there is a perceived world’73.  
One of the main difficulties that these interpreters of Merleau-Ponty have is 
in understanding the role that a transcendental methodology plays in Merleau-
Ponty’s philosophy. In Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty describes his 
method as being at base phenomenological but also importantly involving the ‘taking 
up a transcendental attitude’. His lack of a detailed discussion in Phenomenology of 
Perception of what this transcendental dimension involves can certainly serve to 
foster confusion. It is just such confusion that arises in the interpretation of his 
position by the aforementioned readers of Merleau-Ponty. In order to dispel the 
                                                
71 John Searle, ‘The Phenomenological Illusion’ in Experience and Analysis: proceedings of the 27th 
International Wittgenstein Symposium, 8th to 14th August 2004, Kirchberg am Wechsel (Vienna: 
ÖBV & HPT, 2005). p.29. Naomi Eilan has also recently claimed that Merleau-Ponty's theory of 
perceptual content ‘yield(s) frank idealism': Naomi Eilan, 'Consciousness and the Self', in The Body 
and the Self, José Luis Bermúdez, Anthony Marcel, and Naomi Eilan (eds.) (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1998), p.353. 
72 Gardner, ‘Merleau-Ponty's Transcendental Theory of Perception’, p.16. 
73 Baldwin, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, p.6; cf. also: Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, p.76. 
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confusion contained within these readings of Merleau-Ponty it will be a key goal of 
my ‘counter-reading’ to explore and clarify the nature of his transcendentalism and 
to argue why it is that these readers misinterpret his position. Merleau-Ponty’s 
transcendentalism does not imply idealism. I will argue instead that they misread him 
because they bring him too close to Kant, overlooking the significance of the 
existential dimension of his thought. 
In order to properly grasp his existential phenomenology as a fully 
ontological position we need to understand how his position both powerfully 
critiques the tradition of transcendental idealism and nevertheless incorporates a 
transcendental methodology. It is only through an account of his break with this 
tradition that the full significance of his position can come into view and hence the 
full scope of its challenge to scientistic naturalism be made apparent.  
  
3.2.3 Problem 3: Dialectics 
Another crucial dimension of Merleau-Ponty’s position that is either 
misunderstood or incompletely understood is his incorporation of the Hegelian 
concept of dialectics. The fact that Merleau-Ponty has a dialectical approach is 
discussed in recent Anglophone literature. However, it is never explicitly clarified 
how his regular and varying usages of the term hang together, and this dimension of 
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his thought is often discussed briefly, with some authors even explicating his position 
without mentioning it74. 
Merleau-Ponty himself does not provide an explicit discussion of his 
appropriation and use of the concept of dialectics. Given this, a reconstruction of the 
rationale of that appropriation will help to make clear both what that conception 
amounts to and why recent scholars in the Anglophone tradition have failed to grasp 
the full significance of his conception of an ‘existential dialectics’. 
Taking Merleau-Ponty’s references to Hegel and dialectics in 
Phenomenology of Perception seriously is fraught with interpretative difficulties. 
For, like Merleau-Ponty’s other appropriated terms (e.g. ‘phenomenological 
reduction’, ‘transcendental’), the term ‘dialectics’ is substantially reconfigured in the 
process of its importation into an ‘existential dialectics’. This conception is all too 
easily misunderstood if the language of dialectics that he uses is interpreted through 
the lens of its traditional meaning in Hegelian phenomenology and not properly 
situated in the framework of his existential ontology. 
Many recent readers of Merleau-Ponty struggle to articulate his complex 
conception. Taylor Carman, for example, points out the way in which Merleau-Ponty 
uses a distinctive general strategy of argument: ‘a deliberately nonadversarial 
dialectical strategy’75. However, he does not tell us whether or not this general 
strategy of argument applies uniformly across the board in all areas of Merleau-
                                                
74 See, for example: Hammond, Howarth and Keat, Understanding Phenomenology; Romdenh-
Romluc, Merleau-Ponty and Phenomenology of Perception; Macann, Four phenomenological 
philosophers; Cerbone, Understanding Phenomenology. 
75 Carman, Merleau-Ponty, p.27. 
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Ponty’s theory, implying, by not qualifying, that it does. Carman also discusses 
Merleau-Ponty’s conception of a dialectic operating at the level of culture and 
history without saying whether or how his general dialectical strategy of argument 
links up with his claims about the dialectical structure of historical experience76. Nor 
does he mention the relation between Merleau-Ponty’s usage and Hegel’s usage. 
As mentioned, the basic issue is that the authors I discuss tend talk about the 
use of dialectics in different aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s theory without explaining 
how they hang together. For example, they talk about a dialectical relation between 
body and world that expresses the way in which humans and the world are intricately 
‘intertwined’77. Or, as we saw with Dreyfus earlier, they talk about the ‘feedback 
structure’ by which ‘past experience is projected back into the perceptual world of 
the learner and shows up as affordances or solicitations to further action’ in terms of 
a ‘dialectic of milieu and action’78 – a dialectic operating at the level of perceptual 
subject and environment that structures the perceived world. But these authors do not 
specify what Merleau-Ponty means by dialectic in any detail or, again, its relation 
with Hegel’s usage.  
When we do see authors attempting to grasp Merleau-Ponty’s notion of 
dialectics in more detail they fail to capture the originality of Merleau-Ponty’s view.  
For example, Stephen Priest undertakes several interesting discussions around 
Merleau-Ponty’s use of Hegelian themes without managing to present a coherent 
                                                
76 Carman, Merleau-Ponty, p.171. 
77 Dermot Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology, (London: Routledge. 2000), p.404. 
78 Dreyfus, ‘Merleau-Ponty and Recent Cognitive Science’, p.132. 
Merleau-Ponty quote from Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.129. 
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statement as to how Merleau-Ponty understands his use of dialectics to be reconciled 
with his existential ontology. When explicating certain key Merleau-Pontian ideas 
Priest even offers his reader a dual reading: a ‘quasi Heideggerean’ interpretation and 
a ‘quasi Hegelian’ interpretation79. John Russon, on the other hand, takes a different 
tack, asserting that ‘the Phenomenology of Perception can … with equal legitimacy, 
be called a book of Hegelian or Husserlian (or, for that matter, Heideggerean) 
phenomenology’80. This claim suggests that Merleau-Ponty’s use of dialectics is 
essentially in accord with Hegel’s, which, as I will demonstrate, is not the case. 
Given these less than cohering views, it might be reasonable to be sceptical as to 
whether a coherent picture of Merleau-Ponty’s account is possible. As such, I intend 
to give an account of Merleau-Ponty’s appropriation of the term in order to sort out 
the type of view that he is arguing for. 
By providing an explicit interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s account I will 
show how dialectics is crucial to his view, how he understands himself to have 
integrated the concept of dialectics within the context of an existential ontology, and 
why recent scholarship has failed to grasp how dialectics and existentialism come 
together in his conception of an ‘existential dialectic’. The view that we arrive at is 
that Merleau-Ponty’s position involves three interrelated dialectical structures. The 
first is a dialectical strategy of argument embodied in the methodological structure of 
his critique of Intellectualism and Empiricism81 in Phenomenology of Perception. 
This method structures his analyses in Phenomenology of Perception in terms of a 
                                                
79 Priest, Merleau-Ponty, p.49. 
80 Russon, ‘Dialectic, Difference and the Other’, pp.32-33. 
81 I have chosen to follow the convention used by Sebastian Gardner in capitalising Merleau-Ponty’s 
technical terms Empericism and Intellectualism in order to denote his distinct usage.  
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‘dialectic of objective thought’ that opens us up to a dialectical structure at the level 
of ontology. At this deeper level Merleau-Ponty uses existential-dialectical 
categories to express the most basic ontological structures: the ‘body-subject’ and 
‘being-in-the-world’. Merleau-Ponty advocates the use of dialectics as the model of 
reason and meaning appropriate to the ontological level and, hence, it provides the 
‘logical structure’ of these fundamental ontological categories. The third usage sits in 
between these two, expressing the reciprocal nature of the relationship between the 
individual and their cultural and historical context.  
 
4. The Structure of the Thesis 
The aim of the thesis is to demonstrate the full philosophical import of 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological ontology through an explication of his method 
and of the claims that he arrives at via this method. In terms of its argumentative 
trajectory, the thesis contains a three-step movement. The first step starts with a 
critical intervention into the ‘naturalisation of phenomenology’ question that is raised 
by the uses of Merleau-Ponty in ‘post-cognitivist’ cognitive science. The second 
addresses the question of the correct interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical 
position and method, specifically critiquing recent claims regarding his 
phenomenological method, his transcendentalism and use of dialectics. And, finally, 
the third step moves to consider some problems attending Merleau-Ponty’s central 
thesis of ‘the primacy of perception’, suggesting a response to overcome these 
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difficulties that retains the core of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the lived 
body. 
The linchpin that holds this three-step movement, and thus the thesis, together 
is the reading of Merleau-Ponty that is laid out chapters 1 and 2, but is further 
developed through the critical interpretation and analysis of chapters 3 and 4. This 
reading explicates the distinctive way in which Merleau-Ponty’s position is a 
phenomenological ontology that draws heavily on Heidegger’s ‘existential analytic 
of Dasein’. The reading is intended to function as a ‘counter-reading’ with respect to 
its two mains targets (scientistic appropriations of Merleau-Ponty and recent 
philosophical misreadings). 
To summarise, the basic structure of the argument against our first target – 
scientistic appropriations of Merleau-Ponty – is that: 
1. Rather than being convergent with ‘scientistic’ forms of naturalism, his 
position is in fact explicitly and deeply critical of the philosophical 
presuppositions of the general program of the cognitive sciences and 
scientistic philosophy of mind. 
2. Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy shows us that there is a way to realise a 
naturalistic turn other than the scientistic approach which underpins the 
recent inter-disciplinary program of the cognitive sciences, as well as 
cognitive science-inspired philosophy of mind (the attempt to bridge the 
‘explanatory gap’ that exists between phenomenological accounts and 
scientific models of consciousness). 
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3. Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical position refuses the possibility of 
‘naturalisation’, as conceived in the ‘naturalisation of phenomenology’ 
debate, because ‘naturalisation’ here involves the explicit or implicit 
advocacy of a scientific realist ontology, which he holds as being premised on 
a philosophical mistake. 
4. It is Merleau-Ponty’s objective in Phenomenology of Perception to 
convince his reader of the conceptual confusion at the core of the scientistic 
project, and to argue in favour of a methodology that is both 
phenomenological and transcendental, and for an ontology that is 
‘existential’, as the appropriate way to clear up this confusion. 
The basic structure of the argument against my second target – recent 
philosophical misreadings of Merleau-Ponty in the Anglophone scholarship – is that: 
1. These authors either misunderstand the method, the transcendental 
dimension or the dialectical aspect that underpins Merleau-Ponty’s thought. 
2. On the issue of method, they misconstrue Merleau-Ponty’s conception of 
phenomenological reduction, reading him through either Husserl or 
Heidegger. Whereas, his unique method sees the reduction as involving a 
purgative operation that seeks to eliminate the objectivism of the natural 
attitude at its root in the structure of perception itself. 
3. On the issue of transcendentalism, the authors misconstrue his use of a 
transcendental method as necessitating ‘a new kind of transcendental 
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idealism’. But his existential phenomenology is in fact a transcendental anti-
realism, which rejects the Kantian epistemological problematic that gives rise 
to the traditional the realism-idealism debate.     
4. On the issue of dialectics, the sense in which his philosophy is dialectical is 
either misconstrued or incompletely construed: misconstrued, as a result of 
reading him too closely to Hegel; or incompletely construed, as a result of 
focusing on one aspect of his use of dialectics without properly relating it to 
others. Both of these problems result from failing to fully appreciate the way 
in which the universal phenomenological constraint on Merleau-Ponty’s 
dialectical thinking makes it an ‘existential dialectic’ – a dialectic within the 
bounds of ‘the principle of phenomenology’.  
5. This confusion is dispelled by realising that Merleau-Ponty has three 
dominant senses of dialectic. The first sense refers to the methodological 
structure of his critique of Intellectualism and Empiricism in Phenomenology 
of Perception, a dialectic of ‘objective thought’. The second, ontological, 
usage of the term dialectics refers to the model of reason and meaning 
appropriate to the ontological level, providing the ‘logical structure’ of his 
fundamental ontological categories (‘body-subject’ and ‘being-in the-world’). 
The third usage expresses the reciprocal nature of the relationship between 
the individual and their cultural and historical context. 
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6. The misunderstandings of his method, transcendentalism and dialectics are 
due to the fact that these authors have not grasped the full originality of his 
existential position. 
7. In order to fully grasp this originality we need to understand: 
a) the way that Merleau-Ponty reconceptualises the phenomenological 
reduction; 
b) how his position powerfully critiques the tradition of transcendental 
idealism yet incorporates a transcendental methodology; and 
c) the way in which Merleau-Ponty incorporates the Hegelian concept 
of dialectics within a Heidegger-inspired ontological framework.  
To conclude this introductory chapter I will briefly describe the content of 
subsequent chapters. In chapters 1 and 2 I present an overview of the main 
theoretical innovations contained in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological ontology. I 
begin Chapter 1 with an exploration of his conception of the descriptive method and 
how he contrasts it with scientific explanation and Kantian ‘reflective analysis’. I 
follow this with a discussion of his view of the phenomenological reduction. In this 
discussion I critique several recent interpretations before presenting an alternate 
reading that I argue is more consistent with Merleau-Ponty’s textual claims. 
In Chapter 2 I continue to build my picture with a presentation of how 
Merleau-Ponty sees the taking of a phenomenological approach to philosophy as 
necessitating existentialism – the philosophy of concrete human existence. I do this 
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via an exploration of his account of intentionality and the way that it feeds into his 
concept of ‘existence’ and his exploration of the existential structure of reality. 
Following this, I complete the first step of my argumentative trajectory, contending 
that Merleau-Ponty would hold that the scientistic use to which he has recently been 
put fails to grasp the philosophical significance of his phenomenological account.  
As I have said, there has been some confusion regarding the transcendental 
aspect of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. Should he be read as a transcendental 
philosopher? And if so what kind? In the interest of clarifying this issue I explore the 
question of Merleau-Ponty’s transcendentalism in Chapter 3. This chapter presents 
an account of his position as a methodological transcendentalism that is anti-realist 
but not transcendental idealist. Through an exploration of the implications of his 
damning critique of Intellectualist transcendental philosophy we see why the recent 
claims by Sebastian Gardner and Thomas Baldwin that he is ‘a new kind of 
transcendental idealist’ are mistaken.  
In Chapter 4 I go on to deepen my analysis of Merleau-Ponty’s position via 
an exploration of his appropriation of the key concept of dialectics. The purpose of 
this chapter is to critique the claims of recent interpretations and to deepen our 
understanding of Merleau-Ponty’s existentialism by focusing on the way that he 
critically incorporates the concept of dialectics within his existential ontology.  
And finally, in Chapter 5 I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s thesis of the primacy 
of perception faces a significant problem due to his conception of the 
language/perception relation. This is because he does not see the full significance of 
  Introduction 
 
  47  
the deep linguistic context that is the enabling and conditioning background through 
which phenomenological description necessarily takes place. Despite the fact that we 
can engage in a phenomenology of the pre-predicative level in a way that the results 
of our inquiry can contribute to our epistemological and ontological claims, the 
understanding that we achieve of the pre-personal level is not capable of serving as 
the epistemological foundation of the level of both the objective world of scientific 
discourse and the lifeworld of personal thought and action.  
The central consequence of this, as Joseph Margolis has argued, is that 
Merleau-Ponty’s claim regarding the philosophical significance of the pre-
predicative as ‘originary origin’82 is compromised. Attention to the constitutive role 
of language indicates the need for a revised conception of the ‘originary’. This 
revised conception retains the status of an ‘incompletely penetrable precondition’83. 
However, in encountering the pre-objective we are not thereby encountering the pre-
predicative ‘anterior to all traditions’84 but rather encountering ‘a languaged world’85.  
Furthermore, despite removing the objectivism that grows out of the natural 
attitude, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological reduction does not and cannot remove 
the fact of our necessary situatedness in a received natural language tradition. And it 
is the primary status of this ordinary language form of discourse that Merleau-Ponty 
overlooks in his view of the discourse of the pre-predicative as first-order. As such, I 
                                                
82 Joseph Margolis, ‘Phenomenology and Metaphysics: Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty’, in 
Merleau-Ponty Vivant, M. C. Dillon (ed.) (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1991), 
p.155. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.208. 
85 Margolis, ‘Phenomenology and Metaphysics’, p.155. 
  Introduction 
 
  48  
argue that Merleau-Ponty’s concretised plurality of body-subjects, coupled with the 
argument regarding the deep hermeneutic-linguistic context of lived experience, 
undermines the notion of a singular lifeworld that he tacitly assumes in 
Phenomenology of Perception. As Margolis observes, this view ought to be ‘replaced 
by plural, variable, historicized, open, potentially incommensurable lifeworlds’86.  
This critique suggests grounds for adopting a revised version of Merleau-
Ponty’s position. This revised position involves a full acknowledgement of his 
method as a hermeneutic phenomenology and a revision of his claims about the 
discourse of the pre-predicative as first-order. And although this revised account 
retains his insights about the lived body, perception and the necessary situatedness of 
the subject, the problems with the thesis of the primacy of perception seem to 
necessitate the rejection of the idea of an account of the pre-predicative as capable of 
serving as epistemological ground. As I argue, it is hard to see how it is the pre-
predicative world that is being characterised rather than the pre-predicative as pre-
interpreted through a contextualising linguistic-cultural lifeworld. Therefore, it is 
hard to see how Merleau-Ponty can avoid this revision to the epistemological 
dimension of the primacy of perception thesis. 
 
                                                
86 Ibid. p.175. 
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Chapter 1: Merleau-Ponty’s Existential Phenomenology: 
Theory and Method 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter I begin my exploration of Merleau-Ponty’s main theoretical 
innovations, which centre on his commitment to phenomenology as the fundamental 
method for philosophy. These theoretical innovations develop as a result of his 
attempt to address the issues of ontology inadequately handled in what he refers to in 
Phenomenology of Perception as the ‘Intellectualist’ idealism of Husserl’s position 
in Ideas 1. This development leads him to reformulate Husserl’s central concepts of 
phenomenological reduction and intentionality. His resolutely phenomenological 
approach, coupled with his attempt to provide an answer to the ‘question of being’, 
leads him to assert his two central philosophical theses: the thesis of the 
epistemological primacy of perception and its correlate, the thesis of the ontological 
primacy of phenomena1. 
Although Merleau-Ponty abandons the idea of philosophy as a ‘rigorous 
science’ as Husserl had conceived it, and critiques the ‘Intellectualist’ account of 
perception and the subject, he nevertheless understands himself to be following 
through the ‘phenomenological turn’ in transcendental philosophy initiated by 
Husserl. This chapter contains an outline of Merleau-Ponty’s general position, 
                                                
1 I owe this formulation to M. C. Dillon, Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1988). 
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highlighting key theoretical innovations in his existentialist reconceptualisation of 
transcendental phenomenology. In this chapter I first discuss the fundamental 
contrast he draws between phenomenological description, scientific explanation and 
Kantian ‘reflective analysis’. Secondly, I discuss his view of the phenomenological 
reduction and the key consequences that he sees as following from the attempt to 
operationalise this method. Lastly, as I mentioned in the Introduction, in recent 
Anglophone literature there has been a variety of interpretations of Merleau-Ponty’s 
account of the reduction, making the secondary literature on the subject confusing. In 
order to dispel this confusion it will be necessary to subject these readings to 
criticism. Explaining why they go wrong will help to clarify Merleau-Ponty’s 
conception. The alternate reading that I present both avoids these errors and is, I 
argue, more consistent with Merleau-Ponty’s characterisation in Phenomenology of 
Perception. 
The purpose of the exegesis in this chapter is to present an attentive reading 
of his philosophical position on its own terms, as well as to elucidate both its 
proximity and distance with respect to Intellectualist transcendental philosophy 
(Husserl and Kant) and to scientistic naturalism (what Merleau-Ponty discusses 
under the label ‘Empiricism’). The central part of his method is the 
phenomenological reduction and, as such, it is vital that we avoid the mistakes made 
by recent Merleau-Ponty scholars and get his key methodological procedure right. A 
clear picture of what Merleau-Ponty’s methodological and philosophical claims 
amount to will place us in a strong position to critically situate Merleau-Ponty vis-à-
vis the broader transcendental tradition out of which his work grows. And the 
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progressive development of both my interpretation and argument over chapters 1 to 4 
will serve to formulate a clearer picture of why Merleau-Ponty rejects scientistic 
naturalism, and of his liberal naturalist alternative.  
 
2. Merleau-Ponty’s General Conception of Phenomenological 
Philosophy 
2.1 Phenomenological Description, Scientific Explanation and Reflective 
Analysis 
In Husserl’s original formulation phenomenological description consisted in 
attending to the ‘things’ themselves – the objects that we phenomenally experience – 
with the goal of making systems of ‘apodictic’ statements regarding the essential 
structure of those ‘things’ on the basis of our direct experiential acquaintance with 
them2. These statements are descriptive because they intend to capture this 
experience, and its objects, just as they are ‘intuitively presented’ to the subject. The 
descriptive intent of these statements with reference to what is experienced is 
contrasted with statements about that experience which involve either deductive 
reasoning, the framing of hypotheses, the construction of interpretative frameworks 
                                                
2 ‘Apodictic’ is Husserl’s term designating a property of phenomenological evidence. Apodictic 
evidence is evidence that is indubitable. Statements based on indubitable evidence are, by virtue of 
this, apodictic statements. Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to A Pure Phenomenology and to A 
Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book: General Introduction to A Pure Phenomenology, F. 
Kersten (trans.) (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983) (Henceforth: Ideas 1), p.330. 
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or the construction of theoretical models3. Husserl situated his descriptive method in 
the context of his conception of philosophy as ‘a rigorous science’. In terms of 
descriptive phenomenology he sought to provide a ‘scientifically rigorous’ account 
of the phenomena. And hence his ‘phenomenology’ was a ‘science of the 
phenomena’4. Husserl is using the term science (Wissenschaft) here in the broad 
sense of ‘any rigorous body of knowledge which is open to conclusive confirmation. 
Notably, strict science is to be contrasted with metaphysical speculation’5.  
The conception that Husserl is advocating sees philosophy as the most 
fundamental of all the sciences. Philosophy, in his view, seeks ‘the general aim of 
grounding science absolutely’6, and thus it is the science that grounds all sciences 
(including itself). Unlike the empirical sciences, which presuppose and use certain 
other sciences (for example logic and mathematics), philosophy as the foundational 
science cannot presuppose and use other sciences in this way. In Husserl’s view 
philosophy must be self-grounding. The evidential grounds that philosophy claims 
for itself must be, as he puts it, ‘absolutely ultimate’. That is, a ‘complete and 
ultimate grounding on the basis of absolute insights, insights behind which one 
cannot go back any further’7. For example, in Ideas 1 he asserts that: 
 
                                                
3 See e.g: J. N. Mohanty, Transcendental Phenomenology, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,1989). 
4 Husserl Ideas 1, p.xvii. 
5 Priest, Merleau-Ponty, p.26. 
6 Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, Dorion Cairns (trans.) (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers Group,, 1982), p.8. 
7 Ibid. p.2. 
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Phenomenology, by virtue of its essence, must claim to be ‘first’ philosophy 
and to offer the means for carrying out every possible critique of reason; 
therefore it demands the most perfect freedom from presuppositions and, 
concerning itself, an absolute reflective insight. It is of its own essence to 
realize the most perfect clarity concerning its own essence and therefore also 
concerning the principles of its method.8 
So philosophy is ‘the one all-inclusive science’, whose ‘systematic unity’ is to 
provide the philosophical foundation for the all the other sciences. For ‘only within 
the systematic unity of philosophy can they develop into genuine sciences’9. 
In Merleau-Ponty’s account, on the other hand, phenomenological description 
functions as the primary means to expose the misconceptions involved in the claims 
of systematic scientific philosophy of the kind Husserl advocates. He also uses the 
descriptive method to critique the philosophical implications of a scientific approach 
in the sense of an empirical and objective study of a ‘world of objects’ and their 
external causal relations. The claims of Husserlian philosophical science, as well as 
the implicit philosophical beliefs that the empirical sciences rest on, are undermined, 
he argues, by what we discover through a systematic description of the structure of 
our lived experience situated in the context in which we live it – what Husserl called 
the ‘lifeworld’ (Lebenswelt). 
                                                
8 Husserl Ideas 1, p.148. 
9 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p.1. 
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Now, despite this emphasis on the description of the content and structure of 
lived conscious experience, Merleau-Ponty incorporates the descriptive methodology 
of phenomenology within a fully ontological theory. This phenomenological 
ontology he refers to as existential ontology10. However, in the Preface to 
Phenomenology of Perception he is at pains to emphasise that phenomenology is 
essentially a descriptive enterprise. For example, the phenomenologist, he asserts: 
… tries to give a direct description of our experience as it is, without taking 
account of its psychological origin and the causal explanations which the 
scientist, the historian or the sociologist may be able to provide11. 
The methodological contrast he most emphasises is that between the descriptive 
method and scientific explanation, on the one hand, and the critical ‘reflective 
analysis’ of the Kantian tradition on the other. The term ‘reflective analysis’ is a 
translation of Merleau-Ponty’s ‘analyse reflexive’12. What Merleau-Ponty has in 
mind when he uses this term is immediately informed by a philosophical position 
that was dominant in France prior to the Second World War. This neo-Kantian 
approach, exemplified in the work of Leon Brunschvicg, Alain (the pseudonym of 
Émile-Auguste Chartier) and P. Lachièze-Rey, asserts the idealist view that: 
 
                                                
10 This path of an ontological reinterpretation of the phenomenological method was already laid down 
by Husserl in Ideas 1 and, crucially for the direction that Merleau-Ponty takes, by Heidegger in Being 
and Time.  
11 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.vii. 
12 This is also translated as ‘analytical reflection’ in the English translation. 
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… we have to get altogether outside the world, to a transcendental subject, an 
‘inner self’ or a ‘pure Ego’, in order to find something which can use the 
resources of reason and abstract intuition to make sense of experience and 
thereby give meaning to a world in which it ends up locating itself as a mere 
‘empirical’ self13.  
The method by which the philosopher achieves insight regarding the existence and 
nature of the ‘transcendental subject’ that constitutes the world of empirical 
experience is called a ‘transcendental deduction’. It is so called because it operates 
via a process of deduction from our empirical experience back to the necessary 
structures that are said to constitute this experience. As we do not experience these 
structures – or the ‘pure ego’ that is the putative source of these structures – they are 
not empirical, they are transcendental. Hence we need a transcendental deduction in 
order to lay them bare.  
The descriptive method, by contrast, concentrates its efforts on ‘re-achieving 
a direct and primitive contact with the world, and endowing that contact with a 
philosophical status’14. This procedure is primarily ‘a matter of describing, not of 
explaining or analysing’15, though to give a descriptive account it may be necessary 
to engage in reflection in order to help access experiential contents or structures that 
are not immediately transparent. Nonetheless, this kind of reflection in the service of 
description does not affect the contrast between phenomenological description, 
                                                
13 Baldwin, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, p.12. 
14 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.vii. 
15 Ibid. p.ix. 
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‘reflective analysis’ (transcendental deduction) and ‘scientific explanation’ because 
what it helps us to ‘see’ is – if phenomenologically genuine – describable in its own 
right. 
With respect to scientific explanation in the natural and human sciences 
Merleau-Ponty argues that: 
Scientific points of view, according to which my existence is a moment of the 
world’s, are always both naïve and at the same time dishonest, because they 
take for granted, without explicitly mentioning it, the other point of view, 
namely that of consciousness, through which from the outset a world forms 
itself round me and begins to exist for me. To return to things themselves is 
to return to that world which precedes knowledge, of which knowledge 
always speaks, and in relation to which every scientific schematisation is an 
abstract and derivative sign-language, as is geography in relation to the 
country-side in which we have learnt beforehand what a forest, a prairie or a 
river is16.  
Thus, on Merleau-Ponty’s view, the phenomenological approach consists ‘from the 
start’ in ‘a foreswearing of science17’.  
When a philosopher takes up a fully phenomenological perspective he must 
describe the structure of his experience in a way that does not apply, or in any way 
                                                
16 Ibid. pp.ix-x. 
17 Ibid. p.ix. 
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rely on, theoretical explanations drawn from the natural or human sciences. With 
respect to the human sciences, says Merleau-Ponty, a phenomenological approach 
reveals that:  
I am not the outcome or the meeting-point of numerous causal agencies 
which determine my bodily or psychological make-up. I cannot conceive 
myself as nothing but a bit of the world, a mere object of biological, 
psychological or sociological investigation18.  
What a descriptive approach reveals is that human experience cannot be given an 
adequate account on the model of objects, as ‘another bit of the world’ as Merleau-
Ponty puts it. To discuss human experience as ‘the outcome or the meeting-point of 
numerous causal agencies’ cannot qualify as a legitimate descriptive account of what 
that experience is actually like. This is because, in a Humean vein, we do not literally 
experience this causality but nor can we understand ourselves, either 
phenomenologically or existentially, in terms of causality. Thus it is an explanatory 
construct that we impose onto our experience, not a description of that experience as 
it is – as it is intuitively given to us. It is this kind of theoretical imposition on to the 
more basic level of lived experience that is constitutive of empirical scientific 
theorising. Thus, from his phenomenological perspective, Merleau-Ponty holds that 
any attempt to understand consciousness, or the human level of meaningful 
intentional experience, on the model of physical objects standing in causal relations 
                                                
18 Ibid. p.ix. 
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is doomed to failure. This is because such ‘causal’ and ‘objective’ thinking must 
mischaracterise our experience in order to fit it into its framework. 
A phenomenological approach must go underneath these types of theoretical 
constructs by practicing a methodological rejection of them. Importantly for 
Merleau-Ponty, given existentialism’s focus on human existence, this means that if 
we are to explore the question of human existence through a descriptive 
phenomenology the conception of human existence that arises out of both the human 
and natural sciences must not be allowed to intrude in any way. He is at pains to 
emphasise his distance from these views by stressing that there is a transcendental 
dimension to his phenomenological enquiry, and to his notion of human existence, 
that these scientistic approaches completely lack. Thus, he asserts that from a 
phenomenological perspective: 
 I am, not a ‘living creature’ nor even a ‘man’, nor again even ‘a 
consciousness’ endowed with all the characteristics which zoology, social 
anatomy or inductive psychology recognize in these various products of the 
natural or historical process – I am the absolute source, my existence does not 
stem from my antecedents, from my physical and social environment; instead 
it moves out towards them and sustains them …19  
 
                                                
19 Ibid. p.ix. 
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These statements about the relation between any kind of scientific claims and the 
procedure of phenomenological description, and how this procedure necessitates a 
different concept of existence, are intended to draw our attention to the primordial 
character of the phenomenological level of description. In the assertion of any 
scientific claim, he argues, we ‘take for granted, without explicitly mentioning it, the 
… point of view … of consciousness, through which from the outset a world forms 
itself round me and begins to exist for me’. In doing this we fail to see how ‘the 
whole universe of science is built upon the world as directly experienced’20.  
Scientific approaches to philosophy consist in theoretical abstractions that 
have their basis in our primary lived experience. Any conception of the scientific 
‘universe’ is derivative from the phenomenological ‘perceived world’ and, therefore, 
the validity of all scientific claims must ultimately rest on an account of the 
experience from which they are abstracted. As such, the only way to arrive at an 
accurate assessment of the ‘meaning and scope’ of the sciences, Merleau-Ponty 
argues, is by ‘reawakening the basic experience of the world of which science is the 
second-order expression’21. And it is the job of the phenomenological method to 
facilitate this ‘reawakening’. The overall goal is to give this reawakened basic level 
of experience a ‘philosophical status’.  
 As well as being intended to ‘exclude … scientific explanation’, says 
Merleau-Ponty, this methodological ‘demand for pure description’ is ‘equally’ 
                                                
20 Ibid. p.ix. 
21 Ibid. p.ix. 
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intended to exclude the procedures of ‘reflective analysis’22 – the transcendental 
deductions employed in Kantian transcendental idealism. So, despite its focus on 
consciousness, he argues that his philosophy is ‘absolutely distinct from the idealist 
return to consciousness’23. For in his view the moves of idealists, like Kant and the 
Husserl of Ideas 1, involve an exaggerated prioritisation of consciousness that 
eliminates the ‘bilateral’ relationship between consciousness and world. And the 
reason for this is that it unjustifiably overemphasises the constitutive role of the 
subject with respect to the world of our lived experience24.  
Merleau-Ponty argues that Kant clearly represents an improvement over 
empirical scientific thinking because he recognises the foundational and irreducible 
role of the subject of experience. Nevertheless, in line with the phenomenological 
dimension of his work, he argues that Kantian ‘reflective analysis’ is inadequate 
because it: 
… starts from our experience of the world and goes back to the subject as to a 
condition of possibility distinct from that experience, revealing the all-
embracing synthesis as that without which there would be no world. To this 
                                                
22 Ibid. p.x. 
23 Ibid. p.x. 
24 Merleau-Ponty’s association of Husserl with the position he characterises as Intellectualism 
concerns what he sees as a strong Intellectualist strain running through Husserl’s thought. He does 
not, however, claim that Husserl fits all the criteria for Intellectualism. Rather, Husserl’s Intellectualist 
presuppositions are in conflict with the results yielded through his phenomenological method – the 
phenomenology of the lived body and of perception. Merleau-Ponty’s view is that ‘to all appearances’ 
the ‘programme of a transcendental phenomenology’ is in line with ‘the ordinary perspective of a 
transcendental philosophy’. However, ‘Husserl’s originality lies beyond the notion of intentionality’ 
and ‘is to be found in the elaboration of this notion and in the discovery, beneath the intentionality of 
representations, of a deeper intentionality …’ Thus Husserl’s thought has strong Intellectualist 
elements but is pulled in the direction of existentialism by the implications of this ‘deeper 
intentionality’.  
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extent it ceases to remain part of our experience and offers, in place of an 
account, a reconstruction25. 
A phenomenological approach, on the other hand, criticises Kant’s reconstruction of 
experience and the ‘faculty psychology’ that instantiates it. The phenomenological 
approach urges in place of Kant’s analysis of the object of experience – ‘which bases 
the world on the synthesizing activity of the subject’ – Husserl’s conception of the 
object as it is experienced. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, a ‘noematic reflection’ which 
remains within the object and, instead of begetting it, brings to light its fundamental 
unity’26.  
Here Merleau-Ponty is using the Husserlian terminology of the ‘noesis’ and 
the ‘noema’. In Ideas 1 Husserl characterises the act of consciousness (e.g. 
perceiving) as the ‘noesis’, or the ‘noetic’ component of the intentional phenomenon, 
while he refers to the intentional object (e.g. the object as perceived) as the ‘noema’, 
or the ‘noematic’ component of the intentional phenomenon. This is not a 
terminology Merleau-Ponty adopts in general. He simply uses it to draw a contrast 
between a Kantian reconstruction of experience and the phenomenologist’s 
descriptive account. What he emphasises is the way that the phenomenologist 
‘remains within the object’ (i.e. ‘the perceived’ as perceived), bringing to light its 
‘fundamental unity’ as an actual, phenomenologically encountered ‘object’. 
Whatever unity the object can be said to contain is revealed through the way that we 
                                                
25 Ibid. p.x. 
26 Ibid. p.x. 
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progressively encounter the object in our interaction with it. For example, our 
conscious experience of a table involves a flow of successive perceptual ‘profiles’ 
that are progressively synthesised and unified in such a way that we grasp the 
multiplicity of successive profiles as presenting a numerically identical object. Thus 
the concept of unity involved is that of a synthetic ‘phenomenal unity’ because it 
does not exceed that unity which is revealed through the procedure of 
phenomenological investigation. 
In recapturing the fundamental unity of the object the emphasis on noematic 
description, argues Merleau-Ponty, serves to block the Kantian move to unjustifiably 
over-emphasise the constitutive role of the subject at the expense of objects and the 
world. For what the emphasis on noematic description helps us to see is that the 
world is fundamentally not, and could not possibly be, the construct of the ego’s 
cognitive ‘constituting power’. Rather, the world is ‘always already there before 
reflection begins – as an inalienable presence’27. As such: 
… it would be artificial to make it the outcome of a series of syntheses which 
link, in the first place sensations, then aspects of the object corresponding to 
different perspectives, when both are nothing but products of analysis, with 
no sort of prior reality28. 
                                                
27 Ibid. p.xii. 
28 Ibid. p.x. 
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Kantian philosophy of this kind for Merleau-Ponty involves a ‘reflective analysis’ 
that ‘loses sight of its own beginning’. As such it proceeds through an overly 
abstracted reflection that is ‘carried off by itself’ and that ‘installs itself in an 
impregnable subjectivity, as yet untouched by being and time’29. Merleau-Ponty 
argues that what it fails to see is the crucial way in which, ‘when I begin to reflect 
my reflection bears upon an unreflective experience’30. What this means is that our 
very capacity to abstractedly reflect in the fashion of Kantian philosophy rests upon 
our more primary capacities of perception and action – capacities we have in virtue 
of being essentially embodied subjects. These capacities are manifested in our basic 
‘bodily’ intentionality. For Merleau-Ponty we are not simply objects with the 
property of consciousness, as a scientific approach would suggest, but rather are 
what he calls a ‘lived body’. This is a phenomenological concept of ‘the body as we 
live it’. As a ‘lived body’ we are neither pure subject nor pure object but rather 
experience a richly meaningful intentional ‘world’, resting on our basic bodily level 
awareness of, and responsiveness to, our environmental context. This basic 
intentionality consists of unreflected-upon but nevertheless meaningful relationships 
that manifest themselves through the ‘phenomenal field’ that takes shape as the 
context of our active exploration of the world. The phenomenal field is Merleau-
Ponty’s term for the meaningful field of experience that is constituted and 
reconstituted for us in a progressive and ongoing way as a result of our bodily 
interactions with the world. In critiquing the way in which both empirical scientific 
                                                
29 Ibid. p.xi. 
30 Ibid. p.xi. 
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and Intellectualist approaches misdescribe and misunderstand the body and the 
perceived world, argues Merleau-Ponty, phenomenology ‘open[s] up a phenomenal 
field … and suggest[s] the rediscovery of a direct experience which must be … 
assigned its place in relation to scientific knowledge … and philosophical 
reflection’31. The Empiricist approach misunderstands perception because it tries to 
theorise it around the concept of ‘sensation’ as the basic unit of experience. But, as 
Merleau-Ponty points out, this must fail because it is without phenomenological 
warrant. The most basic structure of perceptual experience is a figure/ground gestalt: 
‘The perceptual “something” is always in the middle of something else, it always 
forms part of a “field”’32. The ‘sensation’, by contrast, is an atomistic abstraction 
from this basic configuration. The Intellectualist approach, on the other hand, 
misunderstands perception because it attempts to model perception on judgement, 
where to perceive an object is to synthesise a set of sensations under a category. With 
Kant, it holds the view that ‘intuitions without concepts are blind’33. However, this 
model makes it is impossible to see how there could ever be a perceptual error of the 
kind that we actually encounter in our lived perceptual experience. This is because 
by building thought (judgement) into the very constitution of the perceptual object as 
                                                
31 Ibid. p.62. 
32 Ibid. p.4. 
33 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, N. Kemp Smith (trans.) (2nd edition, London: 
Macmillan, 1933), B 75. 
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an object Intellectualists in effect collapse the distinction between our perception and 
our beliefs about our perception34. As Merleau-Ponty puts it:  
… if we see what we judge, how can we distinguish between true and 
false perception? How will it then be possible to say that the sufferer 
from hallucinations or the madman ‘think they see what they do not 
see’? Where will be the difference between ‘seeing’ and ‘thinking one 
sees’? 35 
Fundamentally then, both Empiricism and Intellectualism are misleading because 
they try to conceptually ‘construct the shape of the world … perception [and] the 
mind, instead of recognizing as the immanent source and as the final authority of our 
knowledge of such things, the experience we have of them’36. 
For Merleau-Ponty, the idea of the world as being correlative with the acts of 
consciousness – the idea of intentionality – is now interpreted to mean that the world 
neither determines consciousness (Empiricism), nor is it simply constructed by the 
transcendental ego in the sense of giving form to the matter of experience 
(Intellectualism). He argues that the world has ‘priority over’ the operations of a 
reflecting ‘I’ but nevertheless that ‘the world … is given to the subject because the 
subject is given to himself’37. The subject is ‘given to himself’ not as an absolute 
                                                
34 For a particularly clear reconstruction of Merleau-Ponty’s critique of Empiricism and 
Intellectualism see: Carman, Merleau-Ponty, pp.34-61. 
35 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.40. 
36 Maurice Merleau-Ponty quoted in Carman, Merleau-Ponty, p.53 (Carman trans.). 
37 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.xi. 
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reflecting ego but as a ‘relative and prepersonal’38 bodily subject who, by virtue of 
his concrete embodiment, is ‘a subject destined to the world’39. Merleau-Ponty 
observes: I am a bodily subject who is ‘from the start outside myself and open to [a] 
world’40 that is ‘always already there’ before ‘any possible analysis of mine’41.  
We are open to the world through our basic pre-reflective perceptual 
experience – our bodily intentionality – which is our fundamental access to the real. 
Given this, Merleau-Ponty asserts that ‘the real has to be described, not constructed 
or formed’42. Only those ‘forms’ (‘structures’) that are discernible 
phenomenologically are to count. It follows from this approach, Merleau-Ponty 
argues, that the Intellectualists are mistaken to ‘put perception into the same category 
as the syntheses represented by judgements, acts or predications’43. The 
Intellectualists claim that the fact that we see objects as unified things, and not 
simply mere clusters of qualities, is a result of the application of the concept of 
substance to the ‘manifold’ of sensation provided passively by the senses. Kant, for 
example, says that:  
… all synthesis, through which even perception itself becomes possible, 
stands under the categories, and since experience is cognition through 
                                                
38 Ibid. p.322. 
39 Ibid. p.xii. 
40 Ibid. p.530. 
41 Ibid. p.x. 
42 Ibid. p.xi. 
43 Ibid. 
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connected perceptions, the categories are conditions of the possibility of 
experience44.  
But Merleau-Ponty counters this with his phenomenology of the structure of our 
actual lived perceptual experience. And this exploration indicates, as he puts it, that 
‘perception is not a science of the world, it is not even an act, a deliberate taking up 
of a position; it is the background from which all acts stand out, and is presupposed 
by them’45.  
 
3. The Phenomenological Reduction and its Consequences 
Although Husserl is a constant reference point in the explication of his 
phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty does not work out his method via a close and 
detailed critical analysis of Husserl’s ideas. As Herbert Spiegelberg has observed 
regarding Merleau-Ponty’s account of the phenomenological method:  
… there is no clear reference to Husserl’s reductions nor any attempt to 
parallel any of Husserl’s specific descriptions. Merleau-Ponty’s technique 
seems to have been developed without special consideration of Husserl’s 
methods, simply in an attempt to do justice to the phenomena at hand46. 
                                                
44 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B161. 
45 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.xi. 
46 Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, 3rd rev. and enlarged edition, (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), p.554. 
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For Merleau-Ponty, ‘phenomenology is accessible only through a phenomenological 
method’47. And it is the phenomenological reduction which he holds is the central 
methodological insight of phenomenology. In Merleau-Ponty’s view, the concept of 
intentionality has often been mistakenly cited as the main discovery of 
phenomenology, but intentionality ‘is understandable only through the reduction48’. 
His point here is that the reduction is the procedure that facilitates our description of 
our intentional experience just as it is, and thus we can only truly grasp the nature of 
intentionality with the aid of the reduction.  
Husserl’s version of the reduction consists in a methodological demand for a 
‘change of attitude’, a change from what he calls the ‘natural attitude’ to that of the 
‘transcendental-phenomenological attitude’. This shift in attitude is intended to take 
us from the perspective of viewing the world as we normally do as a mind-
independent ‘real world’, to viewing this self-same world in terms of a constitutive 
achievement of subjectivity. This methodological strategy involves what he calls an 
‘epoché’. To perform the epoché is to ‘bracket’ the ‘general thesis of the natural 
attitude’49, our everyday taken-for-granted attitude whereby we implicitly and 
uncritically ‘posit’ the existence of a subject-independent world of spatio-temporal 
objects50. The phenomenological reduction is called a ‘reduction’ because we are 
said to be ‘reducing’ our awareness, focusing it on the ‘pure’ phenomenal content of 
                                                
47 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.viii. 
48 Ibid. p.xix (italics added). 
49 Also, ‘the general positing which characterises the natural attitude’. Husserl Ideas 1, p.56. 
50 Ibid. p.57. 
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experience. This change in attitude ‘leads our attention back to the subjective 
achievements in which the object as experienced is disclosed in a determinate 
manner …’51 Husserl argues that by bracketing the general thesis of the natural 
attitude we discover ourselves to have access to a self-sufficient sphere of 
consciousness that is an ‘absolutely self-contained realm of purely subjective 
being’52. As he puts it in Cartesian Meditations: the ‘phenomenological epoché lays 
open (to me, the meditating philosopher) an infinite realm of being of a new kind, as 
the sphere of a new kind of experience: transcendental experience’53. It is the 
phenomenologist’s task to give an account of how objects come to be ‘constituted’ 
within the sphere of ‘pure’ intentional consciousness. Given this, Husserl argues that 
the proper object of transcendental phenomenology is a ‘transcendental ego’ and its 
‘meant contents’. 
Merleau-Ponty claims that Husserl misunderstands both the nature and the 
consequences of the phenomenological reduction. Merleau-Ponty argues that when 
we ‘break with our familiar acceptance’ of the world, by attempting to perform the 
Husserlian epoché and phenomenological reduction, we are struck by the fact that 
‘from this break we can learn nothing but the unmotivated upsurge of the world54’. 
By which Merleau-Ponty means that the perceived world is experienced as not 
simply immanent to consciousness, in the Husserlian sense of ‘an ego’ and its ‘meant 
                                                
51 John J. Drummond, Historical Dictionary of Husserl’s Philosophy, (Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow 
Press, 2007), p.12. 
52 Edmund Husserl, ‘Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy’, Ted. E. Klein, Jr. and William 
E. Pohl (trans.), The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, 5 (3) (1974), p.29. 
53 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p.27. 
54 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.xv. 
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contents’, but rather as possessing the character of a brute transcendence as well. 
These are, he asserts, ‘forms of transcendence’ that we constantly encounter in 
bodily perception and that the epoché and reduction does not and cannot eliminate. 
Another way he expresses this is by saying that despite our performance of the 
phenomenological reduction, we cannot but be struck by the primordial fact that the 
world is ‘always already there’ before any act of reflection on our part55.  
As a consequence of this Merleau-Ponty claims that the most important 
lesson that the attempt to perform Husserl’s transcendental-phenomenological 
reduction ought to teach us is, in fact, ‘the impossibility of a complete reduction’56. 
The fact that we cannot achieve this complete reduction to the ‘sphere of the 
transcendental ego’ and its ‘meant contents’, but rather find ourselves confronting 
the ‘unmotivated upsurge of the world’, means that in our phenomenological 
description we simply fail to locate Husserl’s transcendental ego – a pure ego that 
transcends the world – and the putatively self-sufficient sphere of meaning that 
Husserl understands this ego to inhabit. Instead, what we locate is Merleau-Ponty’s 
lived ‘body-subject’. This, he argues, is a pre-personal, bodily ‘natural self’ that is 
necessarily and intimately tied to a world. Thus the meaningful contents and 
structures of experience that the phenomenologist seeks to capture are only 
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articulable in reference to the environment in which the body-subject is necessarily 
immersed: ‘we are through and through relation to the world’57. 
In the Preface to Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty cites a line 
from the Cartesian Meditations to indicate that his own project is continuous with 
what he sees as at the core of Husserl’s phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty, quoting 
Husserl, states: ‘it is that as yet dumb experience … which we are concerned to lead 
to the pure expression of its own meaning’58. His appropriation and endorsement of 
this quote is insightful as it exemplifies how he reads Husserl in terms of what he 
sees as the spirit, as opposed to the letter, of his work. For he views this quote as 
indicating Husserl’s own implicit recognition of the intrinsic worldliness and 
situatedness of consciousness. However, whatever the status of Husserl’s alleged 
implicit recognition, this passage certainly expresses the central goal of Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology. As Ted Toadvine aptly observes: 
This state of continual beginning, of the need for continual re-examination of 
the paradoxical foundations of a reflection that attempts to grasp its own 
unreflective origins, could be considered the orienting theme of Merleau-
Ponty’s own phenomenological method59. 
                                                
57 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ‘What is Phenomenology?’ Ted Toadvine and Leonard Lawlor (trans.) in 
The Merleau-Ponty Reader, Ted Toadvine and Leonard Lawlor (eds.), p.61. 
58 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.xvii. 
59 Ted Toadvine, ‘Merleau-Ponty’s Reading of Husserl: A Chronological Overview’, in Merleau-
Ponty’s Reading of Husserl, Ted Toadvine and Lester Embree (eds.) (Dordrecht & Boston: Kluwer 
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Merleau-Ponty’s placing of the attempt to grasp the unreflective dimensions of 
experience that underpin reflection at the centre of the phenomenological method is a 
significant departure from Husserl’s ‘Intellectualist’ program. Merleau-Ponty argues 
that, although Husserl is in some ways aware of the implications of the ‘return to 
phenomena’ that Merleau-Ponty draws out, Husserl’s ‘break’ with his Intellectualist 
‘philosophy of essences’ nevertheless remains ‘tacit’. As such, mistaken 
methodological attachments continue to appear through the work of his later period. 
Chiefly, argues Merleau-Ponty, this can be seen in his presentation of the reduction, 
where Husserl continues to write as if the reduction would: 
… recognize only one true subject, the thinking Ego … would leave nothing 
implicit or tacitly accepted in my knowledge … [and] would enable me to 
take complete possession of my experience and realize the adequation of 
reflecting to reflected60.  
Such a method stands in contradiction with the results of the descriptive 
phenomenological analysis of lived perceptual experience. Whereas Merleau-Ponty’s 
existential version of the reduction, he believes, has overcome Husserl’s 
contradictions.  
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3.1 The Phenomenological Reduction Reveals a Lived Body that Necessarily 
Inheres in a Concrete Situation 
It is Merleau-Ponty’s view that the reduction reveals the subject’s essential 
inherence in a concrete situation via his necessary embodiment. And what is 
fundamentally revealed is that this body is a ‘lived through body’ – the body as we 
directly experience or ‘live’ it as opposed to the body conceived of as a physical 
object among other physical objects. Thus he argues: 
As a meditating Ego, I can clearly distinguish from myself the world and 
things, since I certainly do not exist in the way in which things exist. I must 
even set aside from myself my body understood as a thing among things, as a 
collection of physico-chemical processes. But even if the cogitatio, which I 
thus discover, is without location in objective time and space, it is not without 
place in the phenomenological world. The world, which I distinguished from 
myself as the totality of things or of processes linked by causal relationships, 
I rediscover ‘in me’ as the permanent horizon of all my cogitationes and as a 
dimension in relation to which I am constantly situating myself. 
And therefore he argues that the correct view: 
… does not define the subject’s existence in terms of the thought he has of 
existing, and furthermore does not convert the indubitability of the world into 
the indubitability of thought about the world, nor finally does it replace the 
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world itself by the world as meaning. On the contrary it recognizes my 
thought itself as an inalienable fact, and does away with any kind of idealism 
in revealing me as ‘being-in-the-world’61.  
 
Consciousness, then, is intrinsically attached to a world, to a concrete situation, that 
is not reducible to a mere meaning for consciousness. And it is this worldly 
attachment that makes possible Merleau-Ponty’s new ‘non-idealistic’ interpretation 
of the reduction. For what the reduction now reveals is the irreducible and essential 
body-world relation. Merleau-Ponty appropriates the Heideggerean ontological term 
‘being-in-the-world’ to capture the fundamental phenomenological and ontological 
structure of world-relatedness. His conception asserts that the subject is so ‘tightly 
held’ in his relation to the world that there is no sharp line between ‘inner’ and 
‘outer’, ‘interior’ and ‘exterior’. Rather, the subject is ‘through and through relation 
to the world’62.  
 As a result of this view he argues: 
Far from being, as has been thought, a procedure of idealistic philosophy, 
phenomenological reduction belongs to existential philosophy: Heidegger’s 
                                                
61 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.xiv. 
62 I will explore his conception of ‘being-in-the-world’ in more detail in the next chapter. 
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‘being-in-the-world’ appears only against the background of the 
phenomenological reduction63. 
And, as such: 
Reflection does not withdraw from the world towards the unity of 
consciousness as the world’s basis; it steps back to watch the forms of 
transcendence fly up like sparks from a fire; it slackens the intentional threads 
which attach us to the world and thus brings them to our notice; it alone is 
consciousness of the world because it reveals that world as strange and 
paradoxical64. 
But why should it reveal the world as ‘strange and paradoxical’? The reasoning 
behind this claim is basically that, without the ‘prejudice of determinate being’ in 
place supplying us with a presupposition of determinacy, we now can’t help but see 
the world as ‘strange’ and ‘paradoxical’ – that is, as intrinsically ambiguous.  
The ambiguity that Merleau-Ponty is talking about is a direct consequence of 
our being embodied and manifests phenomenologically in several ways. Let us look 
at two central ones. Firstly, we can see it in our experience of objects. Spatio-
temporal objects, as we perceptually experience them, are never fully determinate but 
neither are they simply indeterminate. Instead they are a movement from 
indeterminacy to determinacy that we build up through specific acts of perception as 
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we perceive the object through a series of related ‘profiles’, as we move around and 
view the object from different sides, different proximities, pick it up (if we can), 
etc.65 The perceptual ‘profiles’ progressively form a relatively stable unified 
meaning, and over a longer span of time this meaning moves in the direction of even 
greater stability. Nevertheless, it always necessarily falls short of being a fully 
determinate ‘pure object’. This is because the object necessarily exceeds our total 
grasp as we cannot in principle perceive it all at once – being embodied beings we 
lack the ‘God’s eye view’ vantage point that this requires. As a result of the 
perspectival nature of bodily perception there can be no pure object. No matter how 
stable the meaning of a given object, it is always, in principle, capable of losing its 
determinate meaning and being revised as a result of subsequent encounters with the 
object. Thus it resists the categories of objective thought which wish to make it an 
unambiguous and fully determinate ‘in-itself’ when, in fact, it has a capacity for 
indeterminacy and is necessarily ambiguous. It is necessarily ambiguous because its 
interpretation can never be definitively settled for all time; therefore any determinacy 
that it has is ultimately relative and not absolute – the determinate can always 
become indeterminate again. 
Secondly, these ambiguous objects are a mirror of the constitution of the 
body itself, which is never fully constituted as an object open to our gaze. This is 
because the body is that which gives us an opening onto objects as such. And so the 
status of the body is ambiguous because it can be viewed as an object (i.e. we are 
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capable of interpreting our body as a purely mechanistic object as in reductive 
physiological neuroscience). But, as the phenomenology shows us, its objective 
dimension can recede and become less visible to us in our directedness upon objects 
and world. Merleau-Ponty points out, for example, that:  
My visual body is certainly an object as far as its parts far removed from my 
head are concerned, but as we come nearer to the eyes, it becomes divorced 
from objects, and reserves among them a quasi-space to which they have no 
access, and when I try to fill this void by recourse to the image in the mirror, 
it refers me back to an original of the body which is not out there among 
things, but in my own province, on this side of all things seen66. 
This active exploring, and ambiguous, body-subject plays a central role in the 
perceptual constitution of objects and world. By standing in a reciprocal relation of 
constitution whereby spatio-temporal objects are constituted through my bodily 
engagement with them, I am simultaneously constituted as a bodily subject through 
the lived spatio-temporality realised in my active bodily exploration of the context 
that is my fundamental meaningful orientation. The phenomenology of the lived 
body, by revealing this intimate and intricate process of reciprocal constitution, 
shows how in our experience the body is never fully ‘object’ or fully ‘subject’ and, 
by connection, our experience is never fully ‘inner’ experience or fully ‘outer’ 
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experience67. Rather, we live an ambiguity that defies the traditional dualistic 
categories, a pure ego outside space (Intellectualism) or a pure object like any other 
object (Empiricism). Merleau-Ponty captures the way that we are fundamentally 
ambiguous between ‘mind’ and ‘body’ in his account of humans as ‘body-subjects’. 
And so, on his account, the phenomenology of the perceived world reveals that 
‘ambiguity is of the essence of human existence’68. Also, by focusing on the subject 
as a body-subject Merleau-Ponty makes that subject necessarily situated, for to have 
a body is to automatically have an anchor point, a location in space and time69. 
Using a Husserlian phraseology, Merleau-Ponty characterises the reduction as 
the method that is sufficiently ‘radical’ to put ‘out of play’ the prejudices of the 
‘natural attitude’. He reassures us that this procedure is not intended to simply ‘reject 
the certainties of common sense and a natural attitude to things’ which are, ‘on the 
contrary, the constant theme of philosophy’70. However, as they are ‘the presupposed 
basis of any thought, they are taken for granted, and go unnoticed’. Thus the method 
requires us to ‘suspend for a moment our recognition of them’71 in order to bring 
what Husserl referred to as the implicit ‘positing’72 of the world to explicit attention. 
                                                
67 See e.g: Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behaviour, pp.188-189. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology 
of Perception, 
p.102. 
68 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.196. 
69 e.g. ‘The word ‘here’ applied to my body does not refer to a determinate position in relation to other 
positions or to external coordinates, but the laying down of the first co-ordinates … the situation of 
the body in face of its tasks’. Ibid. p.115. 
70 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.xv. 
71 Ibid. p.xv. 
72 Ibid. p.xvi. 
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It is important to point out here, in relation to this claim, that although 
Merleau-Ponty could be presented as a kind of ‘phenomenological realist’, his 
position is clearly in opposition to realism as it is standardly construed, for example 
in scientific realism. For Merleau-Ponty is in the business of denying the existence of 
the ‘real world’, in the objectivist sense of the subject-independent world of the 
totality of objects and their objective properties and relations, and replacing it with 
the phenomenologically revealed ‘real world’ – the ontological thesis of the primacy 
of phenomena. So he is a realist with respect to what he designates as the 
‘phenomena’ that arise out of ‘pre-objective being’, which is to say he is an anti-
realist in contrast to scientific realism. His view is that ultimately ‘the thing and the 
world are mysterious’73. They are, ultimately, impenetrable or, as he puts it, ‘they are 
… an absolute mystery, not amenable to elucidation …’74 This is not to say that he 
thinks that we cannot partially ‘penetrate’ and ‘elucidate’ the ‘thing and the world’, 
just that they are something that we cannot ever fully or completely hope to penetrate 
or elucidate. This, Merleau-Ponty holds, directly follows from the fact that we are 
necessarily embodied and situated beings.  
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3.2 Husserl’s Intellectualist and Idealist Presuppositions Inconsistent with the 
Phenomenology of the Perceived World 
Merleau-Ponty argues that Husserl is unable to reconcile two central and 
inconsistent aspects of his philosophy arising from his middle and late period work. 
These are the idealist philosophical commitments presented in Ideas 1 (with the more 
or less self-sufficient methodology that guides that work), and the implications of the 
phenomenological descriptions of the ‘Lebenswelt’ (lifeworld) undertaken in his final 
period. Despite Husserl’s focus on the lifeworld in his final period he still is of the 
view that, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, the return to the lifeworld is a ‘preparatory step 
which should be followed by the properly philosophical task of universal 
constitution’75. Merleau-Ponty characterises his way of developing 
phenomenological philosophy as involving an exploration of ‘the unthought of 
elements’ in the background that Husserl’s analyses of the lifeworld point to76. The 
inconsistency in Husserl’s position, he argues, is the result of unacknowledged 
Intellectualist presuppositions that conflict with the results of the phenomenology of 
the body and of the perceived world. 
The problem with Husserl’s version of the reduction, says Merleau-Ponty, is 
that he presents it as necessarily enmeshed in a transcendental idealist philosophical 
context. This means that Husserl’s presentation involves a presupposition to the 
effect that consciousness or subjectivity can be characterised as a self-sufficient 
                                                
75 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ‘The Philosopher and Sociology’ in Signs (Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press, 1964), p.110. 
76 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ‘The Philosopher and His Shadow’ in Signs, p.160. This essay was 
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sphere or region of being. As we pointed out earlier, Husserl describes this as 
‘infinite realm of being of a new kind … the sphere of … transcendental 
experience’77. Husserl’s version holds that if we ‘bracket’ the ‘general thesis of the 
natural attitude’, the thesis that there exists a subject-independent world of spatio-
temporal objects, then we will discover ourselves to have access to this self-sufficient 
sphere of consciousness78.  
Husserl thus talks of the reduction as the operation that brings into view 
‘pure’ intentional consciousness, the realm of a ‘transcendental ego’ and its ‘meant 
contents’. And as we saw earlier, the phenomenologist adopts this perspective 
through ‘a change in attitude’ that ‘leads our attention back to the subjective 
achievements in which the object as experienced is disclosed in a determinate 
manner …’79 And so it is the phenomenologist’s task to give an account of how 
objects come to be ‘constituted’ within the sphere of pure consciousness. 
Husserl’s characterisation of the reduction, says Merleau-Ponty, involves a: 
… return to a transcendental consciousness before which the world is spread 
out and completely transparent, quickened through and through by a series of 
apperceptions which it is the philosopher’s task to reconstitute on the basis of 
their outcome80. 
                                                
77 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p.27. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Drummond, Historical Dictionary of Husserl’s Philosophy, p.12. 
80 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.xii. 
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On this view perception is understood as: 
… the apprehension of a certain hylè81, as indicating a phenomenon of a 
higher degree, the Sinngebung, or active meaning-giving operation which 
may be said to define consciousness, so that the world is nothing but ‘world-
as-meaning’, and the phenomenological reduction is idealistic …82 
This Husserlian account understands perception as a ‘meaning-giving’ or ‘sense-
bestowing’ by a transcendental ego to its intentional object. The problem with this, 
however, is that the transcendental ego is disembodied – it is not properly conceived 
as perceiving by and through the body. As Merleau-Ponty argues, we must not 
‘envisage the subject as constituting, and the multiplicity of its experiences or 
Erlebnisse as constituted: we must not treat the transcendental Ego as the true 
subject’83. This is because ‘reflection is truly reflection … only if it knows itself as 
reflection-on-an-unreflective-experience’84. The concept of the transcendental ego 
‘tacitly assumes … that the philosopher’s thinking is not conditioned by any 
situation’85. However, reflection can never ‘lift … itself out of any situation’ because 
‘the analysis of perception’ does not ‘do away with the fact of perception, the 
thisness of the percept or the inherence of perceptual consciousness in some 
                                                
81 Husserl’s term for the ‘material’ or ‘stuff’ of sensation, in contrast to the intentional content of 
perception. 
82 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.xii. 
83 Ibid. p.495. 
84 Ibid. p.72. 
85 Ibid. p.71. 
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temporality and some locality’86. The concept of the transcendental ego postulates an 
‘autonomous transcendental subjectivity’, Merleau-Ponty argues, that is to be ‘found 
everywhere and nowhere’87. This is because of the failure to locate that subjectivity 
in a concrete bodily individual (a ‘who’88) perceiving a concrete object (the ‘thisness 
of the percept’) in a concrete experiential context (an actual ‘locality’).  
For Merleau-Ponty, what gets in the way of a fully concrete treatment of 
perception in the case of Husserl is Husserl’s ‘logicism’89, by which he means the 
way that Husserl places an unjustified emphasis on an autonomous rationality, and 
on the universal applicability of syllogistic logical categories unconstrained by 
experiential context. So, rather than giving an account of our bodily perception just 
as it is experienced, Husserl, presupposing the prejudice of determinate being, 
attributes a determinacy to it that it does not possess. For, as Merleau-Ponty argues, 
our lived perceptual experience is a domain that resists characterisation in terms 
‘subjective’ or ‘objective’, ‘inner’ or ‘outer’. Merleau-Ponty rejects Husserl’s claim 
that our lived experience is either a ‘self-contained realm’ or a ‘purely subjective 
being’90. The being that we perceptually encounter through our body is never fully 
determinate and its significance can never in principle be made entirely clear, as 
Husserl, expressing his Cartesian ‘presumptions’, thought that it could. This is 
because, rather than being a disembodied consciousness surveying the world, human 
                                                
86 Ibid. p.49. 
87 Ibid. p.72. 
88 Ibid. p.72. 
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90 Edmund Husserl, ‘Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy’, Ted. E. Klein, Jr and William 
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subjectivity is ‘anchored’ in the body, and it is only through our active bodily 
explorations that a meaningful world takes shape for us. 
As such, Merleau-Ponty can only accurately characterise this phenomenal 
experience in terms of an inseparable body-world relation. And as a result of its 
intrinsic situatedness – revealed through phenomenological analysis – consciousness 
discovers itself to be unable to sufficiently free itself from perceptual experience in 
order to grasp itself in an absolute reflection, as Husserl had urged. But it also 
discovers that the perceptual content that we encounter contains a meaning that is not 
the product of a ‘meaning-giving operation’ of a reflective subject. Rather there is 
always an unreflected-upon perceptual meaning that resists being ‘absorbed’ by such 
conceptual ‘sense-bestowing’ acts. Thus, only through giving an account that 
incorporates the fact of our being situated in the world via our embodiment, and of 
how the active exploring bodily subject plays a central role in the perceptual 
constitution of objects and world, can we make sense of perception as it is revealed 
by phenomenological analyses of it.  
What these phenomenological descriptions reveal, argues Merleau-Ponty, is 
that ‘ambiguity is of the essence of human existence’91. Two principle manifestations 
of this ontological ambiguity are, firstly, that objects are ambiguous because their 
interpretation is never definitively settled for all time. They are a movement between 
determinacy and indeterminacy, never fully determinate, but never simply 
indeterminate. And, secondly, in our experience the body is never fully ‘object’ or 
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fully ‘subject’ and, by connection, our experience is never fully ‘inner’ experience or 
fully ‘outer’ experience. We live an ambiguity that defies the traditional dualistic 
categories: a pure ego outside space (Intellectualism) or a pure object like any other 
object (Empiricism).  
 
4. Correcting Recent Confusions in the Literature 
Merleau-Ponty understands the phenomenological reduction and the 
transcendental attitude as Husserl’s answer to the problem of psychologism. 
Psychologism refers to the view that psychology is the discipline that is capable of 
providing an adequate philosophical theory of consciousness and logic. It views 
everything exclusively in terms of spatio-temporal beings operating within a causally 
mechanistic physical world. Psychologism holds that ‘whatever exists … exists as 
either a physical individual subject to causal laws or as a merely dependent function 
of physical variations, which variations are themselves governed by fixed laws’92. A 
psychologistic view thus tends to reduce consciousness to the physical, and so it is 
traditionally said to be ‘naturalising’ consciousness. Husserl holds that it fails to 
grasp the psychic properly, ‘collapsing all ideal laws, most importantly, those of 
logic, and all ideal norms into merely empirical laws and normative 
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generalizations’93. And it does all of this on the basis of its presupposition of the 
‘natural attitude’.  
Psychologism is a form of scientism that was dominant in the early twentieth 
century. It is the ancestor of the ‘naturalisation of phenomenology’ project in 
contemporary cognitive science, the project that I discussed in the Introduction and 
will explore further in the following chapter. This is because both share the view that 
an empirical ‘science of the mind’ is philosophically adequate to grasp the 
phenomenon of consciousness. Merleau-Ponty’s main concern in regards to the 
psychologism issue, and thus in regard to any science of consciousness, lies in the 
attempt to ‘naturalise’ consciousness. Thus he talks of a ‘psychologism’ in relation to 
perception that holds that ‘the meaning, connection and ‘truth’ of the percept’ arises 
from ‘the fortuitous coming together of our sensations as they are given to us by our 
psychophysiological nature …’94 
Now, given that psychologism occurs only in the natural attitude, it follows 
that in the performance of Husserl’s epoché we eliminate psychologism. The 
problem with this is that the consequence of this move appears to be transcendental 
idealism. Merleau-Ponty views this consequence as unacceptable because it stands in 
contradiction with the results of the phenomenology of the body-subject and of the 
perceived world. This consequence is avoided by Merleau-Ponty’s revised 
conception of the reduction. Thus, despite the fact that his phenomenological 
reduction involves a ‘transcendental attitude’, Merleau-Ponty is at pains to 
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distinguish his position from the Intellectualist-idealistic interpretation of the 
reduction given by Husserl. The way that he achieves this is the subject of this 
section. In order to make the originality of Merleau-Ponty’s reconception clear we 
will now look at some recent misunderstandings of his account of the reduction, 
pointing out how they have got him wrong and what a more accurate reading ought 
to look like. 
In recent Anglophone scholarship it has been an issue of some debate just 
what Merleau-Ponty advocates in his version of the phenomenological reduction95. 
Stephen Priest, for example, argues that Merleau-Ponty ‘replaces the Husserlian 
concepts of the epoché, or phenomenological reduction, and the transcendental ego 
with the Heideggerian existential category being-in-the-world’96. The claim is that 
Merleau-Ponty's account of human existence as being-in-the-world necessitates a 
rejection of the epoché as a core part of the phenomenological reduction. And this is 
because the thesis of being-in-the-world is ‘logically inconsistent with the 
completion of the phenomenological reduction’ due to the fact that the thesis asserts 
that ‘the subject’s relations to the world are essentially constitutive of the subject’97.  
Priest’s formulation – ambiguous between a claim about the ‘replacement’ of 
the reduction and the ‘incompletability’ of the reduction – exemplifies a lack of 
                                                
95 For an insightful but problematic recent intervention into this debate see: Smith, ‘Merleau-Ponty 
and the Phenomenological Reduction’, pp.553-571. Although Smith makes many helpful observations 
he does not identify the difference between Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s conceptions of the epoché 
and reduction. We will explore this issue below. 
96 Priest, Merleau-Ponty, p.36. An earlier interpreter of Merleau-Ponty, Richard Zaner, has also 
argued that ‘Merleau-Ponty … rejects, without stating it, the Husserlian doctrine of epoché…’ R. M. 
Zaner, The Problem of Embodiment: Some Contributions to a Phenomenology of the Body (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), p.142. 
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clarity about the nature of Merleau-Ponty’s method. Priest is wrong to characterise 
Merleau-Ponty as ‘replacing’ the epoché with being-in-the-world. This is because the 
epoché is a methodological technique, the retention of which is consistent with the 
ontological assertion about the body-world relation as being-in-the-world. The 
correct characterisation is that Merleau-Ponty replaces Husserl’s Intellectualist and 
idealist version of the epoché and reduction with his own ‘perceptualist’ and ‘non-
idealist’ version. And, as we have seen, he replaces Husserl’s ontological conception 
of ‘the transcendental ego and its meant contents’ as a self-sufficient sphere of being 
with his conception of the body-subject as being-in-the-world.  
Merleau-Ponty’s conception is distinct from Husserl’s and, as such, it is a 
mistake to read Merleau-Ponty’s position too closely to Husserl. We can see this by 
directly contrasting how Merleau-Ponty and Husserl understand the epoché as an 
operation, and on what that operation is understood to be operating on. Priest says 
that ‘by the application of the epoché or transcendental reduction, the reality of the 
world of the natural attitude is placed in ontological abeyance’98. He explicates this, 
stating that ‘in the procedural order of doing transcendental phenomenology the 
epoché is applied to belief in the world of the natural attitude’99, and he understands 
belief in terms of propositions. So, with respect to a set of such propositions made in 
the natural attitude it is, as he puts it, ‘no longer assumed that [they] have truth 
conditions, but this is not denied either’100. 
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Now Merleau-Ponty does assert that his philosophy ‘places in abeyance the 
assertions arising out of the natural attitude’101. However, Priest fails to grasp the full 
significance of the passage that directly follows this statement. Merleau-Ponty 
immediately adds: 
… but it is also a philosophy for which the world is always ‘already there’ 
before reflection begins - as an inalienable presence; and all its efforts are 
concentrated upon re-achieving a direct and primitive contact with the world, 
and endowing that contact with a philosophical status102.  
Although Merleau-Ponty does not state it explicitly in this specific context, his 
considered view is that, although the ‘putting in abeyance’ of ‘the assertions arising 
out of the natural attitude’ is a necessary condition, as we might say, for overturning 
the natural attitude, it is not a sufficient one. This is because this approach alone does 
not identify the unique status of our natural attitude as a ‘kind of ‘faith’ – a kind of 
primitive perceptual understanding that is so fundamental that it is the condition of 
the possibility for us either holding, denying or bracketing any of our propositional 
beliefs, including the ‘general thesis of the natural attitude’. Further, due to its 
perceptual rootedness, it is not overturnable via purely propositional means as it is, as 
he puts it, a perceptual ‘faith’ – our fundamental pre-predicative ‘faith’ in the world 
that is there for us. It therefore cannot simply be an issue of asserting, denying or 
bracketing a proposition because the possibility of such propositional contents rest on 
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a background context of the ‘always already there’ ‘world’, which rests on, and takes 
shape for us through, the process of embodied lived perception. Only by identifying 
perception’s role in encouraging the ‘mistake of objective thought’ can we truly 
perform an epoché and phenomenological reduction – which now must be taken to 
mean an overturning of the natural attitude at its source, ‘bracketing’ objectivism in 
the interest of non-dogmatic philosophical theorising. 
Taylor Carman is clearer than Priest that Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the 
reduction is ‘more original to Merleau-Ponty’103. But, I would argue, he does not 
properly explicate in what this originality consists. Carman argues that:  
… although Merleau-Ponty spent his career trying to interpret [Husserl’s 
epoché and reduction] in a congenial and fruitful way for his own purposes, 
the truth is that they are fundamentally incompatible with his own 
philosophical commitments, especially those he inherited from Heidegger104. 
So the claim is, as with Priest, that the epoché is inconsistent with being-in-the-
world. 
Although Merleau-Ponty ‘frequently writes with some sympathy for both the 
transcendental and eidetic reductions’, says Carman, ‘he nevertheless evidently 
regards them as paradoxical and self-defeating, hence strictly speaking 
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impossible’105. Carman goes on to observe that Merleau-Ponty’s ‘desire to find in 
both reductions something philosophically valuable therefore leads him to 
characterize them in ways that depart widely from Husserl’s account’106. The 
implication is that Merleau-Ponty’s position is confused and that his account, as a 
methodological reduction, is not coherent. Rather it is essentially a kind of 
misapplication of the term that results from his tendency to read Husserl extremely 
sympathetically, and so strive to retain the bulk of his terminology in an existential 
context in which it is not appropriate. 
Consistent with this, Carman characterises Merleau-Ponty as being 
‘ambivalent with regard to the transcendental reduction, or epoché, that is, the move 
from the external world to pure consciousness, or transcendental subjectivity’107. He 
also suggests that Merleau-Ponty views the epoché as ‘a kind of temporary, 
provisional, merely gradual loosening of our bond with the world, which can be 
neither dissolved in reflection nor fully apprehended in consciousness’108. 
But here Carman misinterprets Merleau-Ponty’s metaphorical talk for a 
description of his practice. Merleau-Ponty says that:  
Reflection does not withdraw from the world toward the unity of 
consciousness as the foundation of the world; it steps back to see the 
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transcendencies spring forth; it slackens the intentional threads which attach 
us to the world in order to make them appear …109  
This last phrase draws on the metaphor of our ‘interwovenness’ with the world, 
which is a recurring theme in Phenomenology of Perception110. In doing so, it uses 
the suggestive image of us ‘slackening’ those ‘intentional threads’ that ‘attach us to 
the world’, evoking the image of a slightly-less-tightly bounded interweaving to 
represent the phenomenologist’s reflection on the intentional connection itself. But 
this is a metaphor intended to evoke a sense of our reflection on our primal ‘bond 
with the world’ – our attempt to ‘see this link, to become conscious of it’111. And so 
this should indicate that Merleau-Ponty is talking about something other than an 
attempt to literally loosen our intentional bond. After all, what could this possibly 
mean? Rather, what we have is a technique whereby we can systematically focus our 
attention, without objectivistic misrepresentation, on the intentional relation as it is 
lived. 
Nor is Merleau-Ponty’s epoché in some sense ‘temporary’ or ‘provisional’. 
He does say that, with respect to ‘the certainties of common sense and a natural 
attitude to things’, given that they are ‘the presupposed basis of any thought, they are 
taken for granted, and go unnoticed’. Thus we need to ‘suspend for a moment our 
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111 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ‘Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man’ in The Primary of Perception 
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recognition of them’112. However, his use of the phrase ‘for a moment’ here is 
rhetorical and not programmatic. It is rhetorical in the sense of suggesting that the 
reader entertain the possibility of problematising taken for granted assumptions and 
provisionally give the phenomenological perspective a try. It also implies that the 
truths of the natural attitude can be suspended for philosophical reasons but 
reinstated for other, non-philosophical, purposes. But it is not Merleau-Ponty’s view 
that the epoché and reduction are provisional or temporary. They are, on his account, 
the central feature of a non-dogmatic philosophical method. Hence he says that 
phenomenological philosophy is ‘accessible only through a phenomenological 
method’, and also asserts: ‘I have never thought that phenomenology was only an 
introduction to philosophy; I believe that it is philosophy’113. 
Merleau-Ponty explains the irreconcilable contradictions confronting 
Husserl’s position as representing a failure to grasp the way in which a reflective 
philosophy of the subject must rest on the presupposition of ‘the unreflected’. Thus 
he argues in Signs that we must draw a distinction between the ‘natural attitude’ of 
our everyday dealings with the world and the ‘theoretical attitude of naturalism’. The 
correct view of the former sees it as a ‘primordial faith’ that is ‘prior to any thesis’, 
and that, being ‘more ancient than any ‘attitude’ or ‘point of view’, it ‘gives us not a 
representation of the world but the world itself’114. This is a crucial difference 
between his and Husserl’s conceptions. Husserl draws a distinction between what he 
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calls ‘the natural attitude’ and ‘the naturalistic attitude’. For Husserl the natural 
attitude involves a tacit thesis to the effect that there exists a world of subject-
independent spatio-temporal objects. To be in the natural attitude is to assume this 
thesis; in ‘bracketing’ this thesis we depart from the natural attitude. The ‘naturalistic 
attitude’ is the explicit conceptualisation of this thesis into a philosophical position 
that underpins the natural sciences. Now Merleau-Ponty, by contrast, refuses to 
conceive of the natural attitude as a ‘thesis’. He argues that it involves more than 
propositional ‘theses’ as it is a brute primordial fact that cannot simply be bracketed 
or suspended in the way one might put in brackets a proposition – neither assenting 
nor not assenting to its content. Instead what is required, on his view, in order to 
successfully perform the epoché and to cultivate a consistent phenomenological 
perspective, is what Sebastian Gardner has referred to as ‘a positive purgative 
operation’115. This operation is ‘purgative’ because it seeks to overturn the natural 
process of perception: ‘to foil its trick’116 of constructing ‘perception out of the 
perceived’117. It is Merleau-Ponty’s view that the process of perception is ignored in 
favour of its results, which are determinate objects. And so he says that ‘the natural 
direction of the process of knowing … goes blindly through the operations of 
perception straight on to their teleological results’. Given this, he asserts that ‘there is 
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in natural intuition a sort of ‘crypto-mechanism’ which we have to break in order to 
reach phenomenal being’118. 
The operation is ‘positive’ because it is actively undertaken by the 
phenomenologist in a continual and ongoing effort against a natural perceptual 
process that is extremely difficult to resist. This stands in contrast with Husserl’s 
characterisation of the ‘bracketing’ of a ‘thesis’. And this is why I earlier referred to 
Merleau-Ponty’s characterisation of the reduction as ‘perceptualist’, in contrast to 
Husserl’s ‘Intellectualist’ version. Merleau-Ponty holds that it is the natural 
movement of perception from indeterminacy to determinacy that is at the root of the 
natural attitude. Thus, in order to ‘bracket’ it, we must find the means by which we 
can focus on the phenomena of the perceived world just as it is – free, for example, 
from presuppositions about the ontological determinacy of the world or the 
amenability of the perceived to the categories of syllogistic logic, presuppositions 
that Husserl retains. 
Husserl, Merleau-Ponty argues, fails to sufficiently remove ‘objective 
thinking’ from his philosophy and thus misunderstands the natural attitude. Husserl 
fails to remove the ‘objectivist’ presupposition of determinate being and thus misses 
the true nature of pre-objective perceptual experience as the transcendental ground of 
both realism and idealism in philosophy119. Instead he attempts to construct 
                                                
118 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.67. 
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phenomenology as a ‘new science’ and to reformulate the Kantian concept of the 
transcendental ego. But, as Merleau-Ponty argues, neither of these moves is 
phenomenologically defensible.  
As a result of the uniqueness of Merleau-Ponty’s account, it is mistaken to 
imply that when he talks about the reduction he is talking about it in the Husserlian 
sense of a ‘parenthesizing of the Objective world’120 – where ‘the existence of a 
world’ is taken to be ‘“parenthesized” in consequence of my epoché’121. In 
Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty does use terms and phrases that derive 
from Husserl’s account, for example ‘reduction’ ‘suspension’, to ‘bracket’, to ‘put 
out of play’. But, consistent with Merleau-Ponty’s style of philosophising, he ‘co-
opts’ these terms, morphing them into his own unique meanings that must be read a) 
with close reference to the context of the specific point that he is presently making 
and b) in relation to the overall theoretical picture he is building over the entire arc of 
the text. For example, he talks about ‘bracketing’ the conception of the world as a 
totality of objects in the context of a discussion of a ‘phenomenological conception 
of reflection’ that, in the process of ‘producing’ the ‘genealogy’ of this conception of 
the world ‘from the starting point of our actual experience’, advances a ‘new 
definition of the a priori’122. But, although he does not specify in this section what 
this ‘bracketing’ actually consists in, the assertions about a new definition of the a 
priori ought to alert us to the novel results he directly relates to his conception of 
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bracketing in this context. That it is a kind of bracketing consistent with an entirely 
new conception of the a priori. 
In a discussion of truth he talks of bracketing beliefs that we hold, but asserts 
that this is only possible against the background of ‘acquisitions’ of what we have 
previously believed or done:  
If it were possible to lay bare and unfold all the presuppositions in what I call 
my reason or my ideas at each moment, we should always find experiences 
which have not been made explicit, large-scale contributions from past and 
present, a whole ‘sedimentary history’ which is not only relevant to the 
genesis of my thought, but which determines its significance123.  
This usage suggests the view that in bracketing beliefs we cannot bracket the 
complex sedimentary history of meaning and understanding that results from the 
temporal and cultural nature of our existence. This view indicates an appreciation of 
our intrinsic cultural and worldly situatedness. In this context he also uses the phrase 
‘placing in abeyance’, arguing that: 
In relation to what we are by reason of our acquisitions and this pre-existent 
world, we have a power of placing in abeyance … I may well close my eyes, 
and stop up my ears, I shall nevertheless not cease to see, if it is only the 
blackness before my eyes, or to hear, if only silence, and in the same way I 
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can ‘bracket’ my opinions or the beliefs I have acquired, but, whatever I think 
or decide, it is always against the background of what I have previously 
believed or done124. 
So the power of bracketing our beliefs occurs against the background of 
‘acquisitions’ and the ‘pre-existent world’ – in other words, our facticity. There is a 
brute perceptual world – the perceived world – that is ‘pre-existent’ in the sense that 
it is not the product of any constituting acts of judgment but rather is experienced as 
‘already there’, as ‘already constituted’, and providing the context in which such 
judgements are undertaken. The ‘acquisitions’ represent our individual ‘sedimented’ 
beliefs and actions that form who we are and how we understand in the present, and 
are not bracketed in the bracketing of any particular judgement or set of judgements. 
In short, we cannot ‘bracket’ or place ‘in abeyance’ our facticity.  
Merleau-Ponty also uses the Husserlian phrase to ‘put out of play’ but only in 
the context of arguing that we need to ‘suspend’ the ‘activity’ that results from the 
fact that ‘we are through and through relation to the world’125 – the objectivism that 
grows out of the natural attitude. The only way for us ‘to become aware of the fact’ 
that ‘we are through and through relation to the world’ is to ‘refuse it our 
complicity’. By a ‘refusal of complicity’, through a ‘suspen[sion] of the resultant 
activity’126, Merleau-Ponty means here not simply the bracketing of a thesis, but the 
‘positive purgative operation’ identified by Gardner. This is because we are 
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125 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ‘What is Phenomenology?’ p.61. 
126 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.xiv. 
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‘complicit’ in the ‘resultant activity’ of ‘objective thought’ by virtue of the intrinsic 
objectifying movement of perception itself.  
The less than crystal clear style of Merleau-Ponty’s presentation makes it 
easy to overlook the full uniqueness of his views. Thus a recent article by Joel Smith 
designed expressly to clarify the nature of Merleau-Ponty’s reduction falls prey to 
this problem. Smith presents an intervention into the Anglophone scholarship, 
arguing that certain readers of Merleau-Ponty are mistaken to think that he does not 
advocate a version of the phenomenological reduction, pointing out that ‘etre au 
monde is perfectly compatible with the epoché’127. Despite this sound observation, 
Smith himself misreads the reduction when he attributes Husserl’s Intellectualist 
conception to Merleau-Ponty, a confusion that undermines the critical force of some 
of Smith’s arguments. He observes that: 
 
Merleau-Ponty makes clear that he in fact accepted the epoché as a 
fundamental methodological principle, whilst simultaneously rejecting what 
he saw as the transcendental idealist context in which Husserl presented it128. 
However, Smith reads this principle through Husserl’s characterisation of it in Ideas 
1. For Merleau-Ponty, the epoché cannot simply involve – as Smith following 
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Husserl asserts – a ‘second-order attitude of indifference towards the positing of the 
natural attitude’129, if that ‘attitude of indifference’ is understood as ‘a second-order 
act of parenthesising, or neutralising, performed on the first-order judgement …’130 
This is because Merleau-Ponty does not hold that the natural attitude rests only on 
the positing of a propositional ‘general thesis’ that might be ‘neutralised’ in this 
fashion. As I have argued, Merleau-Ponty holds that the natural attitude consists of 
what he refers to as a ‘primordial faith’ that is ‘prior to’ any such ‘thesis’131. When 
we try to perform the epoché in Husserl’s sense we find that we are confronted with 
an irreducible body-world relation, which is the source of our having a ‘primordial 
faith’ that there exists a subject-independent world of spatio-temporal objects. The 
nature of this pre-reflective intentional body-world relation is revealed by and 
through our active bodily engagement with the world – and this means in our 
concrete perceptual experience. The central general structure or pattern inherent in 
this experience involves a movement from indeterminacy to determinacy. It is this 
movement that is responsible for the objectivist tendency to ‘congeal’ the ‘whole of 
existence’132 – a ‘congealing’ of the perceived world into an ‘absolute objectivity’133 
by misattributing to the phenomenal contents of experience the ‘absolute existence of 
the object’134. 
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131 Merleau-Ponty, ‘The Philosopher and His Shadow’, p.163. 
132 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.82. 
133 Ibid. p.253. 
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Thus it takes more than a second-order attitude of indifference towards the 
propositional positing of the natural attitude to overturn this objectivistic movement. 
Merleau-Ponty’s ‘positive purgative operation’ is designed to ‘foil’ perception’s 
‘trick’ of misleading us to overlook the process of perception and instead understand 
it through its results – determinate objects. Merleau-Ponty understands the epoché 
not as simply operating on our ‘judgements’ about the ‘existence of the world’, as 
Smith has it, but rather as a process designed to, as it were, unmask the natural 
attitude at its source. And that source is perceptual. This explains, argues Merleau-
Ponty, why it is so difficult to successfully perform the reduction, and so easy to fall 
back into objective thinking – because we are going against the natural grain of 
perception itself, its essential structure. This is something that the Intellectualist 
approach, which views it only as an issue of suspending judgement, fails to see. 
Smith asserts that the epoché is ‘performed on the faculty of judgement’ and adds 
that it ‘cannot be performed on the faculty of perception’135. However, Merleau-
Ponty doesn’t advocate a ‘faculty’ theory. Rather, he argues that all propositional 
meaning is dependent upon the perceptual meaning that subtends it. As such, he 
consistently argues that the performance of the epoché, rather than being provisional 
or temporary as Carman suggests, is permanent and ongoing as far as philosophical 
practice is concerned. This is the case because we need to counter the permanent and 
ongoing objectifying structure of perception itself.  
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5. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have looked at Merleau-Ponty’s main theoretical innovations, 
which centre on his commitment to phenomenology as the fundamental method for 
philosophy. I looked at the fundamental contrast he draws between 
phenomenological description, scientific explanation and Kantian ‘reflective 
analysis’. I also discussed his view of the epoché and the phenomenological 
reduction. We saw that Merleau-Ponty recognises the phenomenological reduction as 
a core component of his method despite the fact that it is ‘uncompletable’ in terms of 
Husserl’s ‘Intellectualist’ conception. And it is ‘uncompletable’ because it reveals us 
as a body-subject inhering in a concrete situation. I also argued that his view of the 
epoché and reduction has been misrepresented in recent Anglophone scholarship 
largely because the authors discussed fail to grasp how his conception of the 
reduction differs from Husserl’s Intellectualist conception. In place of these mistaken 
views I presented a reading of his phenomenological reduction as not simply the 
suspension of the propositional ‘general thesis of the natural attitude’. Rather, it 
involves a ‘positive purgative operation’ that unmasks and overturns the natural 
attitude at its root in the objective movement intrinsic to the structure of perception 
itself.  
In the following chapter I will continue to build my picture of Merleau-
Ponty’s position by providing an account of his conception of intentionality, and of 
the way that it feeds into his concept of ‘existence’ and his exploration of the 
existential structure of reality. I will also provide a brief discussion of the body 
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schema, and of how he sees the taking of a phenomenological approach to 
philosophy as necessitating existentialism. In addition, I will put my exegesis to 
work in completing the first step of the argumentative trajectory of the thesis: my 
critical intervention into the ‘naturalisation of phenomenology’ debate.
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Chapter 2: Intentionality, Ontology and Scientism 
1. Introduction 
In Chapter 1 I looked at Merleau-Ponty’s general conception of 
phenomenological philosophy. I contrasted phenomenological description with 
scientific explanation and reflective analysis. Correcting misreadings in the recent 
literature, I also looked at his account of the phenomenological reduction and its key 
consequences. The two key consequences identified were: 
a) Husserl’s Intellectualist and idealist presuppositions were exposed as 
inconsistent with the phenomenology of the body and of the perceived world; 
and, connected to this,  
b) the phenomenological reduction reveals the subject as a lived body that 
necessarily inheres in a concrete situation. 
In the present chapter I build on this picture by giving a fuller account of 
Merleau-Ponty’s concept of intentionality and the way that it feeds into his concept 
of ‘existence’ and his exploration of the existential structure of reality. Further to the 
goal of securing the argument that the uses of Merleau-Ponty in ‘post-cognitivist’ 
cognitive science fail to grasp the transcendental and ontological dimensions of his 
philosophy, I will also provide a brief discussion of his concept of the ‘body schema’ 
and of how he sees a phenomenological approach as necessitating an existential 
ontology. Lastly, I complete the first step of my three-step argumentative trajectory 
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by arguing that Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical position refuses the possibility of 
‘naturalisation’, as conceived in the ‘naturalisation of phenomenology’ debate. He 
does this because that type of ‘naturalisation’ involves the explicit or implicit 
advocacy of a scientific realist ontology, which he holds as being premised on a 
philosophical mistake. Instead, he argues, the true philosophical import of the 
phenomenological study of perception is captured by his existential ontology. 
 
2. Motor-intentionality and Existential Structure  
The central insight that marks the difference between Merleau-Ponty’s 
concept of consciousness and Kant’s is the former’s appropriation and development 
of Husserl’s notion of ‘operative intentionality’. As he argues in the Preface to 
Phenomenology of Perception: 
Husserl distinguishes between intentionality of act, which is that of our 
judgements and of those occasions when we voluntarily take up a position – 
the only intentionality discussed in the Critique of Pure Reason – and 
operative intentionality (fungierende Intentionalität), or that which produces 
the natural and antepredicative unity of the world and of our life, being 
apparent in our desires, our evaluations and in the landscape we see, more 
clearly than in objective knowledge, and furnishing the text which our 
knowledge tries to translate into precise language1.  
                                                
1 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.xx. 
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Kant’s concept of perceptual experience (Erfahrung) is derived from the narrow 
empiricist concept of ‘outer experience’ where the perceptual content (sensations) 
are given form by being synthesised by the categories of the understanding in 
conjunction with the a priori forms of intuition (space and time). As such, ‘the only 
intentionality discussed in the Critique of Pure Reason’ is that of the ‘intentionality 
of act’, which is a voluntary act involving the subject’s judgement and its judged 
content. What this completely overlooks, says Merleau-Ponty, is the background 
intentionality that makes such voluntary acts of judgment possible: ‘operative 
intentionality’. This background intentionality is a bodily intentionality that 
‘produces the natural and antepredicative unity of the world and of our life’2. That is, 
the unified meaningful ‘world’ that forms the context of our experience takes shape 
in relation to the experientially unified structure and capacities of our lived body. We 
are an intentional lived body that is necessarily correlated with a ‘pre-predicatively’ 
meaningful world because the world is revealed by and through the active 
exploration of the body-subject. And it is in this sense that our basic background 
bodily intentionality is productive of the ‘natural’ unity of the world. Merleau-Ponty 
says that our operative intentionality is ‘apparent in our desires, our evaluations and 
in the landscape we see’, as opposed to ‘in objective knowledge’, because our 
consciousness is fundamentally aiming at, and directed to, a meaningful world – the 
‘perceived world’ – through our body via its capacity for movement, perception and 
also emotion. It is this primary connection with the world that ‘furnishes’ the basic 
level of meaning that, in our attempts at articulating explicit ‘knowledge’, we try to 
‘translate into precise language’. 
                                                
2 Ibid. 
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What we find when we carefully attend to this ‘pre-reflective’ or ‘operative’ 
intentionality is that this primary relationship to the world is not the kind of thing that 
can be ‘any further clarified by analysis’, as he puts it3. Instead it is this pre-objective 
dimension of consciousness that the philosopher must seek to articulate.  
Merleau-Ponty argues that: 
Husserl’s originality lies beyond the notion of intentionality; it is to be found 
in the elaboration of this notion and in the discovery, beneath the 
intentionality of representations, of a deeper intentionality, which others have 
called existence4. 
In his new existential conception Merleau-Ponty ‘enlarges’ the notion of 
intentionality such that it now not only applies to our conscious acts but also 
underlies the entirety of our relations with others and with ‘the world’. As he says, 
this operative intentionality, also ‘motor intentionality’5, produces ‘the natural and 
antepredicative unity of the world’. It does this not simply in the sense of the objects 
being constituted through our bodily engagement with them, a bodily role in the 
constitution of perceived objects. Rather, it is involved in the very constitution of the 
context in which those objects manifest for a perceiver – ‘the world’ in the 
existentialist sense. As such, we have moved from an intentionality of 
representations to a primordial bodily intentionality that is now conceived as being 
                                                
3 ‘Our relationship to the world, as it is untiringly enunciated within us, is not a thing which can be 
any further clarified by analysis; philosophy can only place it once more before our eyes and present it 
for our ratification’: Ibid. 
4 Ibid. p.140. 
5 He also uses the term ‘motor-intentionality’ in order to emphasise the way in which this intentional 
relation is built around the motility of the bodily subject. I will use the two interchangeably. 
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involved in the synthesis of time and space, of a spatio-temporal field of experience 
with a horizonal structure.  
Our ‘phenomenal field’ has a horizonal structure in several respects. Firstly, 
any object that we encounter is said to have an ‘inner horizon’ due to the perspectival 
nature of perception. As a result of being necessarily embodied perceivers, the 
objects we intend are visible to us as series of profiles that we encounter as we 
progressively explore the object. In any particular perceptual act the profile that we 
presently perceive is not simply experienced as a bare atomistic datum; rather, we are 
aware of the rear sides of the object as being implicit in our present perception. This 
does not mean that they are just possible perceptions that we might have but are not 
presently having. Rather, to see an object involves the possibility of perceiving more 
of it as being a constituent part of the experience – the ‘sense’ of the perceptual 
experience ‘seeing an object’. This is the case because it is always perceived as 
situated in a spatial context relative to other objects that imply a possible perspective 
that we might take on the object by occupying another spatial relation to the object 
that we do not presently. This possible perspective is implicit in the perceptual scene 
in which we necessarily encounter the object perspectivally. And so Merleau-Ponty 
says that: 
The perceived thing is not an ideal unity in the possession of the intellect, like 
a geometrical notion, for example; it is rather a totality open to the horizon of 
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an indefinite number of perspectival views which blend with one another 
according to a certain style, a style which defines the object in question6. 
If we were locked in a ‘pure perspective’ and did not take there to be any ‘more’ than 
what was strictly available in our perceptual field, then the object would not appear 
to us as an object at all. This is because each profile is experienced as related to other 
possible profiles via its inherence in a context. And this is just what it is to perceive 
an object. 
Through phenomenological description we also find that the perception of 
any object involves a figure/ground structure. Any explicit act of attention on a 
particular object takes place in a spatio-temporal context or ‘outer horizon’. This 
horizon or context is comprised of implicit objects that we perceive but that 
nevertheless form an indeterminate meaningful background that makes possible our 
focus on a specific object. Again we can have no genuine perception of an object 
other than through this outer horizonal structure, which is the necessary background 
against which we make an object a focal figure. However, the outer horizon of any 
perceptual experience also contains the world as ‘the horizon of horizons’, as Husserl 
put it. And so, Merleau-Ponty says, ‘every perception takes place within a certain 
horizon and ultimately in the “world”’7. And this ‘lived world’ is ‘the permanent 
horizon of all my cogitations … a dimension in relation to which I am constantly 
situating myself’8. We have a consciousness of what lies beyond our visual field in 
any particular act – for example, what lies behind our back. It is certainly not explicit 
                                                
6 Merleau-Ponty, ‘The Primacy of Perception and its Philosophical Consequences’, p.16. 
7 Ibid. p12. 
8 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception,,p.xiv. 
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but nor is it just nothing. It is a meaningful ‘something’ that we have implicit 
awareness of. This is not intended to signify any sort of conceptual grasp; rather, it is 
a perceptual awareness. We have an appreciation of the extension of space beyond 
the limits of our phenomenal field as forming a world, in the existentialist sense of 
the context that provides the background for all possible experience. So ‘to perceive 
is to render oneself present to something through the body’ where ‘all the while the 
thing keeps its place within the horizon of the world …’9 
Now the world as unified primordial context is contrasted with a Kantian 
synthesis, at times also adopted by Husserl, which ‘presupposes, at least 
theoretically, a real multiplicity which consciousness has to surmount’10. As we saw 
in the previous chapter, Merleau-Ponty conceives the subject of this passive 
synthesis as a ‘relative and pre-personal’ body-subject not a transcendental ego. As a 
result, he argues that the phenomenologist must broaden his horizon of concerns to 
include a great deal more than the ‘true and immutable natures’ posited in explicit 
intellectual acts11. 
For Husserl, intentionality signifies the ‘universal fundamental property of 
consciousness’, which is ‘to be consciousness of something’12 – to be always directed 
towards an ‘object’. His concept of ‘intentional analysis’ consists in reflection on the 
phenomena of our intentional experience in terms of its act-object (noesis-noema) 
structure. He uses the intentional object – the ‘what of givenness’ – as the guiding 
thread of his intentional analysis. However, he concentrates for methodological 
                                                
9 Ibid. p.42. 
10 Ibid. p.322. 
11 Ibid. p.xx. 
12 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p.33. 
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reasons on the analysis of the ‘how of givenness’. As a result of Husserl’s general 
concern with the laying bare of the structures of the transcendental ego he inevitably 
concentrates on intentional acts of consciousness that are understood as acts of this 
ego.  
Now given the fact that his intentional analysis takes place in the context of 
his attempt to refer the structures revealed in descriptive phenomenology back to the 
structures of the Ego, it follows that analysis of intentional acts undertaken within 
this framework develops into an idealist ontology. This is because, as we saw in the 
previous chapter, an approach that leads to an increasing focus on the constituting 
acts of a transcendental consciousness loses sight of the inherence of consciousness 
in a body and in a situation. This makes inevitable a move towards an ‘Intellectualist’ 
transcendental idealism – an idealism that the methodology of a presuppositionless 
openness to things themselves might seem putatively designed to avoid. 
With respect to understanding Merleau-Ponty’s modification and expansion 
of the concept of intentionality, it is important to see his central concern with 
exposing the dimension of passivity in his analysis of intentional acts. The analysis 
he undertakes presupposes the connectedness of the acts in ‘inner time’ – lived 
experiential temporality – as opposed to objective time. On Merleau-Ponty’s account 
the ‘constitution’ of ‘inner time’ is pre-given to all acts of consciousness. As the 
constitution of this temporality is primordially passive it is not produced by the acts 
of a reflecting ego. Rather, it is an essential and necessary pre-condition of 
intentionality and is constitutive of its horizonal structure. Husserl’s idealistic 
ontological interpretation of this phenomenological structure results, argues Merleau-
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Ponty, from his restriction of intentional analysis to the framework of ‘static 
phenomenology’. That is, the approach of giving a structural account of fully 
constituted objects and of the acts in which those objects are presented to the 
phenomenologist. This account stands in contrast to a ‘genetic phenomenology’, 
which emphasises the temporal dimension of our experience. Merleau-Ponty 
advocates an analysis of the ‘coming-to-be’ (also ‘becoming’, ‘genesis’) of the fully 
constituted objectivities of the lived world – essentially the building up of sense 
through time. It is this attempt to uncover the origins of the ‘sedimented’ layers of 
meaning that constitute objectivity that leads Merleau-Ponty’s attention to ‘the 
world’ as the ‘horizon’ and ‘background’ against which objects are given to active 
‘body-subjects’. These body-subjects are understood as ‘self-temporalising’ – in the 
sense that they ‘live’ a ‘primordially passive’ temporality which is constituted 
through them as a function of their ‘being-in-the-world’, not by any of their 
conscious acts. As Merleau-Ponty makes clear, the ‘static’ view of the idealist 
Husserl encounters serious problems when confronted with the issues of passive 
synthesis that cluster round the themes of perception, the constitution of the body, the 
problem of the givenness of the bodily other and of the background or world that 
necessarily provides the context in which the other problems arise.  
His principle strategy with respect to drawing out the philosophical 
implications of intentionality is to argue that in the broadening of the concept of 
intentionality, through the notion of motor-intentionality, we now see that it in fact 
applies to holistic human events. As such, the job of intentionality is now no less 
than the revelation of the ‘structure of being’. As Merleau-Ponty puts it in the 
Preface to Phenomenology of Perception, it lies in grasping the ‘unique core of 
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existential meaning’ which provides the conditions for cognition and action in the 
world, and by so doing provides the conditions of possibility for Empiricist and 
Intellectualist forms of theorising. With a broadened conception of intentionality 
combined with an existentialist recasting of the phenomenological reduction, we are 
now in a position, he asserts, to address ourselves to the ‘question of being’. We may 
succeed where Husserl, due to his pronounced ‘Intellectualist’ and ‘logicist’ 
tendencies, had failed. Intentionality, in other words, is now understood in its fully 
ontological dimension. When we couple this with the reconception of the subject as a 
‘body-subject’ we now understand this intentionality as being primarily and 
primordially a pre-reflective bodily-intentionality, a ‘motor-intentionality’. And what 
this motor-intentionality makes plain is the essential situatedness of the subject in an 
environmental context. And thus it reveals as its ontological dimension the 
fundamental structure of our being – ‘being-in-the-world’ – as what makes bodily-
intentionality possible. 
In Merleau-Ponty’s attempt to articulate fundamental existential structures, 
the results of a series of phenomenological investigations that were originally carried 
out in an ‘ontologically disinterested manner’ by Husserl are reinterpreted in the light 
of the question of the meaning of Being. The inspiration for Merleau-Ponty’s move 
here comes from Martin Heidegger’s project for a fundamental ontology in Being 
and Time. Heidegger’s conception of ‘fundamental ontology’ holds that it is the job 
of phenomenology to subserve ontology, and that the foundational question of 
ontology is that of the meaning of being in general. Thus, he is asking what he views 
to be the most fundamental of philosophical questions: what does it mean for 
anything to be? Or alternatively, where does ‘to be’ derive its meaning? He 
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understands this approach to ontology to be fundamental because he is concerned 
with articulating the foundation of all other ontological and metaphysical approaches, 
as well as the various positive sciences that are philosophically dependent on them. 
For Heidegger ‘traditional ontologies’ concentrate their attention on ‘what there is’, 
on entities, rather than on ‘how it is’, on Being. This means that they tend to neglect 
the ‘how’, failing to grasp its significance, or try to explain the ‘how’ in terms of the 
‘what’ – reducing Being to the totality of entities and their relations. 
In order to grasp the meaning of Being – how ‘to be’ derives its meaning – he 
argues that we need to undertake what he calls ‘an existential analysis of Dasein’. 
This consists of an inquiry into the kind of Being that we ourselves have. The reason 
for this is that ‘Dasein’ – literally ‘there-being’, the kind of Being that humans 
instantiate – is the being to whom entities appear. Thus the Being of these entities is 
in some sense manifest to Dasein. Dasein is also unique among beings, according to 
Heidegger, in that it is the only being whose Being is a problem for it. That is, it is an 
essential aspect of Dasein that it raises questions as to the nature of its own Being – it 
is therefore ontological. Heidegger, like Merleau-Ponty after him, argues that a 
phenomenological approach reveals us as necessarily situated in a world that is 
opaque and thus necessarily exceeds our attempt to capture it in theoretical thought. 
Given that we have no explicit conceptual grasp of Being but rather are at the mercy 
of the ‘opacity of the fact’13, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, the correct way to proceed is 
via an explication of Dasein’s ‘pre-ontological understanding of Being’. This 
understanding is ‘pre-ontological’ because in our lived experience in the lifeworld 
                                                
13 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.71. 
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we have an implicit understanding of Being due to the fact that entities manifest 
themselves to us in their particular ways of Being in our active pre-theoretical 
engagement with them in everyday life14. This understanding is implicit as opposed 
to ontology, which is an explicit theoretical articulation.  
The process of making this implicit understanding explicit will provide us 
with an account of the structures that underpin the manifestation of the phenomena in 
their great variety of forms. This fundamental account of the ‘existential structures’ 
that underpin the entities thus presented is, in Heidegger’s terms, ‘an account of the 
Being of entities’. Thus the structure and content of lived experience, as revealed 
through methodical phenomenological description, is situated in terms of its 
‘existential ground’: ‘that which determines entities as entities, that on the basis of 
which entities are already understood’15. Heidegger’s analysis seeks to lay bare the 
essential structures (‘existentialia’ in his terminology) of our ‘pre-reflective’ and 
‘factical’ worldly existence. ‘Being’, on this conception, cannot refer to a thing or a 
property of a thing. It is a unique dimension that provides us with the possibility of 
‘objective thinking’, to use Merleau-Ponty’s term. Traditional metaphysics fails to 
grasp this fundamental ‘ontological difference’ in its marked tendency to confuse 
‘being’ with ‘substance’. 
                                                
14 See Being and Time, section 43. e.g. ‘The question of the meaning of Being becomes possible at all 
only if there is something like an understanding of Being. Understanding of Being belongs to the kind 
of Being which the entity called ‘Dasein’ possesses. The more appropriately and primordially we have 
succeeded in explicating this entity, the surer we are to attain our goal in the further course of working 
out the problem of fundamental ontology’. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, J. Macquarrie and E. 
Robinson (trans.) (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.244. 
 
15 Ibid. p.2. 
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When Heidegger, and following him Merleau-Ponty, refers to an ‘existential 
structure’ he is referring to that which underpins and expresses the uniqueness of the 
human way of existing as opposed to, say, a rock that is indifferent to its Being. 
Dasein – unlike an object – relates itself to its own Being. This Being to which it is 
related is its ‘existence’. ‘Existence’ is a technical term for Heidegger (and Merleau-
Ponty) which is reserved for the unique human mode of Being. It refers to his 
characterisation of the human mode of Being as ‘Ek-sistence’. The prefix ‘ek’, 
meaning ‘out’ is intended to indicate something crucial about Dasein’s way of Being. 
Heidegger understands Dasein’s ‘Ek-sistence’ as a process of ‘standing outside’ 
oneself'16 through one’s being inextricably involved in the world. He also 
characterises this unique form of temporalised Being in terms of being ‘ahead of 
oneself’ due to Dasein’s ongoing orientation towards its future goals and projects, its 
‘possibilities’. 
The reason that Heidegger employs this term is to make a clear distinction 
between the notion of human beings in traditional metaphysics as ‘static, ahistorical 
and self-sufficient substances’ and his conception of Dasein as a ‘dynamic, world-
oriented and self-interpreting’ being17. In stressing that human being stands ‘ahead 
of’ and ‘outside of’ itself he intends this in both a temporal and a spatial sense. In the 
temporal sense he means to indicate that the future-oriented plans and projects that 
are part of the process of self-creation – in the sense of self-definition and self-
interpretation – are always in an ongoing process of being enacted, but are also in an 
                                                
16 Heidegger employs the hyphenated form of this term to recall its original Greek and Latin meaning, 
‘to stand outside of’ or ‘to stand out from’. 
17 ‘Ek-sistence’ in Stephen Michelman, Historical Dictionary of Existentialism (Lanham, Maryland: 
The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2008). 
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ongoing process of being revised. The spatial sense in which we are ‘ahead of’ and 
‘outside of’ ourselves concerns the way in which our actions consist in the projecting 
of ourselves into a world where we stand in a relationship to things of meaningful 
concern – the vast variety of worldly things that we encounter matter to us in a basic 
way. They are not simply objects of indifferent rational inspection. 
This conception of phenomenology pressed exclusively into the service of the 
‘question of Being’, in particular that of the absolute origin of all Being prior to the 
‘subject-object’ framework of indifferent rational inspection, is the ontological 
context for Merleau-Ponty’s own phenomenological analyses. Merleau-Ponty’s 
appropriation of this conception is evidenced when his discussion of intentionality in 
a more Husserlian idiom moves into an explicitly Heideggerean ontological register. 
For example, he says: 
In our opinion Husserl’s originality lies beyond the notion of intentionality; it 
is to be found in the elaboration of this notion and in the discovery, beneath 
the intentionality of representations, of a deeper intentionality, which others 
have called existence18. 
And again: 
In Husserl’s language, beneath the ‘intentionality of the act’, which is the 
thetic consciousness of an object, and which, in intellectual memory for 
example, converts ‘this’ into an idea, we must recognize an ‘operative’ 
                                                
18 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.140. 
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intentionality (fungierende Intentionalität) which makes the former possible, 
and which is what Heidegger terms transcendence19. 
It is important to see how radical Merleau-Ponty’s move is, even within the 
context of classical phenomenology. In making the existentialist move he essentially 
argues that the methodology and theory of phenomenological philosophy, as Husserl 
conceived it, founders on the rocks of the phenomenology of pre-reflective lived 
perceptual experience and its resistance to being fully captured through conceptual 
representation. Thus, when accused of going ‘beyond phenomenological description’ 
and ‘taking sides’ in traditional ontological disputes, Merleau-Ponty rejects the 
charge and asserts: ‘I have never thought that phenomenology was only an 
introduction to philosophy; I believe that it is philosophy’20.  
It is the broadened conception of intentionality that also leads the 
phenomenological philosopher to broaden his horizon of concerns to include a great 
deal more than the ‘true and immutable natures’ posited in explicit intellectual acts. 
As he argues at the end of the Preface: 
Whether we are concerned with a thing perceived, a historical event or a 
doctrine, to ‘understand’ is to take in the total intention – not only what these 
things are for representation (the ‘properties’ of the thing perceived, the mass 
of ‘historical facts’, the ‘ideas’ introduced by the doctrine) – but the unique 
mode of existing expressed in the properties of the pebble, the glass or the 
                                                
19 Ibid. p. 486. 
20 Merleau-Ponty, ‘Man and Adversity’, p.234. 
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piece of wax, in all the events of a revolution, in all the thoughts of a 
philosopher. It is a matter, in the case of each civilization, of finding the Idea 
in the Hegelian sense, that is, not a law of the physico-mathematical type, 
discoverable by objective thought, but that formula which sums up some 
unique manner of behaviour towards others, towards Nature, time and death: 
a certain way of patterning the world …21 
It is here that we see the link between his concept of pre-reflective intentionality and 
his conception of existential ontology. This broadened concept of intentionality 
enables us to see how the phenomenological focus on the description of the structure 
of lived experience moves us from the idea of an ‘intentionality of representations’ to 
that of the motor-intentionality that subtends it. And if we ask about the ontological 
status of the intentional phenomena of the body-world relation, it opens us on to a 
full scale investigation of being – an existential ontology. This is precisely why 
Merleau-Ponty says, in explicit reference to his appropriation of Heidegger, that 
‘beneath the intentionality of representations’ there is ‘a deeper intentionality, which 
others have called existence22. And for its exploration neither the causal explanations 
of the ‘Empiricist’ nor the transcendental deductions of the ‘Intellectualist’ are 
appropriate. What is required is existential interpretation that seeks to express ‘the 
unique mode of existing’ of the subject matter in question. This process rests on the 
                                                
21 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.vxx. 
22 Ibid. p.140 (italics added). 
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descriptive phenomenology of perception but clearly goes beyond it in its 
interpretative ontological method23. 
The application of this broadened conception of intentionality to the 
interpretation of human events, as Ted Toadvine observes, enable us: 
… to grasp the ‘structure of being’ manifest through all possible relationships 
by which the events may be explained: economic, psychological, ideological, 
etc. At the intersection of each of the partial approaches to explanation, on 
Merleau-Ponty’s view, lies a ‘unique core of existential meaning’24. 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological approach to ontology operates via a 
phenomenology that, looking to the ‘deeper intentionality’ that subtends the 
‘intentionality of representations’, attempts to trace the ‘genesis of meaning’ through 
to an interpretation of the primordial ‘structure of being’ that subtends and makes 
possible the claims about subjects and objects that animate the ultimately false 
dichotomy of realism and idealism. The ‘chief gain’ of this approach, Merleau-Ponty 
argues, is that it has ‘united extreme subjectivism and extreme objectivism in its 
notion of the world’. This is clearly not ‘a world in the realist sense’ but rather a 
world that is ‘inseparable from subjectivity and intersubjectivity’25 – the world that 
we live, the perceived world.  
 
                                                
23 It is in this sense that the title Phenomenology of Perception fails to suggest the full content of 
Merleau-Ponty’s major work.  
24 Toadvine, ‘Merleau-Ponty’s Reading of Husserl, p.241 (Merleau-Ponty quote from Phenomenology 
of Perception, p.xxi). 
25 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.xxii. 
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2.2 Motor-intentionality, Body Schema and Ontology 
As mentioned earlier, in addressing the contradictions inherited from Husserl 
it becomes imperative to account for the phenomena of embodiment. It is a central 
component of Merleau-Ponty’s view that the incomplete nature of the constitution of 
the body has the important consequence of ruling out the core Husserlian concept of 
a transcendental ego26. Thus Merleau-Ponty provides his famous account of the 
‘lived body’, or the ‘body-subject’. As we have seen, he views the subject of 
perception as necessarily a bodily one. And the kind of necessity involved here is 
ontological necessity. That is to say, there can exist no subject of perception that is 
not embodied. And the body functions as ‘the subject of perception’, and thus of 
‘motor-intentionality’, by means of what he calls the ‘body schema’27. 
Merleau-Ponty argues that the philosophical significance of the bodily nature 
of perception is that my body constitutes my perspective on the world. My relation to 
my body is unlike my relation to anything else to which it affords me perceptual 
access. This is because my body is that through which I have a world. As Merleau-
Ponty argues, what ‘prevents my body’ ever being ‘completely constituted’ as ‘an 
object’, is the fact that ‘it is that by which there are objects’28. Therefore ‘the body … 
is not one more among external objects’29. For example, I can observe some parts of 
my body by means of others, such as looking at my hand or touching the back of my 
head. But I cannot make my body as a whole an object of perception. It is thus 
                                                
26 Ibid. p.105, p.472. 
27 The concept is an adaptation of the concept of the ‘transcendental schema’ originating in Kant’s 
conclusion that ‘there must be a third thing’ that mediates between concepts and intuitions by having 
something in common with both. 
28 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.105. 
29 Ibid. 
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impossible to shed our own perceptual agency and simply observe ourselves as we 
observe objects in the world. For example, Merleau-Ponty observes that when 
perceiving one’s own reflection in the mirror the reflected ‘body in the mirror never 
stops following my intentions like their shadow’30. However, by doing this I am not 
genuinely observing my body in the way that I observe objects in my everyday 
encounters with them. This is because, unlike in my everyday viewing of an object, 
where ‘observation consists in varying the point of view while keeping the object 
fixed’, the reflected bodily image that I perceive in the mirror is ‘given to me as a 
simulacrum of my tactile body’ because it ‘imitates its initiatives instead of 
responding to them by a free unfolding of perspectives’31. 
This asymmetry indicates the way that the structure of perception is 
constituted by the structure of the body. Perception is not just a simple presence of 
objects to a subject but has the horizonal structure that we discussed in the previous 
section. For example, no matter how accurately a photo can be said to represent an 
object, seeing the photo can never be the same as seeing the object itself. This is 
because the visual field has horizons determined by the structure of the body, 
whereas photos simply have edges. And so Merleau-Ponty argues that these horizons 
of perceptual experience are functions of the body through which this experience is 
realised. Along with horizonality, all perception has, as we saw, a figure/ground 
structure: ‘the perceptual ‘something’ is always in the middle of something else’32. 
This figure/ground structure is not ‘deducible a priori from the concept of 
                                                
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. p.4. 
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perception, and hence applicable to all possible perceivers’33. But nor is it, on the 
other hand, a merely contingent feature of experience, one that we can conceive our 
experience as lacking. Thus this figure/ground structure is part of a contingent a 
priori structure of perception. As Taylor Carman points out: 
It is contingent because it is, after all, a phenomenological function of the 
structures and capacities of the body, yet it is a priori inasmuch as it provides 
a stable ground or framework within which we are able to recognize some 
aspects of our experience as genuinely contingent and changeable34. 
So, Merleau-Ponty claims that our phenomenal field is also a ‘transcendental field’. 
That is, we can take a transcendental perspective on the contents and structure of the 
phenomenal field, enquiring about perceptual possibilities, impossibilities, and 
necessities. And thus, Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the ‘body schema’ anchors his 
account of the bodily nature of perception as a whole. The body schema is that 
which, prior to our applying of explicit concepts to it, structures our experience of 
the world in terms of a set of basic bodily capacities that are geared into a pre-
objective world which calls on those capacities in a kind of ‘dialogue’ between body 
and world. Thus, for example, when we learn a new dance move, which requires of 
us the picking up of a certain habit of movement, it is Merleau-Ponty’s view that ‘it 
is the body that “understands” in the acquisition of [this] habit’35. In the case of 
object perception this means that the perception of objects is already structured by 
                                                
33 Carman, Merleau-Ponty, p.104. 
34 Ibid. p.105. 
35 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.168. 
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my body and its sense of its own possibilities. So saying that perception is grounded 
in the body, as he does, is to say that the phenomenal field is constituted by the body 
schema. That is, our basic bodily structure and capacities serve to constitute a 
perceptual world that we experience ‘motor-intentionally’ as necessarily 
perspectival, horizonal and structured by figure/ground relations. It follows from this 
that the ‘structure of being’ that Merleau-Ponty’s account seeks to lay bare can be 
revealed to the reflecting subject only through the a priori body schema that 
structures the subject’s perceptual world. Thus, in playing an anchoring role in his 
account of the bodily nature of perception, Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the body 
schema also anchors his broader ontological account. This is because it helps to 
articulate the nature of primordial existential structures (a priori structures of being): 
the ‘body-subject’ (with its body schema) as fundamentally ‘being-in-the-world’.  
 
3. The Necessity of Existentialism – the Philosophy of Concrete 
Human Existence 
Given that reflection is grounded in pre-reflective perception, and that we 
always experience this as in some minimal sense meaningful, Merleau-Ponty argues 
that we are a subject whose experience is essentially meaningful. We are, as he puts 
it, ‘condemned to meaning’36. The kind of subject that we are, as we have seen, is 
one that is necessarily embodied; as such, it is necessarily grounded in a world of 
                                                
36 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.xxii. This is Merleau-Ponty’s critical reworking of 
Sartre’s slogan ‘we are condemned to freedom’. Cf: ‘We are always in a plenum, in being, just as a 
face, even in repose, even in death, is always condemned to express something’: Phenomenology of 
Perception, p.525. 
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situated pre-reflective bodily meaning. This lived experience, he argues, is something 
that is common to human beings as an organic species due to universally shared 
structures of perception and embodiment (the body schema), which for Merleau-
Ponty are the structures through which being is necessarily disclosed.  
Merleau-Ponty makes the transcendental argument that pre-objective 
perceptual experience provides the ‘ground’ for conceiving of the world in terms of 
subjects and objects. This entails the idea that the lived experience of the historically 
situated subject is the source and basis of all our knowledge claims. This source, 
however, is not transparent to the reflecting philosopher. Rather, it is ‘opaque’, 
always exceeding our ability to fully grasp it in reflection. This is because all our acts 
of reflection are subtended by a primordial perceptual relationship with pre-objective 
being, the lived background against which those acts stand out and on which those 
acts are ultimately grounded. In discovering ‘the fundamental fact that we exist 
before we reflect37’, we also discover that our basic way of existence is not only 
‘opaque’, but also ‘ambiguous’ (in the sense of being always in principle amenable 
to multiple interpretation). And so Merleau-Ponty argues that in attempting to carry 
out Husserl’s method it will inevitably be discovered that: 
When I begin to reflect my reflection bears upon an unreflective experience; 
moreover my reflection cannot be unaware of itself as an event, and so it 
appears to itself in the light of a truly creative act, of a changed structure of 
consciousness, and yet it has to recognize, as having priority over its own 
                                                
37 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ‘Marxism and Philosophy’ in Sense and Non-Sense, (Evanston IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 1964), p.135. 
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operations, the world which is given to the subject because the subject is 
given to himself.38 
Thus, the very process of attempting to carry out the philosophical method Husserl 
prescribes in Ideas 1 demonstrates to us the necessity of existentialism. This is 
because, as he puts it in the Preface to Phenomenology of Perception, ‘the most 
important lesson which the reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete 
reduction’39. That is to say, when we ‘break with our familiar acceptance’ of the 
world, via the reduction, and systematically focus our attention on the contents and 
structure of phenomenal consciousness just as we experience it, ‘we can learn 
nothing but the unmotivated upsurge of the world’40 – the brute fact of the existence 
of a transcendent world that is ‘always already there’ before any act of reflection, or 
indeed any particular perceptual act.  
  The epistemological thesis of ‘the primacy of perception’ and its 
correlate, the ontological thesis of ‘the primacy of phenomena’, come together in 
Merleau-Ponty’s version of the Cartesian conception of privileged epistemic access. 
That is, he holds that first person consciousness provides us with direct unmediated 
access to emergent pre-objective being. In Merleau-Ponty’s version of the Cartesian 
claim the privileged mode of access is by way of phenomenologically reduced 
perception, which is for him access to the real – that is, the ‘phenomenal being’ 
manifest through the ‘phenomenal field’ of our direct experiential encounter. There 
is, however, an important continuity with the Cartesian/Kantian/Husserlian tradition 
                                                
38 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.xi. 
39 Ibid. p. xv. 
40 Ibid. 
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in terms of the first person approach coupled with the search for a method that would 
ensure the truth of ontological claims made from this vantage point. It is not simply 
that Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy is undertaken from the vantage point of the first 
person (in Merleau-Ponty’s existential-phenomenological sense). It attempts to 
provide a method that will stand as the backbone of a (more or less) systematic 
justification for the philosophical claims subsequently advanced. And it endeavours 
to demonstrate the superiority both of the method and of the advanced claims it 
makes with respect to the rivals of Intellectualist idealism and scientific realism.  
This philosophy, as we have seen, is necessitated by the problem of the 
contradictions engendered in the theoretical claims of Husserl’s ‘static 
phenomenology’ of Ideas 1, which stand in contrast with the implications of the 
phenomenological analyses of the body and of perception. Following these 
implications through serves as the motivation behind Merleau-Ponty’s claim that his 
existential phenomenology is:  
… a philosophy which puts essences back into existence, and does not expect 
to arrive at an understanding of man and the world from any starting point 
other than that of their ‘facticity41. 
Merleau-Ponty’s position is designed to address contradictions in the account 
of the constitution of the body, and of passive synthesis generally, that he inherits 
from Husserl. It is Husserl’s achievement, following in the footsteps of Descartes 
and Kant, to make explicit precisely what a subject-centred philosophical method 
                                                
41 Ibid. p.vii. 
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must look like. Husserl’s work is, in a sense, a summation of the tradition, a spelling 
out of just what needs to be done in order to fulfill the promise of the Cartesian 
philosophy of the subject. But it is the conflict that arises between the position 
outlined in Ideas 1 – with its explicit formulation in terms of the phenomenological 
method – and his self-interpretation of the transcendental idealist ontology this 
method putatively entails, which necessitates phenomenology taking the existentialist 
turn that it does.  
Merleau-Ponty’s work demonstrates that the option of a return to a notion of 
the Kantian-Husserlian epistemological subject of self-transparent reason can no 
longer be seriously entertained. This is the case due to the implications of 
phenomenological analyses undertaken initially by Husserl himself, and then taken 
up and extended by Merleau-Ponty. These analyses serve to indicate the dependence 
of the subject on his embodiment, and on a natural and cultural ‘lifeworld’, for his 
own self-conception. Merleau-Ponty, for his part, collapses the role of transcendental 
theorising as Husserl had conceived it in Ideas 1 into his existential-hermeneutic 
claims about the nature of the emergence of meaning in pre-objective lived 
experience42. Viewed from the perspective of the Husserlian phenomenologist 
seeking to apply Husserl’s phenomenological method to address questions of 
ontology, it must be admitted that Merleau-Ponty’s move to significantly curtail the 
role of transcendental theorising and to focus on a phenomenology of the emergence 
of meaning in pre-objective lived experience is undertaken for good 
phenomenological reasons. For, in doing this Merleau-Ponty is arguably being true to 
                                                
42 I will be discussing exactly what Merleau-Ponty means by transcendentalism in the following 
chapter. 
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the phenomenology of perception and the body that arises primarily out of Husserl’s 
own analyses. 
 
4. Existentialism is a Naturalism … but not a Scientism  
In this chapter we have arrived at a view of Merleau-Ponty’s ‘existential 
phenomenology’ as a distinctive position that has developed through a critique of 
Husserl’s conception of transcendental phenomenology. As we have seen, Merleau-
Ponty’s overriding concern is with the ‘question of Being’ and, as such, he has an 
original conception of the phenomenological reduction, intentionality and the subject 
that reflect this ontological focus. He also demonstrates how a phenomenological 
approach to ontological questions must consist in a ‘constructive’ phenomenology 
that re-interprets descriptions made within the methodological reading of the 
reduction in terms of a version of the reduction as an integral component of an 
existential ontology. 
In this final section of the chapter I will now reconnect with the theme that 
was introduced in the Introduction, and which initially motivated our enquiry: the use 
of Merleau-Ponty for cognitive science and cognitive science-inspired philosophy of 
mind. As stated in the Introduction, the aim of the thesis is to demonstrate the full 
philosophical import of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological ontology through an 
explication of his method and of the claims that he arrives at via this method. My 
exegetical and critical work, including my corrective reading of the reduction, 
addresses itself to two mains targets via a three step argumentative trajectory. These 
 Chapter 2: Intentionality, Ontology and Scientism 
 
  130  
two targets are: recent scientistic appropriations of Merleau-Ponty and recent 
philosophical misreadings in the Anglophone literature. The three steps of my 
argument move from: 
1. making a critical intervention into the ‘naturalisation of phenomenology’ 
debate, to;  
2. addressing the question of the correct interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophical position, specifically, critiquing recent claims regarding the 
phenomenological reduction (Chapter 1), transcendentalism (Chapter 3) and 
dialectics (Chapter 4); to 
3. a critique of Merleau-Ponty’s conception of ‘the primacy of perception’ 
and a suggested modification to his position. 
In relation to this three-step argument, I am now in a position to complete the 
first of these steps: a critical intervention into the ‘naturalisation of phenomenology’ 
debate. This chapter and the previous one, taken together, have provided us with a 
picture of Merleau-Ponty’s key methodological and theoretical commitments 
sufficient to substantiate our intervention. Let us now draw out the implications of 
the picture provided by my ‘counter-reading’ for these recent scientistic 
appropriations of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. 
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4.1 The ‘Naturalisation of Phenomenology’ Project and the Cognitive Sciences 
As I explained in the Introduction, my exploration of Merleau-Ponty is 
initially motivated by the recent use of his work in the cognitive sciences and in 
cognitive science-inspired philosophy of mind. In the Anglophone world since the 
1970s there has been what is sometimes referred to as a ‘naturalistic turn’ in 
philosophy. This has involved a ‘turning away’ from a conception of philosophy as 
consisting principally in a priori methods of conceptual analysis, and towards a 
conception of philosophy as continuous with the natural sciences. This turn has been, 
in significant measure, inspired by the advances in ‘cognitive science’, the new 
interdisciplinary science of cognition where cognition is taken in its broad sense to 
include perception and emotion.  
Theorists in the new interdisciplinary projects of the cognitive sciences take 
themselves to be in the business of constructing the first plausible scientific theory of 
consciousness. Although it has been largely ignored until very recently, interest in 
the phenomenological dimension of cognition has been steadily increasing in recent 
years. Within the last two decades the work of Merleau-Ponty has played a 
particularly prominent role in inspiring and guiding the development of a critique of 
the traditional conception of cognitive science as computational analysis and 
unconscious information processing that rests on the idea of the brain as functioning 
like a computer. 
Recent readings of Merleau-Ponty’s work as representing a strain of 
theorising that is consonant with the cognitive sciences have not been particularly 
concerned with exegetical issues in Merleau-Ponty scholarship. It is not the primary 
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intention of these readers to reconstruct his position with exegetical precision. 
Rather, they claim that they are reading him primarily with an interest in the apparent 
convergence between his phenomenological descriptions and the results of 
contemporary cognitive science. The incorporation of these ideas in the context of 
cognitive science positions Merleau-Ponty in continuity with developments in 
cognitive science and cognitive science-oriented philosophy of mind, as well as 
being an important precursor to contemporary accounts. 
The recent increase of interest in the role of the phenomenology of embodied 
perception by ‘post-cognitivists’, and their enthusiastic use of Merleau-Ponty’s work, 
raises important questions about these readings and the philosophical import they 
take Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology to have. In cognitive science, and in much 
philosophy of mind, Merleau-Ponty is read as offering a theory of perception 
consisting of a set of phenomenological descriptions. From this set of 
phenomenological descriptions, a set of arguments is derived that are said to be 
convergent with work in the empirical cognitive sciences and in contemporary 
philosophy of mind – for example, regarding the intimate interdependence of 
perception and action, the non-conceptual content of perceptual experience and the 
irreducibility of bodily perception43. These readers of Merleau-Ponty are often said 
to be involved in what is referred to as a ‘naturalisation of phenomenology’. They 
understand naturalisation as a project that attempts to bridge the ‘explanatory gap’ 
that exists between phenomenological accounts and scientific models of 
consciousness. This project is driven by the view that phenomenology has to be, as 
                                                
43 See Introduction, n.48. 
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Roy et al. put it, ‘integrated into an explanatory framework where every acceptable 
property is made continuous with the properties admitted by natural science’44. 
Naturalisers of this kind hold, either explicitly or implicitly, that this program holds 
out the promise of overcoming the untenable ontological dualism that persistently 
haunts the philosophy of mind, and is reproduced in the cognitive sciences.  
If chapters 1 and 2 have done their job then they should have combined to 
shed some light on the relationship between this debate and Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophical views. For example, it should now be apparent that the term 
‘naturalisation’, though perhaps the right one when applied to Husserl, is the wrong 
term when applied to the process of making Merleau-Ponty’s work conducive to the 
project of the cognitive sciences. The reason for this, I would argue, is that Merleau-
Ponty is already a naturalist, though not a scientistic one. It is my view that 
Merleau-Ponty is a ‘liberal naturalist’ whose method has a significant transcendental 
aspect. As such, we need a term to capture the moves that need to be performed in 
order for his philosophy to be reinterpreted within the framework of cognitive 
science. Given our reading of his position, it would seem appropriate to characterise 
this as: a reinstatement of the ‘natural attitude’. If this is accepted then we might 
concede that, at least in this sense, it is a naturalisation. However, there are two 
problems with this. Firstly, liberal naturalists might legitimately complain about this 
use of the term ‘naturalisation’ and argue that it is being wrongly equated with the 
term ‘scientism’. This is a justified protest because the term ‘scientism’ is logically 
only a subset of ‘naturalism’. And, secondly, given Merleau-Ponty’s characterisation 
                                                
44 Roy et al., ‘Beyond the Gap’, p.1. 
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of the natural attitude as being a ‘primordial faith’ rooted in the objectivising 
structure of perception, it is perhaps rather the ‘naturalistic attitude’ that develops as 
a result of building a scientistic theoretical view out of the relative determinacy 
delivered through this natural perceptual movement that is the real candidate. Thus, it 
would seem to be preferable, strictly speaking, to talk of a ‘scientising’. This 
attempted scientising of phenomenology – this reinstatement of the natural and the 
naturalistic attitudes – reverses the methodological procedure explicitly laid out by 
Merleau-Ponty in Phenomenology of Perception. Thus, in jettisoning the reduction, it 
‘de-transcendentalises’ his phenomenology, reinstating ‘objective thought’ with its 
‘prejudice of determinate being’. 
If we revisit the examples that we raised in Chapter 1, in light of our 
exposition of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical position, we can see this scientising at 
work. Hubert Dreyfus, as we saw, suggests that we might equate Merleau-Ponty’s 
notion of an ‘intentional arc’, with the notion of a ‘feedback loop’ in cognitive 
science. Then he goes on to argue for a convergence between this reinterpreted 
version of the ‘intentional arc’ and the non-representationalist theory of neural 
networks. Dreyfus suggests that neural-network theory and Merleau-Ponty's 
phenomenology of our basic bodily coping with the world can be claimed to stand in 
a relationship of mutual support in demonstrating the implausibility of 
representationalism. However, by arguing that ‘Merleau-Ponty’s claim that the 
representationalist accounts of our most basic and pervasive forms of learning and 
skillful action are mistaken and require a different account’ can be ‘defended not 
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only on phenomenological grounds, but on neuroscientific grounds as well45’, 
Dreyfus suggests that Merleau-Ponty philosophical claims are straightforwardly 
subject to empirical correction. Hence, he goes on to suggest that: 
… we must supplement Merleau-Ponty's account of the ‘I can’ with a 
scientific theory of how the body – conceived objectivistically as an ‘actual 
body-structure’ – conditions competence and cognition46. 
The general rationale behind Dreyfus’ move here is rooted in the way that a 
cognitive sciences approach views the intrinsic limitations of a purely 
phenomenological approach. Dreyfus suggests this in his discussion of how Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenological approach may be said to leave him without a convincing 
account through which to understand the reciprocal process characteristic of skilled 
behaviour: how ‘past experience is projected back into the perceptual world of the 
learner and shows up as affordances or solicitations to further action’47. This is what 
Merleau-Ponty calls the dialectical process of progressive development and 
refinement of perceptual and motor capacities, and his phenomenology identifies it 
as a central feature of embodied perception. However, suggests Dreyfus, from the 
phenomenological perspective Merleau-Ponty is left to marvel at the ‘magical’ 
nature of the perception-action feedback loop. This is because Merleau-Ponty denies, 
in principle, that a neuroscientific approach is fundamental to a properly 
philosophical account of the complex phenomena of skill acquisition without 
                                                
45 Dreyfus, ‘Merleau-Ponty and Recent Cognitive Science’, p.142. 
46 Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 'The Challenge of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Embodiment for 
Cognitive Science’, p.118. 
47 Dreyfus, ‘Merleau-Ponty and Recent Cognitive Science’, p.132. 
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presenting a detailed alternative account. Dreyfus is referring here to Merleau-
Ponty’s claim that ‘for the normal person his projects polarize the world, bringing 
magically to view a host of signs which guide action …’48 The suggestion is that the 
way acquired skills are projected back into our phenomenal field in terms of 
capacities for action or affordances can only be described by Merleau-Ponty as the 
phenomenal field being reconstituted, ‘being reorganized’ by a ‘ … law unknown to 
the subject’49. Thus, Merleau-Ponty uses the term ‘magic’ to evoke the idea that this 
process is in no sense reliant on any act of the subject; rather, it is a structure of 
perceptual experience that simply passively occurs and, as such, is 
phenomenologically available for description as simply ‘magically’ occurring.  
However from the fact that Merleau-Ponty does not provide an account of 
skill acquisition in Phenomenology of Perception, it does not follow that such an 
account is not possible from a phenomenological perspective. And Merleau-Ponty 
himself would certainly argue that the outline of such an account is to be found in the 
Phenomenology. The important point for our concerns, however, is that Dreyfus 
implies that a neurobiological account might be the appropriate place to supplement 
Merleau-Ponty’s incomplete phenomenological account, rather than just further 
phenomenological exploration of the issue. But, as we have seen, Merleau-Ponty 
would reject Dreyfus’ suggestion on the grounds that he has illicitly scientised 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. His move of translating the concept ‘intentional 
arc’ into the concept ‘feedback loop’ is carried out on the grounds of a deeper 
translation that takes place without argumentation, yet it is the philosophical ground 
                                                
48 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.129 (italics added). 
49 Ibid. p.225. 
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that makes the former translation possible. This deeper translation is the essence of 
the scientising move and consists of ‘de-transcendentalising’ Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophical position in order to read it as a phenomenological psychology. That is, 
a phenomenological approach that understands phenomenological studies as forming 
part of the science of psychology. This is an empirical science about ‘the nature of 
the psyche’ … a science about psychical life understood as a real occurrent entity in 
the natural world’50. On Merleau-Ponty’s view phenomenological psychology, like 
any science, is philosophically ‘naïve’ because it simply takes its subject matter for 
granted. Rather than asking fundamental questions about how experience and 
scientific theorising are possible, as philosophical phenomenology does, it simply 
presupposes objectivism and realism in its attempts to understand consciousness on 
the model of objects and their causal relations. Reconstructing Merleau-Ponty’s view 
in these terms essentially turns it into different position. It is no longer a 
transcendental philosophical position resting on the phenomenological reduction and 
using phenomenology in the service of existential ontology, where the terms ‘body-
subject’ as ‘being-in-the-world’ are understood to express a priori structures of 
being. Instead it is a phenomenological psychological reconstruction that understands 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological claims as claims about the structure and content 
of embodied perceptual experience within the natural attitude and, thus, of the same 
order as claims made in the natural science of psychology. And given that they are 
reconstructed as claims about the cognitive experience of ‘the mind’ or ‘psyche’, in 
the sense that this term is traditionally used in ‘philosophy of mind’, it follows that 
                                                
50 Dan Zahavi, ‘Phenomenology and the Project of Naturalization’, Phenomenology and the Cognitive 
Sciences 3 (2004), p.336. 
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these claims can be deployed in the service of either the confirmation or 
disconfirmation of theories in the cognitive sciences.  
Perhaps the best way to read Dreyfus here, I would contend, is as arguing that 
a cognitive scientific perspective, if it is to progress beyond its present point, needs 
to learn from Merleau-Ponty’s account of embodiment in order to avoid incoherence 
on its own terms. Basically, the idea would be that any and all representationalist 
approaches to perception necessarily fail and that connectionism at least avoids this 
non-start. And, given the centrality of skill acquisition to a theory of consciousness, 
it might fruitfully explore this area using Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological 
descriptions as a plausibility test for its theoretical models. This, of course, makes it 
an argument firmly within the epistemic framework of cognitive science. 
Dreyfus’ critique of Merleau-Ponty’s marvelling at the ‘magical’ nature of 
lived experience is certainly interesting within that framework, and may have 
implications that can spur a Merleau-Pontian to a clarification of their views. 
Nevertheless, he has radically modified Merleau-Ponty for the purposes of a 
potential rapprochement with scientistic naturalism. The key move that allows him to 
claim Merleau-Ponty for this purpose is his translation of the concept of the 
‘intentional arc’ in terms of that of a ‘feedback loop’. He justifies this by referring to 
a statement in Merleau-Ponty’s earlier work, The Structure of Behaviour, where 
Merleau-Ponty asserts the ‘dialectical’ nature of the relationship between organism 
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and environment in the following way: ‘the relations between the organism and its 
milieu are not relations of linear causality but of circular causality’51. 
As Justin Tauber correctly argues in connection with this:  
The translation from ‘circular causality’ to ‘feedback loop’ is certainly a lot 
less problematic than it would be from ‘intentional arc’ … However, it isn't 
clear that Merleau-Ponty would himself endorse the equation of the meaning 
of ‘intentional arc’ and ‘circular causality’ given that, prior to introducing the 
former phrase in the Phenomenology, he writes that ‘reciprocal action’ is as 
yet only a compromise with causal thought, and a contradictory principle’52.  
So there is an important modification being undertaken with respect to the 
role of causal explanation in Dreyfus’ account. But this is a modification that, as we 
have seen, goes against Merleau-Ponty’s view, which holds that such causal 
explanation is philosophically ill conceived because it fails to grasp how it is 
derivative from the more basic level of lived experience. So when Dreyfus asserts 
that ‘the neural-net model thus suggests a nonrepresentational, and yet non-magical, 
brain basis of the intentional arc53’, he is asserting a possibility that Merleau-Ponty 
explicitly rules out in principle. And he does this on the grounds of his ‘scientisation’ 
of Merleau-Ponty’s position. 
                                                
51 Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behaviour, p.15. 
52 Tauber, Invitations, p.24. Merleau-Ponty quote: Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 
p.127. 
53 Dreyfus, ‘Merleau-Ponty and Recent Cognitive Science’, p.134. 
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Shaun Gallagher’s tacit ‘scientisation’ of Merleau-Ponty follows the same 
pattern. Gallagher reads Merleau-Ponty as addressing the issue of ‘bodily systems 
that operate on a subpersonal, automatic level’54. Like Dreyfus, Gallagher argues that 
Merleau-Ponty’s extension of the concept of intentionality to include the motor 
intentionality of the bodily subject must inevitably run up against the limitations of 
the phenomenological method. Arguing that the role of the body schema is 
‘impenetrable to phenomenological reflection’, he concludes that it ought to be 
‘worked out conceptually with the help of the empirical sciences’55. On Gallagher’s 
conception the primary goal is to argue for embodiment as the central theme for 
cognitive science. As in Dreyfus, Merleau-Ponty’s views are seen as being 
straightforwardly subject to empirical correction as the result of a tacit scientisation 
that reconstructs Merleau-Ponty as a phenomenological psychologist. And so, as a 
result of this reconstruction, Gallagher can claim that empirical research can produce 
evidence that, in supporting Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of lived experience, 
also demonstrates a convergence between the two bodies of theory.  
Like Dreyfus, Gallagher also looks to The Structure of Behaviour as the 
reference point for his appropriation of Merleau-Ponty for an embodied cognitive 
science. For example, Gallagher emphasises Merleau-Ponty’s claim that there is ‘a 
truth to be found in naturalism that is lost in a purely transcendental approach’56. 
However Gallagher, whilst advancing no sustained defence of his reconstruction, 
offers suggestions as to what this defence might look like. It involves implying that 
                                                
54 Gallagher, 'Body Schema and Intentionality', p.233. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. p.232. For Merleau-Ponty’s discussion see: Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behaviour, 
pp.201-221. 
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The Structure of Behaviour and Phenomenology of Perception consist of basically 
the same ‘kinds of investigations’57. This view is taken to be illustrated by the fact 
that: 
… although he did not engage in scientific experiments, he took 
contemporary empirical studies seriously and used science in an 
interdisciplinary fashion, to motivate his phenomenological investigations.58 
So given the importance of empirical studies in motivating his phenomenology 
Gallagher argues that: 
If we understand cognitive science in the very general sense of an 
interdisciplinary scientific enterprise that attempts to explain cognition, where 
cognition is defined to include not simply higher-order thought, but such 
things as perception and emotion, then Merleau-Ponty was certainly involved 
in that kind of enterprise59. 
Apart from the contestable claims regarding the content of Merleau-Ponty’s first two 
books, this way of putting the issue is not defensible. For it is certainly true to say 
that Merleau-Ponty ‘used science in an interdisciplinary fashion, to motivate his 
phenomenological investigations’. It is thus true that he was involved in a sort of 
inter-disciplinary cognitive scientific enterprise before the fact60. But Gallagher 
                                                
57 Shaun Gallagher, ‘Cognitive Science’ in Merleau-Ponty: Key Concepts, Rosalyn Diprose and Jack 
Reynolds (eds.) (Stocksfield: Acumen, 2008), p.207. 
58 Ibid. p.208. 
59 Ibid. p.207. 
60 He also held the Chair of Child Psychology and Pedagogy at the Sorbonne from 1949 to1952. 
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implies that Merleau-Ponty took this involvement with the sciences as being 
continuous with his works understood explicitly as ‘works of philosophy’. But this is 
a misunderstanding because Merleau-Ponty’s purpose in using empirical research is 
always to draw the reader’s attention to phenomena that can, and ought to be, re-
described from the phenomenological point of view. This is because it is only from 
this perspective that its true philosophical significance can be grasped. 
This point can be made clear if we look at the case study that Merleau-Ponty 
discusses at greatest length in Phenomenology of Perception, that of the aphasic 
‘Schneider’ who suffered from a brain injury as the result of being struck by a shell 
splinter during the First World War. The Schneider case is complex but a basic 
sketch of Merleau-Ponty’s analysis will suffice for my present point. Schneider can 
comfortably perform complex habitual concrete movements, such as those involved 
in making and mending clothes, but is unable to perform any ‘abstract’ movements, 
like pointing his arm in a specified direction or locating unseen points of contact on 
his body61. Schneider is also unable, for example, to engage in play-acting62.  
Despite the fact that he has retained his capacity for perception and habitual 
movement, he has lost of a sense of the range of possible movements that are 
normally available to us. Merleau-Ponty argues that this indicates that although he 
has retained a sense of his ‘phenomenal body’, his loss of the ability for ‘abstract’ 
movement and play-acting indicate that he has lost the sense of his body as 
something objectively located in space and, as such, available for ‘gratuitous and free 
                                                
61 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.118. 
62 Ibid. p.156. 
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spatial thought’63. The inability to orient himself in relation to the possible means 
that Schneider lacks the ability to ‘creatively reorganise the structure of [his] world 
and then retain this reorganised structure as a cultural “sediment” within [his] 
experience of the world’64. But the point of going through the empirical material for 
Merleau-Ponty is always to draw the reader’s attention to a crucial philosophical 
point. Merleau-Ponty’s goal in discussing the detail of the impoverished world that 
Schneider experiences as a result of his disorder is to bring into relief, by contrast, 
our normal motor-intentional capacities. Again, Merleau-Ponty’s discussion is 
complex, but a key point of showing us the ‘levelling-down of the world’65 that 
Schneider experiences is to illustrate the way that: 
It is this existential basis of intelligence which is affected, much more than 
intelligence itself, for, as we have shown, Schneider’s general intelligence is 
intact … Beneath the intelligence as an anonymous function or a categorial 
process, a personal core has to be recognized, which is the patient’s being, his 
power of existing66.  
And Merleau-Ponty explicates ‘this existential basis of intelligence’ in the very 
words that Dreyfus quotes in his support of his connectionist proposal: 
… the life of consciousness – cognitive life, the life of desire or perceptual 
life – is subtended by an ‘intentional arc’ which projects round about us our 
                                                
63 Ibid. p.119. 
64 Baldwin, ‘Editor’s Introduction’ p.16. 
65 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.150. 
66 Ibid. p.155. 
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past, our future, our human setting, our physical, ideological and moral 
situation, or rather which results from our being situated in all these respects. 
It is this intentional arc which brings about the unity of the senses, of 
intelligence, of sensibility and motility. And it is this which ‘goes limp’ in 
[Schneider’s] illness67. 
So Merleau-Ponty uses the Schneider case material with the express purpose of 
explicating his concept of motor-intentionality, our basic bodily intentionality, and 
thus to lay out an important foundation of his theory. As we have seen earlier in the 
chapter, Merleau-Ponty goes on to explicate the ontological dimension of this motor-
intentionality as the existential structure being-in-the-world. So, even if Merleau-
Ponty was in a sense involved in a kind of cognitive scientific enterprise before the 
fact, it is a serious misunderstanding of Phenomenology of Perception to read it as a 
work of phenomenological psychology rather than of phenomenological ontology. 
This is because, as Merleau-Ponty argues, a ‘work of philosophy’ takes up a critical 
attitude with respect to the sciences and aims to provide a ‘radical reflection’68 on 
their very possibility69. It does not simply presuppose the naturalistic attitude, unlike 
the cognitive sciences, which necessarily presuppose it. 
What my exposition of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy has helped to make clear 
is that, although their conception of the relationship between phenomenology and 
                                                
67 Ibid. p.157. 
68 Ibid. p.57. 
69 The taking up of a critical attitude for Merleau-Ponty means that we refuse to simply take the 
subject matter ‘nature’ for granted. Instead, philosophical phenomenology takes up a transcendental 
perspective with respect to empirical experience and the scientific objective world that it purports to 
discover out there wholly independent of human enquirers. This perspective enables us to ask 
genuinely philosophical questions about the foundations of experience and scientific thinking. It 
investigates the very basis of this experience and this ‘knowledge’ and asks how it is possible. 
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cognitive science may differ in the details, Dreyfus, Gallagher and Roy et al. hold a 
general view in common. That view rests on an implicit transposition of the 
phenomenological claims in Phenomenology of Perception, which are explicitly 
philosophical claims, into the claims of a phenomenological psychology that does 
not take up a ‘critical’ attitude. So, however effective the lines of argument proposed 
by Dreyfus, Gallagher and Roy et al. are when viewed as arguments against 
representationalist approaches to perception within cognitive science, they 
necessarily involve a tacit scientisation of Merleau-Ponty’s view – in diametrical 
opposition to Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical claims. This view, as we have seen, 
argues powerfully against the objectivism presupposed in this kind of 
‘naturalisation’, with its implicit ontological commitment to a realist conception of a 
world of determinate objects standing in external causal relations with one another. 
For the subject-object split that animates ‘objective’ and ‘causal’ thought – leading it 
to assert that fundamentally we are physical objects with the property of 
consciousness – is grounded by Merleau-Ponty in the existential body-world relation 
revealed in pre-reflective perceptual experience. Thus, the body-world relation 
expounded by Merleau-Ponty is taken to ontologically underpin, and hence provide 
the theoretical ground for, the causal explanations proposed in the natural sciences, 
including the cognitive sciences.  
Gallagher claims that ‘the body schema must be worked out with the aid of 
the empirical sciences’ in terms of ‘bodily systems that operate on a subpersonal, 
automatic level’. Dreyfus claims that ‘we must supplement Merleau-Ponty's account 
of the ‘I can’ with a scientific theory of how the body – conceived objectivistically as 
an ‘actual body-structure’ – conditions competence and cognition’. However, it is 
 Chapter 2: Intentionality, Ontology and Scientism 
 
  146  
Merleau-Ponty’s view that what makes such theorising possible is the fact that we 
are fundamentally an irreducible body-subject. As a body-subject we are not 
susceptible to explanation in terms of an objectivist ontology of a determinate being 
comprised of mutually exterior parts that make up a human organism who is located 
as another object in a world conceived of as a totality of objects.  
It is a consequence of his conception of phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty 
would argue, that it is impossible to appraise the theory of perception independently 
of the existentialism in which it is situated. Thus to assess his theory of perception is 
also to assess his ontology, because it is an ontological theory of perception through 
and through. For Merleau-Ponty, as we have seen, perception involves a 
simultaneously intentional and ontological relation between perceiver and perceived, 
an intentional/ontological relation. For Merleau-Ponty, unlike the scientistic 
philosopher of mind, perception does not simply provide a compelling ‘clue’ as to 
the nature of the world; a nature that can only be worked out when the insufficiencies 
of perception are supplemented through the methodological and theoretical practices 
of the cognitive sciences and the critical rational analysis of the philosophy of mind. 
Rather, on Merleau-Ponty’s account, perception gives us direct unmediated access to 
emergent pre-objective being. 
 As with Dreyfus and Gallagher, Varela, Thomson and Rosch 
‘scientise’ Merleau-Ponty in an ‘off-stage’ tacit manner, invoking his 
phenomenology in the name of a scientific project which is at odds with the main 
thrust of his philosophical convictions. On Merleau-Ponty’s account, far from 
evidencing a convergence between phenomenology and the cognitive sciences on the 
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terms of the objectivism that underpins those sciences, the results of 
phenomenological enquiry actively undermine the objectivism that informs the 
tacitly assumed ontology of the cognitive sciences. For example, when Varela, 
Thomson and Rosch claim that they seek to ‘open a space of possibilities in which 
the circulation between cognitive science and human experience can be fully 
appreciated’70, the space that is opened up is nevertheless circumscribed by a 
presupposed objectivism and realism. 
Merleau-Ponty certainly does argue for a convergence between 
phenomenology and ‘the sciences of man’71 but his view of ‘convergence’ is 
definitely not that of the post-cognitivists. He argues for a fundamental difference 
between philosophical and scientific enquiry. On this view, the very results of a 
sustained methodological phenomenology will not simply serve the function of a 
critical compliment to neuroscience-based arguments against representationalism in 
perception. Instead, they show us that, in order to a achieve a full understanding of 
the philosophical implications of the phenomenology of perceptual experience, we 
must take up a transcendental attitude with respect to that experience and attempt to 
grasp the ontological significance of the perceptual phenomena beyond realism and 
idealism. Rather than simply contributing to the stock of knowledge of the ‘sciences 
of man’ or serving alongside the facts of neuroscientific studies, as working towards 
the empirical confirmation of empirical theories within the naturalistic attitude, 
phenomenology must play a distinct role in overturning that attitude and undertaking 
a transcendental reflection that seeks to understand the very possibility of the 
                                                
70 Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, The Embodied Mind, p.xviii. 
71 See: Merleau-Ponty, ‘Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man’. 
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sciences – a ‘critical’ and ‘radical’ reflection following Merleau-Ponty’s 
existentialised version of a transcendental method. This method transforms the 
Kantian project of articulating the transcendental a priori structures of experience 
into the existential project of articulating transcendental a priori structures of 
being72.  
The tacit ‘scientisation’ performed by post-cognitivist theorists fails to grasp 
the depth of the significance of Merleau-Ponty’s rejection of objectivism, the way in 
which it reverberates throughout the entirety of the Phenomenology. In their use of 
Merleau-Ponty for inspiration and guidance in their project of arguing for the 
importance of embodiment for cognitive science, they tacitly morph Merleau-Ponty’s 
view to fit within their objectivist framework and then claim Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology as convergent with their project for an embodied cognitive science. 
This is clearly evidenced in Varela, Thompson and Rosch’s attribution of a ‘double 
sense’ conception of embodiment to Merleau-Ponty. They assert that ‘for Merleau-
Ponty, as for us, embodiment has this double sense: it encompasses both the body as 
a lived, experiential structure and the body as the context or milieu of cognitive 
mechanisms’73. 
To get Merleau-Ponty’s central and foundational concept – the lived body – 
wrong is a significant error. An error that misses Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the 
lived body as the ‘third term between the psychic and the physiological’74, his 
                                                
72 I will further explore the nature of Merleau-Ponty’s transcendentalism in the following chapter. 
73 Merleau-Ponty, ‘Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man’, p.xvi. cf: their talk of the ‘sensorimotor 
structure of the perceiver (the way in which the nervous system links sensory and motor surfaces)’: 
p.173. 
74 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.140n. 
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nuanced phenomenologically grounded attempt to understand the uniqueness of the 
lived body as a ‘between the two’ (entre-deux). In Phenomenology of Perception 
Merleau-Ponty makes clear his view that the project we now call cognitive science is 
fundamentally incapable of grasping consciousness, and inveighs against objectivist 
‘cognitive scientists’ of his day for presupposing that it might. For example, he 
criticises the neuroscientists Adhemar Gelb and Kurt Goldstein in Phenomenology of 
Perception for presupposing objectivism, in a similar way to Varela, Thomson and 
Rosch in The Embodied Mind. Merleau-Ponty argues that in their discussion of 
Schneider and other case studies: 
Gelb and Goldstein … have never named this third term between the psychic 
and the physiological, between the ‘for itself’ and the ‘in itself’ to which their 
analyses always led them and which we call existence. Hence their earliest 
works often fall back on the traditional dichotomy of body and 
consciousness75. 
It is precisely this subject/object dichotomy that is replicated in the ‘double sense’ 
view suggested by Varela, Thompson and Rosch: ‘the body as a lived, experiential 
structure’ and ‘the body as the context … of cognitive mechanisms’. 
Likewise, the Gestalt theorists – ‘the psychologists who practise the 
description of phenomena’ – are ‘not … aware of the philosophical implications of 
their method’76. As a result of this philosophical naiveté, they ultimately try to 
                                                
75 Ibid. p.140n . 
76 Ibid. p.54. 
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explain ‘the … objects in the [phenomenal] field’ in terms of ‘causes of … 
perception’77. This is because they are constrained by ‘the ideal’ of an ‘explanatory 
psychology’ that ‘betrays its own descriptions’ by taking ‘as given the determinate 
universe of science’ – placing ‘perceptual consciousness in the midst of a ready-
made world’78. It simply fails to question ‘the objective thinking of classical logic 
and philosophy’ and ‘the alleged self-evidence of realism’, and so fails to understand 
the need for a ‘phenomenological reduction’79. As we have indicated, ‘realism’ is a 
philosophical position that ‘leave[s] consciousness and take[s] as given one of its 
results’80. This leads it to make ‘the mistake objective thought’. However, ‘objective 
thought’, Merleau-Ponty argues, is fundamentally inadequate to the task of ontology: 
Objective thought, as applied to the universe and not to phenomena, knows 
only alternative notions; starting from actual experience, it defines pure 
concepts which are mutually exclusive: the notion of extension, which is that 
of an absolute externality of one part to another, and the notion of thought 
which is that of a being wrapped up in himself; … the notion of cause as a 
determining factor external to its effect, and that of reason as a law of 
intrinsic constitution of the phenomenon. 
And so, he continues: 
 
                                                
77 Ibid. p.55. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. p.57. 
80 Ibid. p.54. 
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… the perception of our own body and the perception of external things 
provide an example of non-positing consciousness, that is, of consciousness 
not in possession of fully determinate objects, that of a logic lived through 
which cannot account for itself, and that of an immanent meaning which is 
not clear to itself and becomes fully aware of itself only through experiencing 
certain natural signs. These phenomena cannot be assimilated by objective 
thought, and that is why Gestalt psychology which, like all psychology, is 
imprisoned within the ‘self-evident truths’ of science and of the world, can 
choose only between reason and cause …81 
So the phenomena of lived perceptual experience that the post-cognitivists seek to 
explain ‘cannot be assimilated by objective thought’. Rather, it will be systematically 
occluded through the imposition of a categorial framework that is intrinsically 
incapable of capturing its inherently ambiguous structure, instead reducing it to fit 
within the predicative order of a syllogistic logic. By seeking to account for it in 
terms of a binaristic model of subject/object, interior/exterior and reason/cause it 
must inevitably ‘destroy the phenomena’. 
An example of this ‘destroying of the phenomena’ can be seen in a 
fundamental problem that arises regarding the computational model at the core of the 
cognitive science program82. Our phenomenological explorations, as Merleau-Ponty 
                                                
81 Ibid. p.57. 
82 Cognitive science is based on the analogy of the mind with the computer, where the mind is viewed 
as a computational information processing system. Believing this approach to have the potential to 
resolve problems of the mind/body relation, cognitive scientists seek to reveal facts about human 
functional and representational organisation. The model through which these facts are interpreted 
analogically assimilates mind to computer, for example by conceiving brain function in terms of 
complex parallel processing. 
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has shown, reveal that what we experience is not a ‘universe’ in the scientific sense 
but rather a ‘world’ in the phenomenological sense. That is, our lived experience is 
structured in terms of a ‘phenomenal field’ where there is, as G.B. Madison observes, 
‘always a background that cannot be thematized except in terms of a further 
background’83. And given that our experience is necessarily structured this way, how 
could a scientific approach ever hope to render the indeterminacy of the background 
in a formalised way so as to make it conducive to computational modelling?  
This challenge to the original program of cognitive science is precisely what 
is motivating the work of the post-cognitivists. However, in order for there to be such 
a thing as a computational model capable of capturing the way that humans actually 
do bodily perceive and act, a way would have to be found, as Dreyfus has pointed 
out, of treating ‘the broadest context or background as an object with its own set of 
preselected descriptive features’84. In other words, a way would have to be found of 
enframing the horizon. But, as we have seen, any such putative transformation of 
‘the indefinite horizon of determinable indeterminacy’85 – the lived world – into a 
totality of determinate objects – the scientific ‘universe’ – destroys the phenomena 
that it is called to explain. So in presupposing that the background can be treated as 
an object and, hence, subjected to a determinate description, it instantiates the 
‘mistake of objective thought’.  
On Merleau-Ponty’s view, scientific enquiry plays a crucial role in helping 
bring to light and focus our attention on important features of the body and 
                                                
83 G. B. Madison, ‘Merleau-Ponty’s Deconstruction of Logocentrism’ in Merleau-Ponty Vivant, M. C. 
Dillon (ed.) p.132 
84 Hubert Dreyfus, What Computers Still Can’t Do, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1992), p.56. 
85 G. B. Madison, ‘Merleau-Ponty’s Deconstruction of Logocentrism’, p.133. 
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perception through its systematic and rigorous methodology of ascertaining patterns 
using perceptions within the natural attitude to check one another. These empirical 
patterns, however, must be integrated into a fully and explicitly ontological theory of 
human being in order for their full significance to be grasped. Human beings cannot 
be adequately conceived as objects that have the property of consciousness because 
our body is not an object; it is that which gives us our openness to objects, and the 
world in which they appear. And it is the structure of the body that provides the 
contingent a priori body schema that structures our experience. Any ontological 
meaning that we can arrive at is fundamentally dependent for its appearance on this 
body schema. And so a scientific approach, no matter how conceived, must simply 
fail to do justice to consciousness because it presupposes an ontology that is 
incapable of accounting for the content and structure of lived experience.  
It is only by taking a transcendental turn and problematising these 
assumptions that the true philosophical role of the empirical sciences can be made 
clear. For Merleau-Ponty this means resituating the empirical sciences within the 
existential ontological frame, whilst all the time preserving the critical and 
experimental functions of scientific thinking and research. The naturalisation of 
phenomenology program, he would say, simply sidesteps this fundamental issue 
when it tacitly assumes objectivism and phenomenology might be reconcilable 
within a research program, the meta-theoretical framework of which is ultimately set 
by objectivism. 
My exploration of Merleau-Ponty’s use of phenomenological description in 
the context of an existential ontology has served to make his views on the prospects 
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of a ‘naturalisation of phenomenology’ – for example, on the model suggested by 
Roy et al. – clear and unambiguous. He holds that such a project is fundamentally 
misguided due to its tacit acceptance of Cartesian assumptions about the nature of the 
world: the prejudice of determinate being, the mutual exteriority of ontological parts 
and the amenability of phenomenal experience to the predicative order of a 
syllogistic logic. Therefore, despite its attempts to incorporate versions of his insights 
into a science of consciousness – for example: the holism of the functioning of the 
organism; the non-conceptual content of perceptual experience; the embodied and 
‘embedded’ nature of perception; and perception as ‘enacted’ by the organism – it 
will necessarily lose the phenomenon of consciousness that it seeks to explain. 
Fundamentally, he argues, it ‘can never be made comprehensible’ how ‘significance 
and intentionality could come to dwell in molecular edifices or masses of cells’86.  
We now have a clear outline of Merleau-Ponty’s key theoretical 
commitments, and have established both that he would, and why he would, reject the 
claim that his phenomenology is conducive to the kind of scientisation recently 
advocated in the cognitive sciences (and in cognitive science-oriented philosophy of 
mind). With this, we can move on to a further exploration and clarification of his 
philosophical views via the criticism of recent misreadings of key aspects of his 
position. As I explained in the introductory chapter, the argumentative trajectory of 
the thesis consists of a three-step movement. I have now completed step one: my 
critical intervention into the ‘naturalisation of phenomenology’ question raised by 
the uses of Merleau-Ponty in ‘post-cognitivist’ cognitive science. We are now in a 
                                                
86 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.409. 
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position to go on to complete the second step: the question of the correct 
interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical position. I have already addressed 
the issue of the correct interpretation of the phenomenological reduction via a 
critique of some recent claims that have fallen short of an accurate account. I will 
now go on to explore two key areas of his philosophy that are crucial to a proper 
grasp of his position, yet have also been prone to misunderstandings in the recent 
literature. The first (Chapter 3) is the nature of Merleau-Ponty’s transcendentalism, 
and the second (Chapter 4) is his notion of an existential dialectics.  
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Chapter 3: Merleau-Ponty as Transcendental Philosopher 
1. Introduction 
Now that we have a picture of the central claims of Merleau-Ponty’s 
existential phenomenology, it is my goal to clarify two crucial aspects of his position 
that have been the source of recent confusion in the secondary literature: the themes 
of transcendentalism and dialectics. Neither of these themes is readily accessible to 
scientistic naturalists and both are viewed as contentious by them. This fact, coupled 
with the recent misreading of his views, indicates why it is important to clarify just 
what it is that Merleau-Ponty does with these concepts, and to highlight the ways in 
which recent authors have failed to interpret him correctly. My critique and ‘counter-
reading’ on the issue of transcendentalism and dialectics in Merleau-Ponty is 
contained in the present chapter (transcendentalism) and in the following chapter 
(dialectics). As I mentioned in the Introduction, my critique of recent readings of 
Merleau-Ponty’s transcendentalism and existential dialectics, coupled with my 
critique of recent readings of the phenomenological reduction (Chapter 1), 
constitutes the second step of the three-step argumentative trajectory of the thesis. 
This step is a critique of recent claims regarding Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological 
method, transcendentalism and use of dialectics in the interest of establishing the 
correct interpretation of his position.  
I will explore Merleau-Ponty’s concept of ‘existential dialectics’ in the 
following chapter. However, it is the task of the present chapter to draw out the 
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central implications of the set of moves that represent the transcendental dimension 
of his position in contrast to recent misreadings and in relation to the transcendental 
tradition. It is from this tradition that Merleau-Ponty appropriates the idea of a 
transcendental approach to philosophy, however his appropriation incorporates a 
substantial critique of his predecessors.  
If someone were to ask whether it is appropriate to refer to Merleau-Ponty as 
a transcendental philosopher, the answer might seem fairly obvious given my 
discussion in the foregoing chapters. As we have seen, he discusses the 
transcendental dimension of his method explicitly, though not in great detail, in 
Phenomenology of Perception. However, the status of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical 
position in Phenomenology of Perception has been the cause of debate in the 
reception of his work in the Anglophone world since its publication in translation in 
1962. The implications of Merleau-Ponty’s claim to be ‘taking up a transcendental 
attitude’, and of the connected claim that his position is ‘beyond realism and 
idealism’, have come in for particular critical attention. 
Throughout its reception it has often been claimed that Merleau-Ponty’s 
position represents a form of idealism. For example in 1967 in the initial phase of its 
reception, Marvin Farber characterised Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy as a 
‘subjectivism’ that, suffering from ‘unclarified motives and rational processes’, 
draws on ‘idealistic tenets of a bygone generation’1. This sentiment has recently been 
echoed by John Searle, who claims that Merleau-Ponty is ‘an idealist in a rather 
                                                
1 Marvin Farber, Phenomenology and Existence: Toward a Philosophy Within Nature, (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1967), p.237, p.198. 
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traditional sense’2. On the issue of transcendentalism Thomas Baldwin is certainly 
right to assert that ‘it is no straightforward Kantian position that Merleau-Ponty 
affirms’3. Yet his claim that Merleau-Ponty’s transcendental approach to philosophy 
‘is not that of a ‘pure’ subject of consciousness; instead it is an idealism which gives 
a special status to the body as that for which there is a perceived world’4 suggests 
that Merleau-Ponty is a kind of transcendental idealist in spite of himself5. A related 
but more detailed version of Baldwin’s claim has been argued by Sebastian Gardner6. 
The general claim is that in spite of his critique of ‘Kantianism’, Merleau-Ponty’s 
position comes out as a form of transcendental idealism that takes the perceptual 
processes of the lived body as the transcendental constituting condition for the 
possibility of experience. 
Gardner argues that despite Merleau-Ponty’s provision of a profound critique 
of an ‘Intellectualist’ version of transcendental idealism, it is not clear that he is 
‘entitled to claim that his position is in no sense an idealism and is in all senses 
beyond realism and idealism’7, and that, in fact, it is a ‘new kind of transcendental 
idealism’8. This is because despite Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on phenomenological 
description, his philosophy relies on a version of a Kantian ‘transcendental turn’, in 
order to make theoretical claims using ‘transcendental explanation and conditions’ in 
                                                
2 Searle, ‘The Phenomenological Illusion’, p.29. cf: Naomi Eilan’s claim that Merleau-Ponty's theory 
of perceptual content ‘yield(s) frank idealism'. Eilan, 'Consciousness and the Self', p. 353. Also cf: 
Stephen Priest’s claim that Merleau-Ponty has an ‘idealist phenomenology of time’: Priest, Merleau-
Ponty, p.254. 
3 Baldwin, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, p.5. 
4 Ibid. p.6.  
5 Vincent Descombes makes a similar claim in Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, p.76. 
6 Gardner, ‘Merleau-Ponty's Transcendental Theory of Perception’. 
7 Ibid. p.17. 
8 Ibid. p.16. 
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relation to a perceptual subject who is understood to play a ‘constitutive’ role in 
relation to the world of experience. 
The claims of Gardner (and Baldwin) illustrate the potential difficulties we 
can encounter when trying to interpret the sense in which Merleau-Ponty is a 
transcendental philosopher. In addressing their specific claims, and the general issue 
that they concern, it will be useful to raise the following prima facie not 
unreasonable question on their behalf. That is, given that Merleau-Ponty develops 
out of the transcendental tradition and advocates a transcendental method, does his 
position, despite his critique of Kant and Husserl, nevertheless also come out as a 
form of transcendental idealism? Asking the question in this form will allow me to 
tease out the nature of his transcendentalism and its connection to his ontological 
position. It will thus help to accurately situate him, both in relation to the 
transcendental tradition, as well as in relation to scientistic naturalism. 
In section 2 I discuss the nature of Merleau-Ponty’s transcendentalism. 
Following that I critically appraise the claim that, as Gardner puts it, Merleau-Ponty 
is ‘a new kind of transcendental idealist’. And finally, in section 4, I provide an 
analysis that complements our discussion in chapters 1 and 2 by pointing out the way 
in which Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological analyses decisively undermine 
Intellectualist transcendental philosophy.  
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2. Merleau-Ponty’s Transcendentalism 
I agree with Sebastian Gardner’s claim that ‘there is a defensible and 
exegetically significant sense in which Merleau-Ponty can be said to belong to the 
transcendental tradition’9. I do not, however, agree with the conclusion that Merleau-
Ponty’s position is a ‘new kind of transcendental idealism’ and, therefore, I situate 
Merleau-Ponty within the tradition in a different way. Now to say that Merleau-
Ponty is part of the transcendental tradition in philosophy is to claim that he is 
involved in a tradition that, although arising principally out of Kant’s work, consists 
in something much broader than that work and its most direct conceptual 
descendants (e.g. Neo-Kantianism). That there is a broad tradition of this kind is 
fairly obvious from the development of post-Kantian German idealism in Fichte, 
Schelling and Hegel’s attempts to reformulate the critical philosophy in terms of the 
spirit rather than the letter of Kant’s work. This broad characterisation is, in fact, the 
view that Merleau-Ponty himself takes of the transcendental tradition10. This broad 
conception of the tradition, as Gardner points out: 
… allows the claim that Merleau-Ponty belongs to the transcendental 
tradition to be squared with the fact that Kant is one of the principal targets of 
                                                
9 Ibid. p.23.  
10 e.g. in the Preface to Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty compares versions of 
transcendentalism: ‘Husserl’s transcendental is not Kant’s’, p.xv. 
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the Phenomenology of Perception, and that Merleau-Ponty is opposed on 
many fronts to German idealism and neo-Kantianism11.  
However, an immediate objection that might be raised against situating 
Merleau-Ponty within the transcendental tradition – even this broadly construed – is 
that his critique of the transcendental ego undermines the fundamental principle on 
which a transcendental approach to philosophy must rest. This fundamental 
principle, as we have seen, is present in both Kant (‘transcendental unity of 
apperception’) and Husserl (‘transcendental ego’). There is no pure reflecting subject 
in this sense – a subject whose rational self-reflective activity is understood to 
provide philosophical foundations – in Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the body-
subject. Rather, he views the ‘cogito’ as secondary and derivative on the primary 
perceptual consciousness of a ‘tacit cogito’12. In order to see why this objection is 
well motivated, yet should not disqualify Merleau-Ponty from being classed as a 
transcendental philosopher, we need to define what it is for one to be a 
transcendental philosopher. The present discussion has talked of a tradition, but what 
is it that makes this way of philosophising distinct and thus worthy to be talked about 
as a tradition?  
It was Kant who formulated the original program for a transcendental 
philosophy. The question that he sought to answer was epistemological in character. 
                                                
11 Gardner, ‘Merleau-Ponty's Transcendental Theory of Perception’, p. 21. 
12 e.g. ‘Behind the spoken cogito, the one which is converted into discourse and into essential truth, 
there lies a tacit cogito, myself experienced by myself’, and ‘…the tacit cogito, the presence of oneself 
to oneself, being no less than existence, is anterior to any philosophy…’ Merleau-Ponty, 
Phenomenology of Perception, p.469, p.470. 
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In his Critique of Pure Reason he systematically sought an account of the conditions 
that made a particular type of rational knowledge possible. This knowledge he 
termed ‘synthetic a priori knowledge’ and it was transcendental in the sense that it 
‘transcended’ what could be given to us in sense experience (synthetic a posteriori). 
By undertaking his ‘Copernican turn’ – the building of a philosophy out of the view 
that objectivity is an achievement of subjectivity – his philosophy thus rested on a 
conception of a universal transcendental subject that brings the organising principles 
to the matter of sensuous experience. In doing this it provides them with their 
necessary form. On this account the subject is a metaphysical entity, though of a 
purely formal kind. That is, as the empirical subject that each of us takes ourselves to 
be we do not experience our transcendental subjectivity. Rather, we come to know of 
it via a process of (transcendental) deduction through which we establish its 
(transcendental) necessity for an adequate philosophical account of our experience.  
Consistent with his phenomenological turn in transcendental philosophy, 
Husserl holds that via the method of the epoché and transcendental reduction we are 
able to experience our own transcendental subjectivity – which is now individuated 
as ours, and not just a purely formal principle as in Kant. For Husserl, transcendental 
subjectivity must be understood through a comprehensive phenomenological 
exploration of intentionality, and in relation to an essential (eidetic) analysis of the 
thus revealed and necessarily related intentional structures (noetic and noematic)13. 
                                                
13 For Husserl, eidetic analysis is the phenomenologist’s procedure for ascertaining the ‘essence’ or 
‘essential structure’ of a particular set of phenomena. It involves a methodical reduction to only the 
essential necessary elements that go into making those phenomena what they are. Husserl’s eidetic 
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An important distinction that we need to draw at this point, in order to make 
clear the nature of Merleau-Ponty’s position, is that between what we will call a 
methodological transcendentalism and a metaphysical transcendentalism. 
Metaphysical transcendentalism entails the positing of a transcendental entity 
(according to Merleau-Ponty, a ‘transcendental ego’ or ‘universal constituting 
consciousness’), as in the ‘Intellectualist’ approaches of Kant and Husserl. The 
constituting power of this transcendental entity is understood to necessitate, in Kant’s 
case, a form of transcendental idealism with respect to the cognitive status of objects 
and the world that we take to be empirically real. In Husserl’s approach it is 
supposed to necessitate a transcendental-phenomenological idealism with respect to 
the status of the being of intentional objects and of the phenomenal world in general. 
A methodological transcendentalism, on the other hand, consists in 
transcendentalism with respect to philosophical method. That is, the theorist 
undertakes an ‘investigation of the a priori conditions of the possibility of 
experience’14, as Kant puts it, and makes substantive claims regarding those a priori 
conditions that involve an appeal to transcendental necessity in relation to a 
conception of the ‘subject’ that is not simply the empirical subject. In other words, 
they take transcendental forms of argument as integral to their methodology. Notice 
                                                                                                                                     
method relies on a procedure of ‘imaginative variation’, which consists of the imaginary addition and 
subtraction of the properties of an object or content in order to focus and isolate its essence. As Joel 
Smith describes it: ‘… by varying, in imagination, the features of an object, we will eventually come 
up against something that cannot be varied without destroying that object as an instance of its kind. It 
will be inconceivable that an object of that kind might lack a given feature and thus, taking 
inconceivability as a guide to impossibility, we will have seen that the feature in question is a part of 
the essence of objects of that kind’. Joel Smith, ‘Merleau-Ponty and the Phenomenological 
Reduction’, p.564. 
14 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A93/B126. 
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that ‘transcendental forms of argument’ is not equivalent to Kant’s ‘transcendental 
deduction’. Kant’s transcendental deduction is a form of transcendental 
argumentation used in the service of an epistemological project that inherits the 
terms of the problematic as outlined in Descartes’ project to refute the skeptic. 
However in the context of Merleau-Ponty’s existential-phenomenological 
approach, Kant’s ‘investigation of the a priori conditions of the possibility of 
experience’ as a means to address the problem of knowledge substantially morphs. 
Whereas Kant sought to lay bare synthetic a priori knowledge and the nature of such 
knowledge, Merleau-Ponty, as we have seen, seeks to uncover synthetic a priori 
structures of being. Following Heidegger, he rejects the restricted epistemological 
context of Kant’s transcendentalism, asserting that a transcendental methodology 
must be fully ontological in its philosophical scope. As Jeff Malpas and Steven 
Crowell have pointed out in relation to the Heideggerean ontological project: 
To understand transcendental philosophy essentially as an answer to a certain 
kind of skepticism (that is, as primarily an epistemological enterprise) is to 
remain within the Cartesian framework in which alone such a problem can 
arise15.  
The stepping-stone that allows the existential project to be realised is 
Husserl’s phenomenological method, based as it is on the concept of intentionality. 
                                                
15 ‘Introduction: Transcendental Heidegger’ in Transcendental Heidegger, Jeff Malpas and Steven 
Crowell (eds.) (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), p.3. 
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The phenomenological concept of intentionality allows for a widening of the scope 
of the transcendental question precisely because it does away with the 
representationalist concept of intentionality that had animated early modern 
philosophers such as Kant. This conception holds that our intentional relation to 
objects is mediated by ‘mental representations’ of those objects. Whereas on an 
existential-phenomenological conception the subject is necessarily embodied and ‘in-
the-world’, and objects are understood in the sense of intentional ‘noematic’ 
correlates that we encounter in and through our worldly context.          
Thus, on Merleau-Ponty’s view, the transcendental question goes beyond 
Kant’s question regarding the conditions of cognitive experience to include the 
conditions of all intentional experience. As such, it is widened to include the 
conditions of possibility for even the minimal intelligibility of the most basic pre-
predicative, pre-objective perceptual experience. Merleau-Ponty does this, as we 
have seen, because phenomenological description reveals this pre-reflective 
intentionality as subtending all explicit acts of reflective judgement, and even all 
consciously directed acts of perception. As such, it is incumbent upon the 
transcendental philosopher to account for this aspect of our experience. 
Merleau-Ponty’s existentialist conception of the body-subject as essentially 
being-in-the-world necessitates a different approach to transcendental philosophy 
than Kant’s Intellectualism, or Husserl’s inconsistent attempt at a reconciliation of 
the transcendental ego with his innovative phenomenological conception of 
intentionality. Merleau-Ponty’s novel approach has led to confusions as interpreters 
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have tried to make sense of the nature of his position, with some recent readers, as I 
mentioned, claiming that he is a new kind of transcendental idealist. However, given 
our exposition of the nature of his existentialism in relation to Kant and Husserl, 
coupled with our principled drawing of the distinction between metaphysical and 
methodological transcendentalism, the mistake being made by these various 
interpreters of Merleau-Ponty comes clearly into view. His existential 
phenomenology is not a transcendental idealism but rather is correctly interpreted as 
a form of methodological transcendentalism that eschews metaphysical 
transcendentalism. For, if we define a full-blown transcendental philosophical 
position as requiring both methodological and metaphysical transcendentalism – à la 
Kant and Husserl – then Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy does not qualify. However, 
there is no obstacle to asserting that Merleau-Ponty is a transcendental philosopher 
provided that we view him as a methodological and not a metaphysical 
transcendentalist. Let us substantiate this point. 
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy generally, and his arguments specifically, grow 
out of the transcendental tradition and are intimately bound up with the historical 
debates of that tradition. In spite of his view that reflective consciousness is 
secondary and derivative – and his accompanying rejection of metaphysical 
transcendentalism – we can argue, with Sebastian Gardner, that: 
… his position and arguments are intelligible only in terms of the 
transcendental self-consciousness tradition against which he is reacting and to 
which he proposes a radical revision: his position is not independent of the 
  Chapter 3: Merleau-Ponty as Transcendental Philosopher 
 
  167  
self-consciousness tradition in philosophy in the way that others, for example 
the [scientistic] naturalists, are, since he takes from it the basic idea of 
transcendental conditions …16  
And it is this taking up of the ‘basic idea’ of transcendental conditions and of 
transcendental theorising that displays his methodological continuity with the 
tradition and simultaneously marks his distance from scientistic naturalism. What 
makes Merleau-Ponty’s position wholly unique as a form of transcendental 
philosophy, however, is his argument for what should occupy the most fundamental 
transcendental role. 
  He is of the view that there are transcendental roles that need to be 
filled if we are to provide an adequate philosophical account of human consciousness 
and the world. However, he disagrees with his predecessors in the tradition as to the 
nature of the occupants of these roles. As Gardner observes, the occupant of the most 
fundamental transcendental role: 
… is located not … in the objectivity of conceptuality, as per Hegel, but nor 
is it located in subjectivity, as per Kant: it lies in something non-conceptual 
with regard to which the subjective/objective distinction cannot be made 
intelligibly, viz. perception conceived pre-objectively17. 
 
                                                
16 Gardner, ‘Merleau-Ponty's Transcendental Theory of Perception’, p.21. 
17 Ibid. 
  Chapter 3: Merleau-Ponty as Transcendental Philosopher 
 
  168  
This key thesis tethers his transcendentalism to an ontology that is ‘liberal naturalist’. 
This is because it consists in an argument for transcendental necessity that is built out 
of a phenomenological account of the primordial level underpinning natural attitude 
perception. For Merleau-Ponty the transcendental necessity refers back to pre-
objective lived experience and emphatically not to a metaphysical ego that is 
transcendent to the world. And, given that for Merleau-Ponty transcendental 
philosophy is understood to be seeking transcendental a priori structures of being, 
the body-subject who has this perceptual experience must be understood 
ontologically as ‘being-in-the-world’. Therefore, the transcendental structure that is 
revealed is the fundamental existential structure of the primordial body-world 
relation. That this relation is a ‘lived’ relation does not affect its transcendental 
function in his argument. For it is precisely this lived pre-objective perception – 
understood ontologically as being-in-the-world – that Merleau-Ponty argues provides 
the transcendental condition of possibility for both natural attitude perception and for 
the theoretical claims of Empiricism and Intellectualism, the claims of objective 
thought. As a result of this view: 
… Merleau-Ponty can be regarded as pursuing the post-Kantian search for 
subject-object identity, and as proposing that the relation of subject to object 
is grounded, not in an all-encompassing conceptually graspable whole, but in 
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the non-conceptual being which mediates the relation of the thinking subject 
to the objects of thought18. 
It is thus that the distinctive nature of his phenomenological ontology is made 
clear. His Heideggerean conception of the body-subject as an ‘Ek-stase’, as always 
transcending itself towards a world in which it is necessarily entangled as being-in-
the-world, is the essence of his existentialism. And it is this concept that blocks the 
validity of any claims to the effect that he is an idealist. For, although his existential 
philosophy is in an important sense grounded in the experiencer, it definitely cannot 
be a subjective idealism of the Berkleian type – esse est percipi19 – because the 
concept of intentionality, perception, the subject, indeed the entire Cartesian 
problematic that this position engages is roundly rejected. But neither is it a 
transcendental idealism of the Kantian type: the form is given to the content of sense 
experience via the ‘transcendental unity of apperception’, which orders the ‘chaos’ of 
an ultimately incomprehensible world-in-itself into a knowable world of possible 
experience, via a combination of the forms of intuition and the categories of 
experience. Nor, on the other hand, is Merleau-Ponty’s view a version of Husserlian 
transcendental-phenomenological idealism. This view claims that the transcendental 
subject has ‘absolute being’ in relation to the ‘relative being of the world’, which is 
ultimately dependent on its constitutive powers20. Merleau-Ponty lacks the kind of 
                                                
18 Ibid. 
19 G.J. Warnock (ed.), The Principles of Human Knowledge with Other Writings by George Berkeley 
(London 1977), Part 3. 
20 Husserl, Ideas 1, §§ 54-55. 
  Chapter 3: Merleau-Ponty as Transcendental Philosopher 
 
  170  
transcendental metaphysical commitments that make the philosophies of Berkeley, 
Kant or Husserl ‘idealist’. 
 
2.1 Transcendental Method in Phenomenology of Perception 
As we saw in the previous two chapters, Merleau-Ponty conceives the 
phenomenology of pre-objective perception as having an intrinsically ontological 
import. That is, articulating the structure of pre-objective perception is the key to 
laying bare the structure of pre-objective being. And, in order to grasp this primordial 
dimension, it is necessary to undertake a transcendental turn. Before I look at the 
claims for this move in Phenomenology of Perception it is important to point out that 
the move had already been announced in The Structure of Behaviour. At the end of 
that book Merleau-Ponty calls for a philosophy that ‘inverts the natural movement of 
consciousness’ with the purpose of uncovering the ways in which the world is 
constituted in consciousness’21. We need to do this, he claims, because ‘perception is 
not an event of nature’22. As Thomas Baldwin argues: 
This conclusion is of fundamental importance to Merleau-Ponty: perception, 
he holds, is so fundamental to our ways of making sense of the world that it 
cannot itself be just a fact within the world, and certainly not just ‘a fact of 
nature’ … perception cannot be a fact of nature precisely because it plays a 
                                                
21 Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behaviour, p.220. 
22 Ibid. p.145. 
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crucial role in constituting nature, since the forms, structures or laws that we 
find in nature are there only as aspects of a perceived world23. 
In claiming that ‘perception is not an event of nature’ Merleau-Ponty signals both his 
rejection of realism and the necessity of a transcendental turn. ‘Speaking generally’, 
he says, ‘… we are rejoining the critical attitude’24. So ‘the first conclusion that we 
have to draw from the preceding chapters’, he summates in Structure of Behaviour, is 
that the analysis ‘leads … to the transcendental attitude’25. However, as a 
foreshadowing of his future existentialism, he also says that we have to ‘redefine 
transcendental philosophy anew in such a way as to integrate with it the very 
phenomenon of the real’26. So the only kind of transcendental philosophy that 
Merleau-Ponty can envision as viable is one where the ‘phenomenon of the real’ – as 
revealed through a phenomenology centred on the lived body – forces a 
‘redefinition’, a reconceptualisation, of what it is that a transcendental approach to 
philosophy ought to consist in. That is, we take up a ‘transcendental attitude’ with 
respect to the phenomenal field, and the kind of transcendental a priori structures 
that we seek to articulate are a priori structures of being.  
In Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty makes clear that a 
transcendental turn is his intention, arguing that ‘the descriptive method can acquire 
                                                
23 Baldwin, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, p.4. n.b. Baldwin’s phrase ‘perception is not a fact of nature’ is his 
translation of the phrase that is rendered ‘perception is not an event of nature’ in the original English 
translation. 
24 Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behaviour, p.206. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. p.224. 
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a genuine claim only from the transcendental point of view’27. He lays out this part 
of his method in the concluding chapter of the Introduction, which is entitled ‘The 
Phenomenal Field’. In this chapter he argues that what we are faced with is the 
internal incoherence of Intellectualist and Empiricist accounts of perception, an 
incoherence that rests on the ‘mistake of objective thought’.  
Merleau-Ponty holds that proceeding through an analysis of psychological 
theories of perception motivates us to take a transcendental approach. This is because 
the attempt to account for perception with the psychologist’s categories of ‘mind’ or 
‘psyche’ and ‘body’ or ‘neural underpinnings’ inevitably leads to the ‘explanatory 
gap’ identified by contemporary cognitive science. But these attempts to capture the 
phenomenon of consciousness in a scientistic theory, as we saw, necessarily fall 
short because they ‘destroy’ the phenomena of our lived perceptual experience. 
Grasping the shortcomings of psychological accounts, argues Merleau-Ponty, allows 
‘the true problem of constitution’28 to come into view for us.  
This is why, he argues, Phenomenology of Perception has to begin its 
examination of perception with a critical analysis of psychological theories. By 
examining the problems with these theories – basically their inability to account for 
the phenomena of perception – the need to undertake a ‘return to the phenomena’ is 
thereby motivated. Thus he argues: 
 
                                                
27 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.8. 
28 Ibid. p.73. 
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If we had not done so, we would not have understood the whole meaning of 
the transcendental problem, since we would not, starting from the natural 
attitude, have methodically followed the procedures which lead to it29.  
He sees it as part of the natural progression towards the correct transcendental 
approach that the reader should become acquainted with the subject of ‘phenomena’ 
via an initial process of purely psychological description. Thus he argues that it is 
necessary for us ‘… to frequent the phenomenal field and become acquainted, 
through psychological descriptions, with the subject of phenomena …30 This is 
because by starting with the concrete phenomena we ‘… avoid placing ourselves 
from the start, as does reflexive philosophy, in a transcendental dimension assumed 
to be eternally given’, and so ‘missing the true problem of constitution31. 
So ‘reflexive philosophy’ – Intellectualism – misses the ‘true problem of 
constitution’ precisely because it pays insufficient attention to what our perceptual 
experience is actually like – the way that objects and world are dynamically and 
progressively constituted in relation to an active corporeal subject. As this statement 
makes clear, Merleau-Ponty’s problem is with the conception of the transcendental 
that posits mental faculties and processes that are taken to be universal to any 
perceiving and rational creature. This ‘misses the true problem of constitution’ 
because it ignores the phenomena and the process of perception involved in our 
uniquely human embodied experience, thus overlooking what is in fact the primary 
                                                
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
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locus of constitution. Instead, it presupposes a disembodied ‘transcendental ego’ as 
the subject of experience, a ‘universal constituting consciousness’ without ‘thisness, 
location or body’32. 
If we follow the way in which the scientific approach to psychology 
necessitates a descriptive approach we are led to phenomenological psychology. 
Thus, we are introduced to the concept of the ‘phenomenal field’. But Merleau-Ponty 
does not stop here, as a scientistic naturalist thinker would have to. He argues, as we 
have seen, that this psychology needs to be ‘purged’ of its ‘psychologism’ in order to 
be turned into a properly philosophical method:  
We could not begin, however, our psychological description without 
suggesting that once purged of all psychologism it can become a 
philosophical method. In order to revive perceptual experience buried under 
its own results, it would not have been enough to present descriptions of them 
which might possibly not have been understood, we had to establish by 
philosophical references and anticipations the point of view from which they 
might appear true. Thus we could begin neither without psychology nor with 
psychology alone33.  
And so he concludes with an invitation to the reader: 
 
                                                
32 Ibid. p.xiii. 
33 Ibid. p.73. 
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… now that the phenomenal field has been sufficiently circumscribed, let us 
enter this ambiguous domain, with the expectation that the psychologist's 
self-scrutiny will lead us, by way of a second-order reflection, to the 
phenomenon of the phenomenon, and decisively transform the phenomenal 
field into a transcendental one34. 
So the ‘second-order’ reflection ‘transforms’ the field of the phenomena – the 
‘world’ of lived experience with its various describable structures – into a 
transcendental field that is understood, as Taylor Carman puts it, as ‘a space of 
possibilities, impossibilities, and necessities constitutive of our perceptual world’35. 
From this vantage point contingent facts about perception are understood to 
presuppose the necessary, invariant structures of the phenomenal field. Merleau-
Ponty, as we have seen, articulates these through his concept of the ‘body schema’, 
which provides the necessary structure of our perceptual experience in terms of its 
intrinsically perspectival orientation in space and time, the figure/ground structure in 
object perception and the horizonal structure of the phenomenal field in general.  
Merleau-Ponty understands himself to be critically reconceiving 
transcendental philosophy through philosophical reflection on concrete 
‘psychological considerations’ that the Intellectualist transcendental philosophers 
have overlooked. As Sebastian Gardner points out, Merleau-Ponty views this 
reflection as disclosing:  
                                                
34 Ibid. 
35 Carman, Merleau-Ponty, p.82. 
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… what moves are necessary in order to ascend from the natural attitude to 
the transcendental standpoint, thereby transforming our conception of that 
standpoint from its Intellectualist misconception36. 
Merleau-Ponty views this as a more experientially grounded, and therefore 
justifiable, account of what the phenomenological reduction concretely involves. 
This concrete approach is in line with, and is an instantiation of, his existentialism. 
As I argued in Chapter 1, performing the epoché is not simply an issue of the 
bracketing of a ‘thesis’; rather, the ‘psychologism’ of the natural attitude is in need of 
a ‘positive purgative operation’, as Gardner puts it37. Neither the truth of the 
philosophical conclusions that Merleau-Ponty argues for, nor our knowledge of them 
as truths, ultimately depends on the facts of psychology as the empirical psychologist 
understands them. This is why I argued in the previous chapter that Dreyfus, 
Gallagher and Roy et al. are mistaken when they imply that Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenological account can be straightforwardly subject to empirical correction. 
The view that the philosophical import of Merleau-Ponty’s claims depends on the 
viability of the empirical accounts that he reinterprets is, in Alphonse de Waelhens’ 
words, ‘an absolute misreading’38. 
Sebastian Gardner perceptively observes that Merleau-Ponty approved de 
Waelhens’ essay as the Introduction to The Structure of Behaviour because, on 
                                                
36 Gardner, ‘Merleau-Ponty's Transcendental Theory of Perception’, p.24. 
37 Ibid. p.10. 
38 Alphonse de Waelhens, 'A Philosophy of the Ambiguous', Foreword to the Second French Edition 
of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behaviour, (Boston: Beacon, 1963), p.xxvi. 
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Merleau-Ponty’s view, it is the role of psychology to allow us to arrive at a point 
from which we will be able to ‘grasp phenomenological truth independently of the 
scientific method’, on the basis of a primordial ‘relation to the pre-objective’39. It is 
Merleau-Ponty’s view that objectivist thinking is rooted in the natural process of 
perception, constituting objects and world in a movement that simultaneously 
occludes the process of perception in favour of the perceived (determinate objects)40. 
Given this, ‘objectivism’ in the form of scientific theorising does not simply hold an 
accidental place vis-à-vis phenomenological philosophy. Rather, because it is based 
on the natural movement of perception, it is a necessary and irremovable part of 
human thinking as it tries to conceptualise this experience. Thus Merleau-Ponty does 
not argue for its removal from our thinking, as for example Heidegger does; instead, 
he views it as performing a crucial constraining and guiding function with respect to 
phenomenological philosophy41. This is because if, as Merleau-Ponty urges, 
philosophy is to base the essential on the factual (in the phenomenological sense), 
then the factual (in the empirical sense) explorations of the special sciences can bring 
phenomena to light that will suggest reappraisals at the level of philosophical 
phenomenological theory. Psychology is the special science that has a special status 
with respect to phenomenological philosophy. This is because its research, for 
example the Gestalt psychologists’ work on the figure/ground structure in perception, 
                                                
39 Gardner, ‘Merleau-Ponty's Transcendental Theory of Perception’, p.24. 
40 ‘Human life is defined in terms of this power which it has of denying itself in objective thought, a 
power which stems from its primordial attachment to the world itself.’ Merleau-Ponty, 
Phenomenology of Perception, p.381. 
41 Despite his sustained critique of the realist concept of an ‘absolute object’ Merleau-Ponty holds that 
‘a return to pre-science is not the goal. The reconquest of the Lebenswelt is the reconquest of a 
dimension, in which the objectifications of science themselves retain a meaning and are to be 
understood as true’. Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p.182. 
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functions to focus phenomenological analyses onto important concrete phenomena 
that a phenomenological philosophy ought to be able to account for. Thus Merleau-
Ponty says: 
Phenomenology could never have come about … prior to the 
construction of science. It measures the divergence between our 
experience and this science. How could it ignore it? How could it 
precede it?42 
To sum up: Merleau-Ponty’s claim regarding the transforming of the 
phenomenal field into a transcendental one in order to make phenomenology 
properly philosophical, is clearly a version of a transcendental methodology. 
Merleau-Ponty’s ‘existentialising’ of transcendental philosophy results in a unique 
position because he develops a transcendental approach through a discussion of the 
status of the body and perception. His methodological transcendentalism, therefore, 
stands in sharp contrast to the Intellectualist conception of transcendental philosophy, 
which is metaphysical as well as methodological.  
  
2. Merleau-Ponty as Transcendental Idealist: A Critical Analysis 
Merleau-Ponty, as we have seen, was adamant that his position was not a 
form of idealism and that, in fact, his phenomenological ontology gets us beyond the 
                                                
42 Merleau-Ponty, ‘The Primacy of Perception and its Philosophical Consequences’, p.29. 
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realism/idealism contest because it rejects the Cartesian epistemological framework 
in which that contest is played out. In the previous section I asked the question as to 
whether Merleau-Ponty’s adoption of a ‘transcendental attitude’ meant that his 
position would inevitably end up as a form of idealism. Pointing out the contrast 
between his existentialist conception of transcendental philosophy and the 
Intellectualist one, I argued that his position is a methodological but not a 
metaphysical form of transcendentalism. That is, it manages to avoid the idealism 
that was intrinsic to Kant and Husserl by rejecting their positing of a metaphysical 
entity, the transcendental ego. In order to further substantiate this point I will now 
look at some recent claims that Merleau-Ponty is a transcendental idealist, pointing 
out how and why they misinterpret his position. This will help to further clarify the 
nature of Merleau-Ponty’s ontology, its distance from transcendental idealism, and 
thus indicate why the temptation to read Merleau-Ponty as a transcendental idealist is 
fundamentally misguided.  
Sebastian Gardner has argued that despite Merleau-Ponty’s provision of a 
profound critique of Intellectualist transcendentalism, it is not clear that he is 
‘entitled to claim that his position is in no sense an idealism and is in all senses 
beyond realism and idealism’43. In fact, it is a ‘new kind of transcendental 
idealism’44. Gardner focuses our attention on Merleau-Ponty’s belief that any 
theoretical claims that we make about perception and the world can be true only in so 
                                                
43 Gardner, ‘Merleau-Ponty's Transcendental Theory of Perception’, p.17. 
44 cf: Thomas Baldwin’s claim that Merleau-Ponty’s transcendentalism ‘is not that of a ‘pure’ subject 
of consciousness; instead it is an idealism which gives a special status to the body as that for which 
there is a perceived world’. Baldwin, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, p.6.  
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far as they are able to accurately capture the structure of pre-predicative, pre-
objective lived experience. Given his attempt to consistently follow through on a 
phenomenological approach, Merleau-Ponty holds that any claims to philosophical 
knowledge necessarily rest on the pre-objective, the perceived world. And it is 
through the giving of ‘a philosophical status’ to our pre-objective experience that we 
will be able to solve persistent philosophical problems (for example, the problem of 
skepticism and knowledge, the mind/body problem and the problem of the 
mind/world relation). On Merleau-Ponty’s account these problems are not to be 
solved simply via discursive solutions. Rather, in referring them back to their basis in 
lived experience we can advance solutions via, as Gardner puts it, ‘a strategy of 
dissolution’ that shows how they in fact arise due to the intrinsic structure and 
limitations of rational thought. 
 Gardner observes that Merleau-Ponty’s strategy is:  
… a novel development of Kant's argument that transcendental idealism is 
uniquely capable of resolving philosophical problems which are otherwise 
insoluble45. 
In his discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of perception Gardner points out several 
important respects in which Merleau-Ponty’s position derives from Kant’s. The first 
is the way in which Merleau-Ponty employs a version of the strategy of argument 
that Kant uses in the Antinomy of Pure Reason. This is the strategy whereby Kant 
                                                
45 Gardner, ‘Merleau-Ponty's Transcendental Theory of Perception’, p.15. 
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addresses four topics in traditional metaphysics and argues that they each have a set 
of two opposing metaphysical theses that contradict each other, and yet which can 
both be shown to be arrived at through valid arguments. For example: 
1. the thesis that the world is infinite in space and time and its contrary the 
thesis that the world is finite in space and time, and  
2. the thesis that causality is in accordance with the laws of nature and 
freedom. And its contrary: ‘there is no freedom; everything in the world takes 
place solely in accordance with the laws of nature’46.  
Kant argues that the antinomies instantiate a general form of theoretical 
conflict between the positions of empiricism and Rationalism. Kant’s strategy of 
resolving this conflict is to identify a proposition in each antinomy that is 
presupposed by both of the contradictory claims, and to then go on to deny this 
proposition. The denial of this shared presupposition then serves to eliminate the 
contradiction. What his antinomies have in common, Kant argues, is that when we 
ask ‘what is the presupposition that they all share?’ we find that they all assume that 
the ‘objects of our knowledge are things in themselves’. So, by pointing out that the 
contradictions are generated due to adhering to this key claim of transcendental 
realism, an indirect proof of transcendental idealism has thereby been presented, as it 
manages to avoid these irresolvable contradictions. In eliminating this shared 
presupposition regarding the nature of objects of knowledge, philosophy can proceed 
                                                
46 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A445/B473. 
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to produce a theory of knowledge that grounds the sciences whilst it simultaneously 
articulates the limits of reason. The principle methodological vehicle for this is the 
taking of a transcendental turn that views objectivity as an achievement of the subject 
– Kant’s ‘Copernican turn in philosophy’. 
Gardner draws our attention to the following passage from Merleau-Ponty as 
an indication of his use of a Kantian Antinomy strategy: 
It is true that we arrive at contradictions when we describe the perceived 
world. And it is also true that if there were such a thing as a non-
contradictory thought, it would exclude the whole of perception as simple 
appearance. But the question is precisely to know whether there is such a 
thing as logically coherent thought or thought in the pure state. This is the 
question Kant asked himself … One of Kant's discoveries, whose 
consequences we have not yet fully grasped, is that all our experience of the 
world is throughout a tissue of concepts which lead to irreducible 
contradictions if we attempt to take them in an absolute sense or transfer them 
into pure being47.  
In relation to this passage, Gardner points out that Merleau-Ponty is centrally 
concerned with the fact that when we attempt to describe the perceived world a basic 
contradiction arises. This contradiction concerns the relation of the subject to the 
world and is expressed by Merleau-Ponty in terms of ‘the contradiction of 
                                                
47 Merleau-Ponty, ‘The Primacy of Perception and its Philosophical Consequences’, p.18. 
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immanence and transcendence’48. This refers to the contradiction that arises as a 
result of the fact that the objects of perception are both immanent in acts of 
perception while also being transcendent to them. In seeing an object, what we see is 
never the whole or complete object; rather, we always see a given side (‘profile’) of 
the object. Thus, despite the seen side of the object being immanent to our act of 
perception, the unseen sides are transcendent. So the object is necessarily both 
immanent to, and transcendent of, our perception as constitutive of what it is to ‘see 
an object’. Thus Merleau-Ponty says that the ‘perceived thing itself is paradoxical’. 
Likewise, he says that ‘the perceived world is paradoxical’49 because this same 
structure of transcendence in immanence applies to the perceived world in general: 
the perceived world is only immanent to a perceiver because it is simultaneously 
transcendent to them. 
Gardner argues that:  
… just as Kant shows in the Antinomy that contradictions can be avoided 
only if we deny identity between the given empirical world and the world qua 
an object of reason, so the Phenomenology of Perception shows that we must 
similarly deny identity between the perceived world and the world as 
conceived in objective thought. Kant's argument is meant to establish that the 
given empirical world is a realm of mere appearances; in Merleau-Ponty, 
                                                
48 Ibid. p.13. 
49 Ibid. p.16 
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what is supposed to be shown is, by contrast, that the perceived world is a 
realm of pre-objective being50. 
And so he concludes that although: 
… the conclusions drawn are opposed – because pre-objective being 
specifically lacks the conceptual constitution of Kantian appearance – the 
form and idealistic trajectory of the two arguments are the same. In both 
cases there is an attempt to demonstrate a lack of fit between what is given in 
experience and what is represented by our concepts…51 
Gardner draws out two implications from Merleau-Ponty’s antinomy argument. The 
first is that the argument is ‘taken to show that the objects of our experience lack the 
subject-independence which our concepts represent them as possessing, i.e. to show 
idealism’52. And secondly, ‘it is taken to entail a limitation or demotion of the power 
of thought: in Kant, the conclusion drawn is that pure reason cannot grasp nature, 
and in Merleau-Ponty, that the perceived world eludes the objectification of 
thought’53. Thus, Merleau-Ponty’s strategy results in: 
… a new kind of transcendental idealism … which not only denies that 
empirical reality can be grasped by concepts independent of intuition, but 
                                                
50 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.16. 
51 Ibid. p.16 (italics added). 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
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also affirms that the perceived world owes its reality exclusively to the 
intuitive component of cognition’54.  
Merleau-Ponty asserts that ‘the opposition of realism and idealism’ being ‘an 
antinomy of objective thought’55 is a problem that we ‘leave behind’ upon grasping 
that ‘the solution of all problems of transcendence’ can be found ‘in the thickness of 
the pre-objective present’56. That is, in understanding the fundamental role of 
temporality from an existential-phenomenological perspective. The ‘thickness of the 
pre-objective present’ refers to the phenomenological view that an objectivist 
conception of time as a series of abstract ‘now-points’ presupposes the lived 
experience of time that is constituted by the retention of an intended past and the 
anticipation of a projected future. Thus the phenomenological present is ‘thick’ 
because it denies the possibility of a ‘pure’ self-contained present as an abstraction of 
objective thought, and puts in its place the idea that we live a temporality that we do 
not constitute but rather which constitutes itself through us. As Merleau-Ponty puts 
it: 
‘In’ my present, if I grasp it while it is still living and with all that it implies, 
there is an ek-stase towards the future and towards the past which reveals the 
dimensions of time not as conflicting, but as inseparable … Subjectivity is 
                                                
54 Ibid. 
55 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.17. See e.g. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of 
Perception, pp.500-503. 
56  Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.503. 
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not in time, because it takes up or lives time, and merges with the cohesion of 
a life57.  
So the process by which a body-subject as a transcendence towards a world – an ‘Ek-
stase’ in Heidegger’s sense – is in a primordial process of co-constitution that is 
expressed by the ontological category ‘being-in-the-world’, is a fundamentally 
temporal process that is made possible through the primordial temporality that it 
‘takes up or lives’. This stands in sharp contrast to the idea of the body-subject being 
in some sense ‘in’ time, implying an abstract separation of objective time from ‘the 
subject’ who exists ‘in’ time. This understanding presents us with another example of 
the way that the categories of objective thought are inadequate to the task of grasping 
pre-objective perceptual experience. 
But Merleau-Ponty’s existentialist ‘solution’, says Gardner, is not genuinely 
‘beyond realism and idealism’. This is because despite his critique of Intellectualism, 
he still retains a subject-centred and transcendental approach, where perception is not 
‘a fact of nature’ and therefore must be theorised using ‘transcendental explanation 
and conditions’. Further, given his Kantian perspectival conception of the 
transcendental (that is, any transcendental claims that he makes are always 
relativised to, and constrained by, the situated experience of a lived body-subject58), 
                                                
57 Ibid. p.491. 
58 For example, he characterises the philosophical problem of understanding the nature of visual 
perception as that of understanding ‘how vision can be brought into being from somewhere without 
being enclosed in its perspective'. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.78. As Gardner 
observes: ‘vision must be relativised to something that is not a point in the world, that could itself 
become an object of vision or be located in objective, geometrically determined space, but that is 
nevertheless 'somewhere', i.e. that has the perspectival character of a point.’ Gardner, ‘Merleau-
Ponty's Transcendental Theory of Perception’, p.20. 
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Merleau-Ponty’s antinomy strategy only entitles him to the claim that his position 
‘subsumes the realism/idealism opposition in a restricted sense’59 – a sense that 
results in the re-creation of idealism at another level. Gardner argues that Merleau-
Ponty’s claim that perception is not ‘a fact of nature’ but is that through which we 
experience facts of nature, coupled with his antinomy strategy designed to show that 
the perceived world is our mode of access to pre-objective being, entails ‘a 
transcendental idealism of pre-objective being’60. Let us assess these claims.  
My basic contention is that, although Gardner’s reading of Merleau-Ponty is 
very perceptive, and that Gardner’s reflections on Merleau-Ponty’s relation to Kant 
are for the most part illuminating, the ‘idealism’ part of the term ‘transcendental 
idealism’ is not justified here. And our discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s position and 
his critique of Intellectualism should indicate why. Gardner’s use of that term rests 
on his claim about Merleau-Ponty’s retention of a broadly Kantian subject-centred, 
antinomial and transcendental approach. However it misses an important point about 
the way in which these are retained in Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology. 
Although Merleau-Ponty retains a transcendental methodology, in a 
phenomenologically restricted sense, he repudiates the transcendental metaphysics of 
the reflecting subject that underpins transcendental idealism. In relation to the claim 
                                                
59 Gardner, ‘Merleau-Ponty's Transcendental Theory of Perception’, p.17. 
60 Ibid. p.17. cf: Thomas Baldwin’s view. Merleau-Ponty’s retention of a subject-centred and 
transcendental approach attempts to work out a unique version of an idealist position ‘that does not 
detach the subject of perception altogether from the world and thereby end up treating the world and 
his own body merely as objects for consciousness’ as Intellectualist transcendental idealism does. His 
attempt to characterise his existential phenomenology as a ‘synthesis’ that ‘transcends’ the opposition 
between the unsatisfactory positions of Empiricism and Intellectualism is not actually a genuine 
synthesis: ‘There is no question that Merleau-Ponty’s position is in fact a good deal closer to 
intellectualism than empiricism’. And this is because ‘the intellectualist and the existential 
phenomenologist’ are at base ‘both idealists’. Baldwin, ‘Editor’s Introduction’ p.13. 
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that it is the pre-objective perceptual processes of the lived body that play the role of 
transcendental subject, Gardner is definitely identifying the locus of Merleau-Ponty’s 
key transcendental move. However, in emphasising the Kantian dimensions of his 
position, Gardner loses sight of the way in which ‘the subject’ undergoes a radical 
reconception in Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology. For example, when he 
makes statements such as: it is ‘therefore as if Merleau-Ponty had applied to the 
faculty of understanding the strategy of argument which Kant applies to the faculty 
of reason, and subjected Kant's idealism to the sort of critique to which Kant subjects 
transcendental realism’, he implies that the term ‘pre-objective perceptual processes 
of the lived body’ could be taken to simply slot into an otherwise relatively intact 
Kantian framework, replacing the term ‘transcendental ego’. 
This is very misleading because it implicitly characterises his notion of the 
perceptual body-subject as being-in-the-world as being broadly congruous with the 
rest of the Kantian framework. But this is not the case. As we have seen, Merleau-
Ponty repudiates the metaphysical notion of the subject as in any sense transcendent 
to the world (transcendental ego), as well as the Kantian Intellectualist account of 
perception modeled on judgement. So, given his critique of transcendental idealist 
metaphysics, coupled with his phenomenological conception of the body-subject as 
being-in-the-world, the claim that ‘the objects of our experience’ lack the ‘subject-
independence which our concepts represent them as possessing’ cannot be adequate 
for the claim of transcendental idealism. Failing to recognise the full significance of 
what Merleau-Ponty takes existentialism to mean, Gardner mistakenly interprets its 
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anti-realism and its transcendental methodology as signifying transcendental 
idealism. 
When Gardner claims, in relation to Merleau-Ponty’s antinomy strategy, that 
‘the objects of our experience’ lacking the ‘subject-independence which our concepts 
represent them as possessing’ shows ‘idealism’61, he is interpreting Merleau-Ponty 
through the lens of a Kantian framework that Merleau-Ponty rejects. In order to 
make this clear we need to ask the question as to what it means to call a 
philosophical position an ‘idealism’. In the modern period the notion of idealism is 
connected to a representationalist theory of perception. This theory holds that the 
content of our perceptions are mere representations of the objects that we perceive. 
Kant’s theory of perception retained this empiricist notion holding that what are 
brought under the categories of the understanding in an act of outer perception are 
representations (Vorstellungen)62.  
An idealism, therefore, involves something more than a simple denial of 
realism, an assertion that the objects of our experience lack subject-independence. 
This is anti-realism and anti-realism does not entail idealism. The term ‘idealist’ 
itself is connected to the ‘way of ideas’ initiated by the philosophy of Descartes and 
taken up in the early modern tradition. The contents of the mind, on this account, are 
‘ideas’ (simple and complex) and it is through these that we have access to reality, 
argue empiricists like John Locke63. But idealists such as George Berkeley argue 
                                                
61 Gardner, ‘Merleau-Ponty's Transcendental Theory of Perception’, p.16. 
62 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B34/A20. 
63 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, abridged and edited by A.S. Pringle-
Pattison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964), E II.2.1. 
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instead that it is actually these ideas that truly exist, and not some mind-independent 
material reality underpinning them. Thus, on his account, ‘to be is to be perceived’. It 
is due to the conception of ‘ideas’ operative in ‘the way of ideas’ – shared by 
empiricists and Rationalists alike – that it makes sense to label Berkeley’s denial of 
Locke’s thesis of a mind-independent reality ‘idealism’. 
Kant, for his part, called this ‘empirical idealism’ and understood himself to 
have refuted it in the Critique of Pure Reason. The position he advanced in its stead 
he called ‘transcendental idealism’. The Cartesian notion of the pure subject, a 
version of the representationalist view of perception (where representations are 
brought under the categories) and the epistemological problematic that it engages are 
the vital ingredients that make Kant’s philosophy a transcendental idealism. For it is 
in attempting to resolve this problematic that he introduces his transcendental 
methodology.  
Additionally, the notion of the transcendental ego is crucial here because it is 
via the a priori categories of the understanding that this self-subsistent reflecting 
entity brings sensible intuitions (i.e. what is given in perception) under concepts in 
acts of judgement about the experienced world. Thus, his idealism is idealist because 
it holds that we cannot know the things in themselves but rather only that which can 
become an object of experience. And something becomes an object of experience by 
being brought under the a priori forms of intuition and the categories of the 
understanding – cognitive structures of a transcendental subject that give form to the 
matter of experience. What we know are appearances. So here, as with Berkeley, it is 
the ideal – the a priori cognitive structures – that is playing an essential role in 
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giving form to the world that we experience and can potentially know; this is 
precisely why Merleau-Ponty refers to it as Intellectualism.  
As we have seen, Merleau-Ponty rejects Kant’s Intellectualist theory of 
perception, his Intellectualist conception of the subject and the epistemological 
problematic of Kant’s transcendental approach to philosophy. That is, Kant’s attempt 
to answer the skeptic via a philosophical justification of scientific knowledge that he 
grounds in a transcendental ego. Merleau-Ponty powerfully critiques Kant’s 
misconception of perception on the model of an act of judgement. He uses the 
phenomenological concept of intentionality in order to demonstrate the way that 
perception is not an act of judgement but rather is a pre-reflective openness to the 
world that provides the background against which any explicit act of judgement 
stands out. Merleau-Ponty’s subject is not a self-transparent subject of reason, the 
cognitive structure of which provides the eternal conditions of possibility for the 
truths of empirical sciences in a trans-historical set of categories. Rather, his subject 
is a lived ‘body-subject’ that is opaque to itself, concretely culturally and historically 
situated, not an object but a lived process of transcendence towards a world. And 
thus it is simultaneously engaged in a ‘co-constitution’ of the phenomenological 
perceived world – or, ontologically, being-in-the-world.  
Kant’s notion of the subject and of perception modeled on an act of 
judgement involving representation is nowhere to be seen. And it follows from this 
that the epistemological problem of knowledge that underpins Kant’s transcendental 
idealism is not what motivates Merleau-Ponty’s existentialism. If the subject is not 
separate from the world but rather is necessarily primordially and intentionally 
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related to it, and only comes to know itself via bodily participation with the world, as 
an ‘Ek-stase’, a subject-for-a-world, then the problem does not arise. As Merleau-
Ponty puts it: ‘we must not … wonder whether we really perceive a world, we must 
instead say: the world is what we perceive’64. Thus, to call Merleau-Ponty a 
transcendental idealist in a sufficiently similar sense of the term as it applies to Kant 
is a mistake. He does not have the right conception of ‘subject’, ‘objects’ and ‘the 
world’, and of the relations between them, to justify this usage.  
So when Gardner and Baldwin talk of Merleau-Ponty as a transcendental 
idealist they fail to grasp the full dimension that the term ‘existentialism’ has for 
Merleau-Ponty. When Gardner says that Merleau-Ponty’s position is a 
‘transcendental idealism’ that ‘not only denies that empirical reality can be grasped 
by concepts independent of intuition, but also affirms that the perceived world owes 
its reality exclusively to the intuitive component of cognition’65, there is an 
interpretation problem at work. Although Gardner’s analysis is very helpful in 
teasing out the kind of moves that Merleau-Ponty is making vis-à-vis Kant, he is 
doing it in a way that at times interprets Merleau-Ponty’s view through the notion of 
Kantian faculties, such as ‘intuition’, which have no place in Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophy. Thus, he tends to distort Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological-
existentialist claims making him appear to be closer to Kant than he is by 
reconstructing his claims in a Kantian language rather than in the existential-
phenomenological idiom in which Merleau-Ponty expresses them. 
                                                
64 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.xviii. 
65 Gardner, ‘Merleau-Ponty's Transcendental Theory of Perception’, p.16. 
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And if, in response, it is argued that the term is intended to draw attention to 
the fact of a ‘subject-dependence’ of ‘objects’ and ‘the world’ in Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophy, as well as the transcendentalism in his method, it might be suggested that 
this could be more accurately captured by the neologism ‘transcendental 
perceptualism’. However, the problem with this is that it is also misleading because it 
suggests that a direct contrast with Intellectualist transcendental idealism is 
appropriate. However, given that Merleau-Ponty’s existential-phenomenological 
concept of perception is so different from the Kantian one – based on ‘objective 
thought’, which presupposes the ‘prejudice of determinate being’– this will likely 
just serve to compound the confusion. This is because if Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy 
is a ‘transcendental perceptualism’, it is so in the context of an existential ontology 
that seeks to articulate a priori structures of being (existential structures) – a project 
fundamentally at odds with a transcendental idealism that seeks to justify knowledge 
in the face of radical scepticism. Surely then the claim about ‘subject-dependence’ is 
more accurately characterised by the term anti-realism. The term ‘transcendental 
anti-realism’ is more accurate still, as it captures Merleau-Ponty’s rejection of 
realism coupled with his transcendental methodology. This distinct theoretical space 
between realism and transcendental idealism is understood by Merleau-Ponty to be 
occupied by existential phenomenology. 
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3. Why Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenological Analyses Decisively 
Undermine Intellectualist Transcendental Philosophy  
Given the combined discussion of the preceding chapters and the present one 
it would seem plausible to hold the view that the consistent application of ‘the 
principle of evidence’ – the stipulation that all theoretical constructions be grounded 
by phenomenological evidence – undermines the coherence of transcendental 
philosophy as conceived by Kant and Husserl. This is because the more detailed and 
concrete the experiential analyses become, the less plausible is an ‘Intellectualist’ 
epistemology and metaphysics. We have seen this in the case of the transcendental 
ego in relation to embodiment and perception. So if there is a place for a 
transcendental approach to philosophy then it seems that Merleau-Ponty is uniquely 
positioned to fulfil the tradition’s promise. And it is his existentialism, with its 
concretised, perspectival conception of the transcendental that presents ‘critical’ 
philosophy in its most viable form.  
As we have seen, Merleau-Ponty believed that the course he had taken was an 
inevitable development growing out of the problems that developed in Husserl’s 
‘phenomenological turn’ within Kantian philosophy. As part of Husserl’s bid to 
bring transcendental philosophy to full fruition he argues that it is vital to do detailed 
phenomenological analyses of the constitutive acts of consciousness. This is for 
Husserl the appropriate way to provide a ground – via the ‘principle of evidence’ – 
for the theory of transcendental subjectivity. The problem with this for the Husserlian 
version of transcendental philosophy is that attentive phenomenological analyses, 
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both in Husserl’s late work, and as these are elaborated by Merleau-Ponty, turn out to 
actively undermine its explicit epistemological and metaphysical claims and goals, 
thus rendering it a failure on its own terms.  
As we saw in the previous chapter, it is as a result of the contradictions 
embodied in Husserl’s own work – between the statement of his method in Ideas 1 as 
being bound up with an idealist metaphysics, and the results of phenomenological 
studies into the nature of perception, embodiment and the lifeworld – that Merleau-
Ponty takes phenomenological philosophy in an existentialist direction. Merleau-
Ponty critiques Kant and Husserl as ‘Intellectualists’ who have inadequate accounts 
of perception, embodiment, and subjectivity (i.e., ones that fail to account for the 
relevant phenomenology). This phenomenologically based critique appears to 
irretrievably undermine the Intellectualist conception of transcendental philosophy. 
This is because, even if one disagrees with Merleau-Ponty’s positive ontological 
claims, agreement with the central arguments of his phenomenology of perception, 
embodiment and the perceived world as they do their work against ‘Intellectualism’, 
is enough to show that the Intellectualist conception, in being unable to 
accommodate this phenomenological material, cannot be the correct version of a 
transcendental approach to philosophy. And this is indeed what we have seen 
Merleau-Ponty argue, to powerful effect. 
Though scientistic naturalists may find his view that perception66, the body67, 
objects68, the world and reason69 are fundamentally ‘mysterious’ unsettling, Merleau-
                                                
66 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.60, p.249. 
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Ponty has a a systematic rationale for this view. This rationale grows out of his deep 
engagement with Kantian and Husserlian transcendental idealism. Merleau-Ponty 
follows Husserl in his efforts to do justice to the kind of phenomena that Kantian 
philosophy was not designed to accommodate as a result of its level of abstract 
generality. For example, with respect to the issue of perception this abstract 
generality was evident in Kant’s lack of interest in even the question of the 
relationship between different types of ‘perceptual apparatuses’, such as those of 
humans and animals. Instead, his claim is the general one that an experiencing 
subject must have some faculty of ‘sensible intuition’70. 
Husserl, in bringing the phenomenological detail into the picture via his 
principle of evidence, in effect opens the Kantian philosophy up to a kind of testing 
of its claims whereby phenomenologists can explore the central concept of 
‘constitution’ (as well as of ‘transcendental subjectivity’ ‘objects of experience’ and 
‘Copernican revolution’) in detail in a myriad of actual concrete acts of constitution. 
As a result of this ongoing ‘testing’ we see, following Merleau-Ponty’s critique of 
Intellectualism, that there is nothing to phenomenologically justify either the Kantian 
or Husserlian conception of the transcendental ego. Nonetheless, despite his strong 
critique Merleau-Ponty still holds that it is entirely appropriate that we take up a 
‘transcendental attitude’ in order to engage in a transcendental essential (eidetic) 
                                                                                                                                     
67 Ibid. p146. 
68 Ibid. p.271, p.388. 
69 Ibid. p xxiii. 
70 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A15/B29. 
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analysis of the ‘existential structures’ of our lived experience as they are made 
manifest through the ‘phenomenal field’71.  
What this transcendental reflection uncovers is not the ‘Intellectualist’ subject 
that is a pure ego that is transcendent to the world. As we have seen, it reveals the 
body-subject and its active motor-intentional connection to the perceived world. The 
transcendental significance of his account of motor-intentionality is, therefore, that it 
reveals to us the body’s role in the constitution of the perceived world. And by 
revealing the reciprocity of the perceiver-perceived, body-world relation, it uncovers 
the fundamental ontological structure being-in-the-world. Thus, there can be nothing 
to justify the Husserlian attempt at a method of ascertaining ‘apodictic’ universal 
essences in the ‘pure’ consciousness of transcendental subjectivity because, as 
Merleau-Ponty argues, we are irreducibly worldly beings. What this means is that we 
are intrinsically ‘rooted’ in the world via our embodiment, as a ‘worlded-subject’ or 
‘subject-for-a-world’, and that our body plays a vital role in the constitution of the 
perceived world. This is the reason behind Merleau-Ponty’s formulation of the 
ontological term ‘body-subject’, and the appropriation of his other key ontological 
term which describes the kind of existential-dialectical relational being that the body-
                                                
71 Merleau-Ponty talks of ‘the essence of … the world’ (Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of 
Perception, p.388) the ‘essence of perception’ (Ibid. p.xviii), the ‘essence of consciousness’ (Ibid. 
p.67) and the ‘essence of the object’ (Ibid. p.151). On his account, the ‘essence’ claims that 
phenomenology advances are grounded in the structure of the pre-objective level that underpins all of 
our meaningful experience. And so an account of the ‘essential structure’ of the pre-objective level is 
crucial because he understands linguistic meaning as derivative from a more basic lived perceptual 
meaning. Therefore, any claims as to essential structure – attained through a procedure of ‘eidetic 
variation’ resting on phenomenological description – are underwritten by the world as primordially 
experienced. Ibid. p.xvii. 
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subject shares with the world in which it finds itself: ‘being-in-the-world’72. The 
Husserlian goal of attaining ‘apodictic’ universal essences from the transcendental 
standpoint is simply unachievable. This is because, as we have seen, perceptual 
experience is intrinsically perspectival due to the fact that it is necessarily situated. 
That is, perception inheres in a concrete situation that is opaque (never fully 
graspable) and ambiguous (inherently amenable to multiple interpretation). 
Consequently, we can never be sure of having intuited the phenomena on which 
eidetic analysis is based with the requisite clarity and distinctness. 
There is a further implication that can be drawn with respect to Merleau-
Ponty’s emphasis on the constitution of intentional objects as a bodily constitution 
through motor-intentional relations with the world: a ‘co-constitution’ between body 
and world. That is, there is no justification for ‘Intellectualism’ in that it represents 
the privileging of the standpoint of reflection in general, and in particular with 
reference to the constitution of things, the world, others, space and time. If Merleau-
Ponty is right then there is no place for a conception of transcendental subjectivity of 
either the Kantian or Husserlian variety. This is because for Merleau-Ponty the 
subject is demonstrated to be both necessarily embodied and necessarily world-
related. As such no sharp distinction can be made between ‘subject’ and ‘world’. 
Therefore there cannot be the kind of ‘purity’ – the kind of transcendent subjectivity 
– that Husserl requires for his account to work. There is a pre-reflective intentionality 
that subtends all explicit thinking. It is only opaquely accessible to the reflecting 
                                                
72  I will be exploring what Merleau-Ponty means by ‘existential-dialectics’ in the following chapter.   
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subject who takes up a transcendental attitude. As such, it is pre-reflective, pre-
objective being that provides the transcendental condition for ordinary natural 
attitude perception and thought.  
I think that Merleau-Ponty indeed makes the logical moves here in the 
context of attempting to make good on the project of a consistently 
phenomenological and transcendental philosophy. His critique of Kant and Husserl 
in this respect is a substantial philosophical achievement. Merleau-Ponty follows the 
phenomenological turn consistently through in a way that Husserl fails to do. 
Arguably, he works out the intrinsic logic of this move in such a way that leaves 
respondents in the tradition no option but to either follow him or to deny 
phenomenology the status of legitimate heir to the Kantian tradition73. Indeed, 
Merleau-Ponty’s assessment of Intellectualism and his better-grounded use of a 
transcendental approach to philosophy, in terms of his ‘existentialising’ of the 
transcendental, makes it hard to see how the Kantian or Husserlian versions of 
‘critical’ philosophy could possibly be recovered. 
However, despite this powerful critique it is, as we have seen, essential to 
Merleau-Ponty’s program to give a defence of the role of a transcendental 
methodology in the articulation of a phenomenological ontology. Thus in relation to 
                                                
73 Indeed the huge impact of Heidegger’s and Merleau-Ponty’s existential turn in eclipsing both the 
realist tradition and the non-metaphysical practice of phenomenological description following 
Husserlian method is testimony to this fact. For a sympathetic treatment see: Elizabeth A. Behnke, 
‘Merleau-Ponty’s Ontological Reading of Constitution in Phénoménologie de la Perception’ in 
Merleau-Ponty’s Reading of Husserl, Ted Toadvine and Lester Embree (eds.). And for a 
unsympathetic one see: Kevin Mulligan, ‘Searle, Derrida, and the Ends of Phenomenology’, in John 
Searle, Barry Smith (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).  
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the issue of naturalism, and of how he intends to persuade scientistic naturalists of 
the incoherence of their scientism and the viability of his alternative, Merleau-Ponty 
offers the ‘Empiricist’ a method through which to grasp both the significance of the 
phenomena and the necessity of a transcendental methodology. He does this via his 
use of a large amount of empirical studies, mostly in the area of psychology and 
neuroscience. These studies are invoked heuristically as a tool through which to 
illustrate the significance of his existential phenomenology for resolving questions 
that scientism is unable to. Merleau-Ponty uses cases from neuropathology in order 
to throw into relief abilities that are easily taken for granted in normal functioning 
people, such as the case of the aphasic Schneider74 discussed in the previous chapter. 
As we saw, the purpose of discussing these cases is to demonstrate the philosophical 
significance of an otherwise psychological account of motor-intentionality. Thus the 
pre-reflective motor-intentional perceived world becomes ‘being-in-the-world’: the 
phenomenological structure of a basic type of experience is taken to indicate a 
transcendental a priori structure of being.  
It seems clear that we ought to understand Husserl as attempting to make 
good on Kant’s troubled project by a more accurate phenomenologically grounded 
account of constitution via his principle of evidence75. By extension, we should view 
Merleau-Ponty as attempting to make good on Husserl’s troubled project by working 
out the details of the relationship between the natural attitude of everyday life and 
science, and of the transcendental-phenomenological attitude, by linking them 
                                                
74 Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of Schneider is staged in Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of 
Perception, Part 1: chapters 3 and 5 
75 He argues for this explicitly in Husserl, ‘Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy’.  
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together in the fully embodied, socially and historically situated subject. Moreover, 
by so doing, Merleau-Ponty provides a more phenomenologically accurate account 
of perceptual constitution than Husserl’s. As we have seen, this is a move that 
undermines Husserl’s Intellectualist conception of the phenomenological reduction. 
The upshot of this move, it might be argued, is that Merleau-Ponty, through his deep 
commitment to the phenomenological principle of evidence, uses that principle 
against Husserl to damaging effect.  
 
4. Conclusion 
My discussion of Merleau-Ponty as a transcendental philosopher has 
illustrated the way in which his is an original existentialist position that uses a 
transcendental methodology. My discussion of his critique of Kant and Husserl and 
his scaled down use of transcendental theorising has served to mark out his distance 
from their transcendental idealism. In using the ‘principle of evidence’ against 
Husserl, Merleau-Ponty argues that his phenomenology of perception shows 
something that Husserl, due to his ‘Intellectualist’ bias, could not see. This is the 
epistemological primacy of pre-objective embodied perception, the complex, 
ambiguous nature of this perceptual experience, and the basic role of bodily 
perception in the co-constitution of the meaningful world that we experience. This 
phenomenologically based realisation helps us to grasp the inseparable and intricate 
connection between subjectivity and embodied action. And, as a direct result of this, 
it serves to severely constrain the kind of account of transcendental subjectivity that 
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can be formulated in this new context. This is because Merleau-Ponty has blocked 
Husserl’s ‘Intellectualist’ move, which emphasises ‘the properly philosophical task 
of universal constitution’ for which the return to the lifeworld is understood to be a 
‘preparatory step’76. Thus, his critique stands as a refutation of the claim that a 
transcendental phenomenology might realise the Kantian ‘critical’ project in 
anything like its Husserlian form. And, as I have argued, Merleau-Ponty makes this 
move precisely as a result of his commitment to the very principle of phenomenology 
– the principle of evidence. 
On Merleau-Ponty’s conception the ‘transcendental subject’ is a ‘body-
subject’ of always world-directed and historically and socially situated lived 
experience. As a result, the kinds of claims that he thinks the transcendental 
philosopher can make are very limited when viewed in contrast to Husserl’s 
expansive conception of philosophy as a universal and rigorous science. In contrast 
to Husserl, his scaled-down and reformed conception of transcendental subjectivity 
sticks closer to the phenomena of bodily experience. An example of this is his 
‘retreat’ to making claims regarding the transcendental conditions underpinning the 
lived experience of the body subject in terms of his a priori ‘body schema’. In line 
with Merleau-Ponty’s declared goal to ‘redefine transcendental philosophy anew in 
such a way as to integrate with it the very phenomenon of the real’77, he locates a 
reconstructed version of transcendental subjectivity in the pre-objective perceived 
world, which the ‘body-subject’ co-constitutes. 
                                                
76 Merleau-Ponty ‘The Philosopher and Sociology’, p.110. 
77 Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behaviour, p.224. 
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It has been an important goal of this chapter to combat the tendency to bring 
Merleau-Ponty too close to Kant by misreading the significance of his transcendental 
method for his existentialist ontology. My critique of Gardner and Baldwin’s claim 
that Merleau-Ponty is a transcendental idealist, combined with my clarificatory 
exegesis, has explicated the uniqueness of Merleau-Ponty’s position in relation to 
other key figures in the tradition. The nature of this uniqueness, namely that 
Merleau-Ponty’s position is a liberal naturalism that nevertheless utilises a 
transcendental method, means that the kind of challenge that he represents to 
scientistic naturalism is likewise unique. This is because, unlike Kant or Husserl, he 
is deeply sympathetic with the naturalistic view – traditionally empiricist – that the 
body is the subject of perception. On the other hand he boldly rejects the ‘objectivist 
thinking’ characteristic of the scientistic mindset that has dominated naturalism since 
the early modern period. 
Before moving on to a critical appraisal of Merleau-Ponty’s thesis of the 
primacy of perception, which is the subject of the final chapter, I will analyse another 
key aspect of Merleau-Ponty’s theory that is prone to misunderstanding. This is the 
theme of dialectics. In the following chapter I will explore Merleau-Ponty’s concept 
of an ‘existential dialectics’ and subject some recent interpretations to critical 
analysis. This key theme further marks his difference from Kant and Husserl, as well 
from scientistic forms of naturalism. As my critique of the interpretation of Merleau-
Ponty as a transcendental idealist has shown, one cannot be clear about how 
Merleau-Ponty understands his existential phenomenology without an understanding 
of the nature of his transcendentalism. However, without a grasp of his unique 
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attempt to combine Heideggerean existential ontology with Hegelian dialectics one 
would also fail to grasp the full originality of his position. Thus, it is important to 
discuss Merleau-Ponty’s concept of an ‘existential dialectics’ in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4: Merleau-Ponty and Dialectics  
1. Introduction 
While Husserl had a relatively low opinion of Hegel and, as I have indicated, 
took his philosophical cues from Kant, Merleau-Ponty, by contrast, saw Hegel as 
providing a model for the conception of rationality and meaning that must underpin 
the existentialist response to the set of problems bequeathed by Husserlian 
phenomenology1. In this chapter I will extend my picture of Merleau-Ponty’s 
existential phenomenology through an exploration of the influence of Hegelian 
thought on his conception of rationality and meaning, and on the existential 
categories that he formulates via that conception. This exploration is necessary 
because, although the fact that Merleau-Ponty has a dialectical approach is discussed 
in recent Anglophone literature, it is never explicitly clarified how his regular and 
varying usages of the term hang together. This dimension of his thought is often 
discussed only briefly, and some authors explicate his position without mentioning it 
at all2.  
If we look at the uses of the term ‘dialectic’ in Phenomenology of Perception 
we cannot but be struck by the fact that Merleau-Ponty gives the concept very wide 
                                                
1 The main influence on Merleau-Ponty here was the interpretation of the humanised Hegel presented 
in the work of Jean Hyppolite’s influential Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit 
(Evanston IL: Northwestern University Press, 1979). Merleau-Ponty also attended Alexandre 
Kojeve’s multi-year course and had close personal contact with Kojeve. See: Spiegelberg, The 
Phenomenological Movement, p.548. 
2 See, for example: Hammond, Howarth and Keat, Understanding Phenomenology; Romdenh-
Romluc, Merleau-Ponty and Phenomenology of Perception; Macann, Four phenomenological 
philosophers; Cerbone, Understanding Phenomenology. 
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application. This is because his conception of reason and meaning dovetails with his 
desire to be responsive to what he comes to understand as the ontological ambiguity 
in its variety of phenomenological manifestations. Given that Merleau-Ponty himself 
does not provide an explicit discussion of his appropriation and use of dialectics, a 
reconstruction of the rationale of that appropriation will help to make clear both what 
his conception amounts to, and why recent scholars in the Anglophone tradition have 
failed to grasp the full significance of his conception of an ‘existential dialectics’. 
Taking Merleau-Ponty’s references to Hegel and dialectics in 
Phenomenology of Perception seriously is fraught with interpretative difficulties. 
For, like Merleau-Ponty’s other appropriated terms (e.g. ‘phenomenological 
reduction’, ‘transcendental’), the term ‘dialectics’ is substantially reconfigured in the 
process of its importation into an ‘existential dialectics’. This conception is all too 
easily misunderstood if the language of dialectics that he uses is interpreted through 
the lens of its traditional meaning in Hegelian phenomenology, and not properly 
situated in the framework of his existential phenomenology.  
Many recent interpreters of Merleau-Ponty struggle to articulate the way in 
which he incorporates the concept of dialectics into existential phenomenology. 
Taylor Carman, for example, points out the way in which Merleau-Ponty uses a 
distinctive and general strategy of argument, ‘a deliberately nonadversarial 
dialectical strategy’3. However, he doesn’t tell us whether this general strategy of 
argument applies uniformly across the board or just in certain areas of Merleau-
Ponty’s theory. Carman discusses Merleau-Ponty’s conception of a dialectic 
                                                
3 Carman, Merleau-Ponty, p.27. 
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operative at the level of culture and history without saying whether or how his 
general dialectical strategy of argument links up with his claims about the dialectical 
structure of historical experience4. And there is no mention of the relation between 
Merleau-Ponty’s usage and Hegel’s usage. 
Dermot Moran asserts that Merleau-Ponty’s position: 
… may be described as dialectical in that he sees the relations between 
humans and the world as so intertwined as if by a kind of ‘pre-established 
harmony’. The world’s colours proclaim themselves to our visual systems; 
space reveals itself through our bodily gestures and our desire to traverse 
distances. Traditional science and philosophy have not adequately managed 
to describe the nature of this interaction or ‘intertwining’ between body and 
world …5 
Moran is talking here of a dialectic between body and world that expresses the way 
in which humans and the world are intricately ‘intertwined’. But, like Carman, he 
does not specify what Merleau-Ponty means by dialectic in any detail, or its relation 
with Hegel’s usage.  
Hubert Dreyfus, in his discussion of the learning of skilled behaviour that we 
explored in earlier chapters, discusses a related sense of dialectic. In this discussion 
he emphasises the ‘feedback structure’ by which ‘past experience is projected back 
into the perceptual world of the learner and shows up as affordances or solicitations 
                                                
4 Ibid. p.171. 
5 Dermot Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology, (London: Routledge. 2000), p.404. 
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to further action’6. In connection to this he argues, using Merleau-Ponty’s phrase, 
that this process rests on a ‘dialectic of milieu and action’7. So there is a dialectic 
operating at the level of perceptual subject and environment that structures the 
perceived world. But, again, there is no explicit discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s usage, 
or its relation with Hegel usage. 
One author that does attempt to grasp Merleau-Ponty’s notion of dialectics in 
more detail is Stephen Priest. Priest undertakes several interesting discussions around 
Merleau-Ponty’s use of Hegelian themes but doesn’t quite manage to present a 
coherent statement as to how Merleau-Ponty understands his use of dialectics to be 
reconciled with his existential ontology. When explicating certain key Merleau-
Pontian ideas Priest, for example, offers his reader a dual reading: a ‘quasi 
Heideggerean’ interpretation and a ‘quasi Hegelian’ interpretation8. John Russon, on 
the other hand, takes a different tack asserting that ‘Phenomenology of Perception 
can … with equal legitimacy, be called a book of Hegelian or Husserlian (or, for that 
matter, Heideggerean) phenomenology’9. This suggests that Merleau-Ponty’s use of 
dialectics is essentially in accord with Hegel’s. Given these not immediately 
cohering views, it might be reasonable to be sceptical as to whether a coherent 
picture of Merleau-Ponty’s account is possible. As such, I intend to give an account 
of Merleau-Ponty’s appropriation of the term in order to sort out the type of view that 
he is arguing for.  
                                                
6 Dreyfus, ‘Merleau-Ponty and Recent Cognitive Science’, p.132. 
7 Ibid. Merleau-Ponty quote from Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.129. 
8 Priest, Merleau-Ponty, p.49. 
9 Russon, ‘Dialectic, Difference and the Other’, pp.32-33. 
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Many naturalists will be unsympathetic with the use of dialectics within a 
naturalist philosophy. However, given:  
1. my analysis of the shortcomings of the ‘Gardner-Baldwin’ thesis that 
Merleau-Ponty is a transcendental idealist;  
2. Merleau-Ponty’s repeated references to Hegel and to dialectics; and  
3. the fact that dialectics are not part of either the Heideggerean existentialism 
or Husserlian phenomenology from which Merleau-Ponty draws so much; 
the question as to just what Merleau-Ponty does with the idea of dialectics presses 
itself upon us. In providing an explicit interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s conception I 
will show how dialectics is crucial to his view, how he understands the integration to 
occur, and why recent scholarship has failed to grasp how dialectics and 
existentialism come together in his concept of ‘existential dialectics’.   
This will further serve to clarify the relationship between his position and the 
idealism of the transcendental idealist tradition, as well as the realism of the 
scientistic naturalist tradition. The critique of recent scholars will also enable me to 
complete the second step of my three-step argument: the critique of recent authors’ 
accounts of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological reduction, transcendentalism and 
existential dialectics. So, in the interest of deepening and clarifying our 
understanding of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical position, let us turn to an 
examination of Merleau-Ponty’s relation to Hegel and his conception of an 
existential dialectics. 
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2. Dialectics Necessitated by the Ambiguity of the Phenomena  
Merleau-Ponty, following Heidegger, argues that metaphysics is tied up with 
‘objectivist’ thinking, and that the proper task of philosophy is to attempt to 
formulate a phenomenological ontology beyond ‘objectivist’ and ‘logicist’ 
metaphysics. As we have seen, perceptual ambiguity and indeterminacy provides 
Merleau-Ponty with a general model for ontology. Merleau-Ponty asserts that 
ontological ambiguity – that being is ultimately intrinsically ambiguous – is what is 
responsible for the general form of the traditional problems of philosophy with their 
seeming irresolvability, as disputants inevitably divide along the lines of Empiricism 
and Intellectualism. The antinomial form that this entails is the result of attempting to 
conceptualise an ambiguous being that is fundamentally resistant to, hence always 
exceeds, the determinate categories of ‘logicist’ and ‘objectivist’ thought. As 
Sebastian Gardner puts it:  
… in so far as we seek to take the ambiguity up in judgement, we find 
ourselves in contradiction. This ultimately real, unanalysable ambiguity is 
brute but not unintelligible, for we can make it intelligible either by 
recapturing the relevant pre-objective intuition, or by 'living' the ambiguity10.  
 
It is the task of the philosopher, on Merleau-Ponty’s view, to attempt to articulate the 
nature of pre-objective experience in order to articulate an account of being as it is 
                                                
10 Gardner, ‘Merleau-Ponty's Transcendental Theory of Perception’, p.19. 
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revealed to us through our lived body as primordial openness on the world. And it is 
here that the rationale for his importation of dialectics presents itself. 
Gardner, with his tendency to read Merleau-Ponty through Kant, offers us a 
good way into the issue of dialectics. Gardner goes a long way towards making sense 
of Merleau-Ponty’s position but ultimately fails to grasp the dialectic dimension of 
his thought. In his account Gardner argues that Merleau-Ponty’s antinomy strategy in 
Phenomenology of Perception ‘parallels’ Kant in his ‘mode of solution of 
philosophical problems’11. By this he means to point out that Merleau-Ponty follows 
the Kantian strategy of seeking the solution (or dissolution) of the central and 
persistent problems of philosophy by viewing them as a product not of the objects of 
experience but rather of the intrinsic limitation of human conceptual capacities. This 
allows us to understand the most fundamental of contradictions as being a product of 
the inappropriate use of our rational faculties. In the case of Kant these 
contradictions arise in the context of the ‘cosmological’ problems of traditional 
metaphysics. Kant pointed out that in speculative cosmology – thought about the 
world as a whole – there are four contradictory pairs of propositions, consisting of a 
thesis and antithesis, where each member of the pair has compelling reasons that we 
should accept it as true. For example: the proposition that the world has a beginning 
in time and is spatially limited and its contrary, that it does not; or that every 
composite substance consists of simple substances and its contrary, that every 
composite substance does not consist of simple substances. Kant argues that these 
traditional metaphysical questions fall outside the scope of possible knowledge for us 
                                                
11 Ibid. p.17. 
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and that therefore it is an inappropriate use of our rational faculties to presume to be 
able to answer them. 
Merleau-Ponty, by contrast, takes Kant ‘a step further and applies ‘Kant's 
own strategy to Kant himself’12. In Merleau-Ponty’s hands it is not simply the 
‘cosmological’ problems of traditional metaphysics to which the strategy applies. 
Rather:  
… all of the problems of epistemology and metaphysics, including those that 
the Critique of Pure Reason claims to solve, disappear in the light of the 
discovery of pre-objective being …13 
The claim that they ‘disappear’ is too strong, but they certainly are radically recast as 
problems that arise relative to a certain metatheoretical framework and its inherent 
problematic. Gardner sums up Merleau-Ponty’s strategy in the following way: 
Expressed in general terms, Merleau-Ponty's mode of solution to 
philosophical problems is, therefore, to reduce them to representations (albeit 
necessary ones) produced by objective thought in its confrontation with pre-
objective being. All that remains of those problems, after this fact has been 
grasped, is the recognition that there is in reality, i.e. in pre-objective being, 
an irresolvable ‘ambiguity’14.  
                                                
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
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The use of ‘representations’ here is perhaps a little too Kantian but the general idea is 
right. Merleau-Ponty holds that the problems are generated as a function of objective 
thought and the epistemological problematic it necessarily generates as it tries to 
come to terms with our lived experience of pre-objective being. This problematic is 
dissolved via the phenomenological account of the structure of pre-objective being, 
which objective thought ‘represses’. What is revealed through this account is a deep 
and ‘irresolvable ambiguity’ that pervades all levels of our experience.   
As we have seen, Merleau-Ponty holds that this ambiguity can be seen 
fundamentally in our experience of the lived body. For example, the body is lived by 
me as being ambiguous between ‘subject’ and ‘object’. ‘Subjective’ in the way that I 
phenomenally experience my body as I live through it and yet ‘objective’ in the way 
I can observe and touch it like an object in the world. This basic ambiguity pervades 
the perceived world in general. Merleau-Ponty asserts, for example, that ‘the visual 
field is that strange zone in which contradictory notions jostle each other’15, a ‘zone’ 
in which we encounter ‘the indeterminate as a positive phenomenon’16.  To illustrate 
this Merleau-Ponty uses the example of the Muller-Lyer lines:  
 
                                                
15 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.6. 
16 Ibid. p.7. 
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He argues that ‘the two straight lines in Muller-Lyer’s optical illusion are neither of 
equal nor unequal length’; and ‘it is only in the objective world’ that the ‘question 
arises’ as to what their determinate length really is17. This is because if we attend to 
our perceptual experience of them we find that, prior to any act of judgment, we 
perceive them as being ambiguously indeterminate between the claim that they are of 
equal length and that they are of different lengths. We perceive them as being both, 
in a way that is not correctable by perceiving them ‘more truly’, by going beneath the 
ambiguity to an unambiguous Cartesian clarity and distinctness that reveals what 
they determinately really are. For Merleau-Ponty they really are this ambiguity.   
This ambiguity also pervades language, in the sense that language is 
ambiguously both an ‘external’ social structure that is not of the subject’s making 
and into which the body-subject is ‘born’. Yet it is simultaneously the immediate 
expression of ‘subjective’ thought and experience, and only exists in as much as it is 
‘taken up’ by each subject in a process of creative expression that transforms the 
structure in the very act of utilising it. History is likewise also ambiguously objective 
and subjective because events of the past come to be understood only through 
particular human interpretations, and these interpretations of past events go on to 
influence future events. Merleau-Ponty’s views on language and history come 
together in his claim about the generational reproduction of traditions of thought: 
                                                
17 Ibid. p.6. 
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A man cannot receive a heritage of ideas without transforming it by the very 
fact that he comes to know it, without injecting his own and always different 
way of being into it18.  
All these different manifestations of ambiguity occur because at base they are 
expressing a deep ontological truth about the structure of being, a truth that is 
necessarily occluded ‘by the (Cartesian) assumption that the world consists of 
discrete substances whose properties may be clearly and univocally enumerated’19. 
Merleau-Ponty’s ontological category ‘being-in-the-world’ is intended to capture this 
deep ambiguity at its most basic level, the body-world relation. ‘The world’ and the 
‘subject’ can be given Empiricist and Intellectualist interpretations not simply 
because of a flagrant and cavalier misuse of our intellectual capacities. Rather, it is 
because the perceived world as revealed phenomenologically is a world that suggests 
just these kinds of theories due to the nature of perception and of the world revealed 
through it.   
Thus on this account Empiricism and Intellectualism are not simply wrong 
theories to be discarded in a contest of progressive theoretical supersession. For this 
presupposes that Empiricism, Intellectualism and existentialism are all operating 
within the same metatheoretical framework and problematic. But, as I have argued, 
Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of philosophy consists in a substantive break with 
these philosophies and their key Cartesian epistemological and ontological 
assumptions. As such, Merleau-Ponty would not go along with Gardner’s statement 
                                                
18 Merleau-Ponty, ‘Man and Adversity’, p. 224.   
19 ‘Ambiguity’ in Michelman, Historical Dictionary of Existentialism. 
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above that ‘all that remains’ of the key problems of modern philosophy, after the 
relationship between objective thought and pre-objective being has been grasped, ‘is 
the recognition that there is in reality, i.e. in pre-objective being, an irresolvable 
“ambiguity”’. Instead, he would say that the key problems of modern philosophy 
cannot be simply discarded, precisely because objective thought is not an optional 
way of theorising that we may or may not choose to take up. It is in fact a product of 
the natural attitude, which we necessarily use in everyday life and in science.  
 
3. Merleau-Ponty’s Antinomies: Mid-way between Kant and Hegel 
Gardner points out that Merleau-Ponty locates the antinomies ‘mid-way 
between’ Kant’s and Hegel’s conceptions. Hegel critiques Kant’s view in two key 
ways. The first problem is that Kant fails to see that ‘antinomial structure is 
ubiquitous in thought’20. And the second is that he fails to grasp the true significance 
of the Antinomy, mistakenly subjectivising the antinomies. On Kant’s view ‘the 
relevant contradictions should be regarded as a function of the subject's mode of 
cognition’21. As Hegel puts it:  
The explanation offered by Kant alleges that the contradiction does not affect 
the object in its own proper essence, but attaches only to the Reason which 
seeks to comprehend it … The blemish of contradiction, it seems, could not 
                                                
20 Gardner, ‘Merleau-Ponty's Transcendental Theory of Perception’, p.19. 
21 Ibid. 
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be allowed to mar the essence of the world; but there could be no objection to 
attach it to the thinking Reason, to the essence of mind.22  
By contrast, Hegel argues that we should instead ‘lay the blame for contradiction on 
the objects, for failing to cohere with thought’23. Kant, he argues: 
… never got beyond the negative result that the thing-in-itself is unknowable, 
and never penetrated to the discovery of what the antinomies really and 
positively mean. That true and positive meaning of the antinomies is this: that 
every actual thing involves a coexistence of opposed elements. Consequently 
to know, or, in other words, to comprehend an object is equivalent to being 
conscious of it as a concrete unity of opposed determinations24. 
Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the antinomies is located mid-way between these two 
models. As Gardner observes, Merleau-Ponty ‘analyses antinomy as a function of the 
relation between the body-subject’s capacity for objective thought and the “real 
ambiguity” present as a fundamental structural feature of the perceived world’25. 
Gardner goes on to point out that Merleau-Ponty holds the Hegelian view that: 
… we should reject the ‘reproach of ambivalence’, i.e. that we should regard 
antinomy as a philosophical discovery, and not as a failure of philosophical 
                                                
22 Georg Hegel, The logic of Hegel: translated from the Encyclopaedia of the philosophical sciences, 
William Wallace (trans.) (London: Clarendon Press, 1975) (henceforth (Encyclopaedia) Logic 
(1817)), §48. 
23 Gardner, ‘Merleau-Ponty's Transcendental Theory of Perception’, p.19. 
24 Hegel, (Encyclopaedia) Logic (1817), §48. 
25 Gardner, ‘Merleau-Ponty's Transcendental Theory of Perception’, p.19. 
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thought showing the need to withdraw our logically contradictory description 
of the world26.  
On Merleau-Ponty’s view, ‘if this contact [with being] really is ambivalent, it is for 
us to accommodate ourselves to it’27. Thus, as Gardner argues, ‘we must also accept, 
with Kant, that conceptuality is in some sense impugned by antinomy’28. And in the 
case of Merleau-Ponty it is the thesis of the primacy of perception that this serves to 
legitimate, with its necessary constraints on the pretensions of autonomous 
rationality.  
Merleau-Ponty's distinct approach to the problem of the antinomies 
incorporates elements of Kant's transcendental idealism and Hegelian absolute 
idealism. With Hegelian absolute idealism Merleau-Ponty rejects things in 
themselves, affirms a version of subject-object identity in his phenomenological 
conception of pre-objectivity, and aims to transcend the opposition of realism and 
idealism. However as I argued in the previous chapter, Merleau-Ponty's holds, with 
Kantian idealism, a conception of transcendental theorising that understands 
transcendental conditions as inherently perspectival. Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenological conception of subjectivity is finite and limited as with the Kantian 
subject. However, it is nonetheless the case that as Gardner rightly observes:  
The perspectival character of Merleau-Ponty's conception of the 
transcendental is what marks his difference from conceptions of the 
                                                
26 Ibid. 
27 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p.75. 
28 Gardner, ‘Merleau-Ponty's Transcendental Theory of Perception’, p.20. 
  Chapter 4: Merleau-Ponty and Dialectics 
 
  219  
transcendental in objective thought: Kant's ‘eternal’, a priori subjectivity is, 
in Merleau-Ponty's view, not rigorously perspectival …29 
It is through his use of the concept of intentionality and the phenomenology of the 
lived body that Merleau-Ponty gives this notion of perspectival subjectivity a more 
consistent account. However, what Gardner misses is that Merleau-Ponty views the 
incorporation of dialectics as vital in order to help fully articulate this picture.  
 
4. Merleau-Ponty’s Appropriation of Dialectics 
Merleau-Ponty discusses his general interpretation of Hegel, and the relation 
of his own position to it, in the essay ‘Hegel’s existentialism’30. In the essay he 
argues that the central movements in modern philosophy that he seeks to integrate in 
his own position – phenomenology, existentialism and Marxism – do not appreciate 
that their origin lies in Hegel’s philosophy. ‘Not that Hegel himself offers the truth 
we are seeking’, says Merleau-Ponty, but rather:  
If we do not despair of a truth above and beyond divergent points of view, if 
we remain dedicated to a new classicism, an organic civilization, while 
maintaining the sharpest sense of subjectivity, then no task in the cultural 
order is more urgent than re-establishing the connection between on the one 
                                                
29 Ibid. 
30 This essay was occasioned by Jean Hyppolite's lecture of the same title, delivered on February 16, 
1947, 
to l'Institut d'Études Germaniques. ‘The great interest of Hyppolite's lecture is that, as far as 
existentialism is concerned, it begins the translation which will illuminate the discussions of our time’. 
Merleau-Ponty, ‘Hegel’s Existentialism’, in Sense and Non-Sense, p.64. 
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hand, the thankless doctrines which try to forget their Hegelian origin and, on 
the other, that origin itself31. 
The Hegelian dimension to Merleau-Ponty’s thought can be seen in the importation 
of dialectics in his conception of reason, of meaning, and thus in the ontology that he 
constructs through them. Merleau-Ponty argues that Hegel is vitally important to 
existential phenomenology because he is the philosopher who ‘started the attempt to 
explore the irrational and integrate it into an expanded reason …32 By ‘the irrational’ 
Merleau-Ponty is not referring to the incoherent or contradictory. Rather, he means 
non-rational in the sense of the lived or the existential. Merleau-Ponty sees his 
attempt to incorporate the pre-reflective intentionality of the lived body into 
philosophy as Hegelian in this sense. Thus, like Hegel, he seeks ‘a new idea of 
reason’ that does not forget ‘the ‘experience of unreason’33. This expanded, yet 
concrete and situated, conception derives from the ‘Hegel of 1807’, the Hegel of 
Phenomenology of Spirit. Merleau-Ponty finds this Hegel’s conception of a 
phenomenological exploration of the concrete historical structures of meaningful 
human activity – for example ‘customs, economic structures, and legal institutions’34 
– consonant with the existentialist’s profound concern with one’s concrete situation. 
This is because it:   
… does not try to fit all history into a framework of pre-established logic but 
attempts to bring each doctrine and each era back to life and to let itself be 
                                                
31 Merleau-Ponty, ‘Hegel’s Existentialism’, p.63. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Merleau-Ponty, ‘Author’s Preface’ in Sense and Non-Sense, p.3. 
34 Ibid. p.63. 
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guided by their internal logic with such impartiality that all concern with 
system seems forgotten35. 
Thus, Hegel’s phenomenological thought is ‘existentialist in that it views man not as 
being from the start a consciousness in full possession of its own clear thoughts but 
as a life which is its own responsibility and which tries to understand itself’36. 
Merleau-Ponty agrees with the Hegelian idea that it is the philosopher’s task 
to ‘reveal the immanent logic of human experience’. So, like Hegel he rejects the 
Kantian opposition of matter and form, the view that experience can somehow be 
analysed into meaningless matter to which the mind gives form, or meaning. And, 
with Hegel, he affirms that experience itself is pregnant with meaningful form. 
Unlike Kant, Merleau-Ponty holds that the conditions of experience are not 
susceptible to analysis in terms of form and content. As we saw previously, Kant 
holds that the conditions of experience can be divided between the form of 
experience and the contents of experience, where the a priori forms of intuition (time 
and space) and the categories of the understanding are taken to give form to the 
formless ‘manifold of sensation’ (the contents of perception). As Gardner 
characterises Merleau-Ponty’s view: ‘pre-objective perception is intuitive, and it is 
intuitive without being, like Kant's matter of experience, determinately formless; it is 
a formed-content’37.  
                                                
35 Ibid. p.65. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Gardner, ‘Merleau-Ponty's Transcendental Theory of Perception’, p.18. 
  Chapter 4: Merleau-Ponty and Dialectics 
 
  222  
From a Kantian perspective it might be argued that the exact nature of this 
formed-content, which Merleau-Ponty discusses under the theme of ‘the world that is 
always already there’, is not made entirely clear. Merleau-Ponty, for his part, would 
see this as a criticism informed by Intellectualist confusions about the nature of 
perception and of the perceived world. He would not see this as a shortcoming. He 
would argue that the notion that the ‘formed-content’ structure that comprises the 
world (‘a whole already pregnant with an irreducible meaning’38), and the objects 
within it, could be made entirely clear is based on failing to grasp the significance of 
the constraints placed on the reach of rationality due to its intrinsic situatedness. 
Rather, by implicitly ‘postulating a knowledge rendered totally explicit’ it 
instantiates an unjustified ‘presumption on reason’s part’39. The world that is ‘always 
already there’ is a primitive experiential dimension that represents our primordial 
contact with, and participation in, being. As such, it necessarily resists a total 
explication. Thus for him the form/content binarism is a product of objective 
thought, one that he does not feel obliged to theorise the structure of pre-objective 
being in terms of. This is because the characterisation of pre-objectivity is in the last 
analysis answerable to the content and structure of our lived experience rather than to 
‘logicist’ either/or categorial frameworks. Only a dialectical type of reason can 
capture the nature of the form/content relation manifested in the formed-content 
structure of perceptual phenomena. 
In relation to our earlier discussion of the role of antinomies, Merleau-
Ponty’s identification of the philosopher’s role as the revealer of the ‘immanent logic 
                                                
38 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.25. 
39 Ibid. p.73. 
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of experience’ necessitates his fundamental rejection of the ‘reproach of 
ambivalence’. Although he provides no explicit account of his adoption of this key 
move, it is clear that he assents to the view that the dialectical embracing of what are 
traditionally understood to be antinomies is appropriate for the philosophical level of 
thinking because this move is adequately phenomenologically grounded. Its 
appropriateness is further demonstrated by the way that it enables us to overcome 
irresolvable traditional philosophical problems.  
Although Merleau-Ponty understands the dialectical nature of the world 
differently from Hegel, his dialectical conception of reason has its origin in Hegel’s 
critique of Kant’s distinction between ‘the understanding’ and ‘Reason’. Attacking 
the legitimacy of this distinction, Hegel advocates a kind of thinking that is not 
constrained by this core Kantian schema. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant argues 
that our cognitive capacities are empirically constrained in such a way that only 
possible objects of experience are capable of becoming possible objects of 
knowledge. The understanding is the faculty through which we can acquire 
knowledge of the objects of experience. Reason, in contrast, is the faculty that seeks, 
but can never achieve, knowledge of an experience-transcendent reality. Thus in its 
application in the speculative metaphysical philosophies of the Rationalists it 
becomes a faculty that leads to unjustifiable conceptual constructions. Merleau-Ponty 
interprets Hegel as advocating a speculative rational faculty, a ‘quasi-Kantian Reason 
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(Vernunft)’ as Stephen Priest puts it40. Thus we see Merleau-Ponty arguing that 
Hegel has a conception of ‘Reason’ that is: 
… broader than the understanding, which can respect the variety and 
singularity of individual consciousnesses, civilizations, ways of thinking, and 
historical contingency, but which nevertheless does not give up the attempt to 
master them in order to guide them back to their own truth41.  
However, in Merleau-Ponty’s version it is not applied in the service of an absolute 
idealist metaphysics. Instead it is constrained through the phenomenological 
principle of evidence and pressed into the service of existential ontology, the search 
for the concrete existential structures of human being. 
Merleau-Ponty claims that the most fruitful way to interpret Hegel’s 
philosophy is through the lens of existential phenomenology. Thus, he suggests that 
we ought to ‘base his logic on his phenomenology and not his phenomenology on his 
logic’42. This inverts Hegel’s own understanding of his philosophy where the logic is 
the key to understanding the true meaning of the phenomenology. This inversion is 
consistent with Merleau-Ponty’s central thesis of the primacy of perception and his 
philosophy of the concrete where all ontological claims are understood to rest on a 
phenomenological grounding. 
                                                
40 Priest, Merleau-Ponty, p.38. 
41 Merleau-Ponty, ‘Hegel’s Existentialism’, p.63. 
42 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ‘The Battle over Existentialism’ in Sense and Non-Sense, p.81. 
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In Hegel’s philosophy ‘the separation of the material and the immaterial can 
be explained only on the basis of the original unity of both’43. However, on Hegel’s 
account the relationship between body and spirit (Geist) is a relationship between a 
particular and a universal, thus: body and universal Geist. It is impossible to translate 
the German word ‘Geist’ into English and retain all of its resonances. The two main 
ways it has been rendered are ‘spirit’ or ‘mind’. The term ‘spirit’ has divine 
connotations while ‘mind’ represents the mental as it is commonly understood, in 
contrast to the physical. Both are intended in his conception of, as Peter Singer puts 
it, ‘an over-arching collective Mind that is an active force throughout history, and of 
which all individual minds—that is, all human beings, considered in their mental 
aspect—are a part’44.  
On Hegel’s account the physical world is an expression of universal Geist. 
For example he says: 
In truth the immaterial is not related to the material as particular to a 
particular but as the true universal which overarches and embraces 
particularity is related to the particular; the particular material thing in its 
isolation has no truth, no independence in face of the immaterial45.  
 
                                                
43 Georg Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, A.V. Miller (trans.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1979), §389n. 
44 Peter Singer, ‘Hegel’ in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Ted Honderich (ed.) (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995) p.342 
45 Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit, §389n. 
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Nevertheless, Geist cannot exist but through the physical through which it expresses 
itself and comes to know itself in a process of progressive historical self-realisation. 
Not, however, at the level of the individual but at the level of human collectivities 
through which Geist is manifest and which evolves in a process of dialectical 
movement that Hegel refers to as ‘sublation’ (Aufgehoben). ‘Sublation’ is Hegel’s 
term that is intended to capture the movement of synthesis between two opposing or 
contradictory historical forms of human life and consciousness. As Robert 
Sinnerbrink observes, Hegelian dialectics is: 
… the attempt … to show the relatedness of opposing terms, the negative 
movement of thought from one determination [thesis] to its opposite 
[antithesis], and their synthesis within a more complex configuration of 
conceptual meaning. Dialectic thus underscores the role of negation in the 
constitution of positivity (the new emerges out of the negation or superceding 
of the old)46.  
In Hegel’s dialectics the movement of historical forms of human life and 
consciousness proceeds via ‘a determinate negation that both cancels and preserves’, 
a ‘“supercession” that synthesises opposing terms into a more integrated and 
complex ‘conceptual unity’47. This is a process whereby a general historical form of 
life is grasped as generating a contradictory form contained within it and where, 
through a process of dynamic historical development, the two forms are subsumed 
and transformed (sublated) via a new synthesis into a new form. This new form, in 
                                                
46 Robert Sinnerbrink, Understanding Hegelianism (Stocksfield: Acumen, 2007), p.166. 
47 Ibid. 
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turn, contains its own contradictions, which will develop towards a new sublation, 
and so on. 
Hegel’s account of the process and the stages of the growing historical 
expression of Geist in human activities in Phenomenology of Spirit is complex as it is 
intended to be an account of all the stages of consciousness that Hegel thinks are 
possible. The details of this story, however, are not important for our purposes 
because Merleau-Ponty completely rejects Hegel’s conception of the world as the 
expression of Geist, as well as the account of the stages which Hegel claims the 
evolution of Geist to involve.  
 Hegel holds that the mental and the physical are united in an ultimate 
reality: ‘universal Geist’. He understands universal Geist as the unity of all 
dialectical opposition, including particular and general. Geist, then, is in fact the 
totality of what exists, as it really is. Hegel’s ‘absolute idealism’ is reminiscent of 
pantheism in that it holds that ultimately the individual minds of finite human beings 
are perspectives of one universal divine mind called Geist. ‘Spirit is this absolute 
substance which is the unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses’48. He 
also holds that at each higher stage of development Geist comes closer to 
understanding itself. The culmination of this historical process, claims Hegel, is 
‘Absolute knowing’ (Absolute Wissen), whereby there is a ‘unity of thought and 
being’ and Spirit … knows itself as Spirit’49. In Hegel’s conception of absolute 
knowing, as Stephen Priest puts it:  
                                                
48 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p.110. 
49 Ibid. p.493. 
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… there is no difference between what is knowing what it is and what is being 
what it is: it is what it knows and it knows what it is. All the various 
dialectical structures of consciousness and self-consciousness are subsumed 
or aufgehoben into the ultimate speculative synthesis of subjectivity and 
objectivity, epistemology and ontology50. 
This identity of knowing and being in ‘Absolute knowing’ – the claim that 
consciousness and that which exists are ultimately identical – is why Hegel’s idealist 
position is referred to as ‘absolute idealism’.   
 Merleau-Ponty rejects Hegel’s ‘absolute idealism’ with its concept of 
‘universal Geist’, believing that Hegel fails to appreciate the significance of the 
insights that his phenomenology helps to reveal. The most important of these is that 
the concrete ‘incarnation’ of consciousness in a cultural and historical situation 
places constraints on human experience and thus on human knowledge. For Merleau-
Ponty, following Kierkegaard, the metaphysical aspect of Hegel’s philosophy that we 
have just been discussing ‘offers us nothing but a ‘palace of ideas … where all 
historical antitheses are overcome, but only by thought’51. As Hubert Dreyfus 
observes: 
Hegel attempts to overcome the incompleteness and contradictions in 
individual experience by absorbing the individual in a universal harmony, 
                                                
50 Priest, Merleau-Ponty, p.40. cf: Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 490. 
51 Merleau-Ponty, ‘Hegel’s Existentialism’, p.64. 
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thus eliminating the incarnate perceiver … who raised the original 
difficulties52. 
Merleau-Ponty views this part of his philosophy as deeply misguided arguing that: 
Insofar as he reduced history to the history of the spirit, Hegel found the final 
synthesis heralded and guaranteed in his own consciousness, in his certainty 
at having understood history completely; and in the very realization of his 
philosophy. How could he help being optimistic, when history was 
consciousness’s return to itself and the internal logic of the idea as he lived it 
in himself testified to the necessity of this return and to man's possibility of 
attaining totality and freedom from anxiety?53 
Whereas, by contrast, existential philosophy: 
… which renounces absolute Spirit as history's motive force, and which 
admits no other reason in things than that revealed by their meeting and 
interaction, could not affirm a priori man's possibility for wholeness, 
postulate a final synthesis resolving all contradictions or affirm its inevitable 
realization54. 
 
                                                
52 Hubert Dreyfus, ‘Editor's Introduction’ in Sense and Non-Sense, p.xviii. 
53 Merleau-Ponty. ‘The Battle over Existentialism’, p.81. 
54 Ibid. 
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Hegel doesn’t learn the lesson that phenomenology teaches us about how the 
perspectival and incompletable nature of perceptual experience cancels the 
possibility of any necessary meaning and direction in historical experience. Hegel’s 
view of a meaning that is implicit in all experience that will in the end be made fully 
explicit overcomes the contingency and perspectivality of our lived perceptual 
experience. As Merleau-Ponty has shown us, we are irreducibly embodied beings 
and the contingency of our perceptual experience is at the base of all of our cultural 
activities and endeavours. It follows from this that there can be no justification for 
claims regarding an ultimate achievement of social or cosmic order in Hegel’s sense.  
The degree of transformation that Hegel’s ideas undergo in Merleau-Ponty’s 
appropriation is exemplified in the fact that he is capable of making the suggestion 
that we should read Hegel’s ‘Absolute knowing’ (Absolute Wissen) in existentialist 
terms: 
Absolute knowledge, the final stage in the evolution of the spirit as 
phenomenon wherein consciousness at last becomes equal to its spontaneous 
life and regains its self-possession, is perhaps not a philosophy but a way of 
life55.  
By any standards this is an extremely unorthodox interpretation of ‘Absolute 
knowing’ that goes very much against the grain of Hegel’s thought. It is, however, a 
powerful example of Merleau-Ponty’s ‘existentialising’ of Hegel. And what it begins 
to illustrate for us is the pattern by which Merleau-Ponty brings together existential 
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and Hegelian concepts in his ontology. He brings them together in order that the 
Hegelian concepts be recast, giving them a thoroughly existential reading designed to 
flesh out and enhance his fundamentally existential view. Thus it is suggested, in line 
with his existentialist emphasis on lived experience and on action, that ‘absolute 
knowing’ is interpreted in terms of an experience that cannot be intellectually 
grasped but instead must be lived. This rendering of ‘absolute knowing’ is not so 
much an incorporation of the idea as a transformation. Merleau-Ponty does not go 
on to work out this suggestion in any detail and what he is perhaps really up to here 
is attempting to draw Hegelian scholars into an appreciation of the phenomenological 
concept of the depth and richness of pre-objective lived perceptual experience in 
powerful terms with which they are familiar. Thus, indicating where they really 
ought to be looking if they wish to see a genuine – lived – overcoming of the 
conceptual contradictions that exercise philosophers in the European tradition.  
Merleau-Ponty’s existentialising of this Hegelian concept is not simply the 
suggestion of a way that we might read Hegel in order to get a fuller appreciation of 
Hegel, but rather represents the morphing of Hegel into Merleau-Ponty, so to speak. 
What the suggestion really amounts to is an indication that the philosopher who 
attends to pre-objective lived experience finds an experiential structure that shares 
certain qualities that Hegel attributes to ‘Absolute knowing’. Namely, it is an 
existential unity (being-in-the-world) that is prior to the subject-object distinction. It 
is also an existential unity of being and ‘knowing’ in the sense that pre-objective 
perception involves simultaneously an intentional and ontological relation with the 
world: a pre-reflective intentional relation and an existential relation. It is both our 
access to being via the perceived world as well as a kind of ‘knowing’ that we live. 
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We don’t just grasp being reflectively but rather we live being in the body-world 
relation, and our pre-reflective grasp of the perceived world is a kind of 
‘antepredicative knowledge’56. Thus, Merleau-Ponty talks about the philosopher as 
attempting to capture in reflection our lived pre-reflective bodily ‘complicity’ with 
the world, a primordial ‘pact’ of which our pre-reflective bodily being ‘knows’ more 
than we do from our explicit reflective stance towards it. 
 
5. The Three Principal Senses of Dialectic in Phenomenology of 
Perception 
Although Merleau-Ponty’s brazen existentialising of ‘absolute knowing’ 
serves to indicate something of the way that Merleau-Ponty treats Hegelian concepts 
in his transformative appropriation, nothing theoretically substantive rests on this 
suggestion. If we turn to the issue of dialectics, however, the same cannot be said. 
Merleau-Ponty recruits dialectics in his attempt to understand the existentialist 
‘lived’. In connection with this, Sebastian Gardner argues that Merleau-Ponty's claim 
that ‘antinomy is in some sense “true” appears to call for the Schelling-Hegel 
apparatus of speculative identity’57. Gardner further observes that Merleau-Ponty 
effectively acknowledges this to be the case by his introduction of the concept of 
‘chiasmus’ in his late work, where he argues that ‘the self and the non-self are like 
the obverse and the reverse … by a sort of chiasm, we become the others and we 
                                                
56 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.82 (italics added). 
57 Gardner, ‘Merleau-Ponty's Transcendental Theory of Perception’, p.20. 
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become world’58. In his discussion Gardner draws our attention to Merleau-Ponty’s 
‘working notes’ for The Visible and the Invisible, where he discusses a ‘return to 
ontology’ in order to address ‘the subject-object question’ with the goal of 
elaborating ‘notions that have to replace’ those of subject and object. 
In spite of these observations, Gardner fails to grasp the way in which 
Merleau-Ponty’s putative version of the speculative identity claim incorporates 
dialectics within an existential-phenomenological framework. Merleau-Ponty does 
this in order to provide a ‘logic’ – a kind of thinking – that is appropriate to the task 
of describing the phenomena and their relations as revealed to the phenomenologist. 
So when he talks of his fundamental existential categories (e.g., body-subject, being-
in-the-world) as dialectical, what he is claiming is that dialectics is the only way to 
express the structures that are present in our dynamic lived experience. But this is the 
case only if we reconfigure dialectical thought, strictly constraining it by ‘the 
principle of phenomenology’. So ‘dialectical unity’ in Merleau-Ponty’s existentialist 
sense is not the same thing as Hegel’s sublation (aufheben). In Hegel, a ‘dialectical 
unity’ is born out of an antinomy that is subsumed in a historical process of 
‘sublation’, that involves a ‘determinate negation’ that ‘cancels and preserves’, 
synthesising opposing terms into a more complex unity. This is not the case for 
Merleau-Ponty because of the ontological primacy of the pre-objective perceived 
world. As we have seen, it is the nature of the pre-objective perceived world to 
produce an antinomy of objective thought (the antinomy of Empiricism and 
Intellectualism, realism and idealism), as it draws on the either/or binaristic structure 
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inherent in objective thought to represent our lived experience. This antinomial 
structure is a necessary feature of our natural existence due to the fact that we live in 
the natural attitude. And the natural attitude is a result of a powerful intrinsic 
tendency to understand perception on the model of objects, a tendency that is built 
into the very structure of perception itself.  
Merleau-Ponty’s account of the relation between Empiricism and 
Intellectualism as they try to make sense of pre-objective being is an example of how 
he uses a dialectical strategy of argument. In Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-
Ponty doesn’t simply proceed by asserting and defending the position that he 
advocates. Rather, he addresses each successive topic in the book via a description 
and analysis that outlines familiar approaches to the phenomenon in question and 
then ‘measures’ them in relation to the phenomenon they purport to explain. Doing 
this allows them to demonstrate their own inadequacies. Merleau-Ponty first 
describes an Empiricist account of the phenomenon in question, where the subject is 
held to be inherently passive and acted on by an objective external world. Analysing 
this account in relation to the phenomenon that it purports to explain reveals an 
insufficient account of the contribution of subjectivity. He then turns to an 
Intellectualist account as an alternative, where the subject is viewed as inherently 
active, constituting the world of experience. Analysing this account in relation to the 
phenomenon that it purports to explain reveals an insufficient account of the 
contribution of the body and the world, the passive dimension of the phenomena. 
Merleau-Ponty then argues, as John Russon points out, that: 
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… the positive characteristics of the phenomenon revealed through these 
accounts, together with their mutual insufficiencies, are then shown to point 
to the need for a third form of accounting for the phenomenon that reveals the 
subject (and mutatis mutandis the object) to be being-in-the-world, a 
condition that … necessarily underlies and makes possible the sorts of 
attitudes that [E]mpiricism and [Intellectualism] presume to be primary59. 
By thinking - from within - through the implications of one-sided accounts Merleau-
Ponty shows how they are both in need of supplementation by what they exclude as 
opposite. But he then goes on to show how these ‘objectivist’ accounts are locked in 
an antinomial relationship with each other because their meaning derives from a 
more basic form of experience that is not defined in terms of the antithesis that 
characterises the two opposites, and which provides their conditions of possibility. 
So the move from objective thought to existential-phenomenological thought 
involves a dialectical interplay between the claims of Empiricism and Intellectualism 
that is ‘resolved’ in the move to existentialism: a ‘third form of accounting for the 
phenomenon’. However, it is important to emphasise that the ‘resolution’ of the 
antinomial structure of objective thought is achieved through the phenomenology of 
the pre-reflective perceived world. The argument is that what phenomenological 
description finds is that the antinomies are always already ‘overcome’ at this pre-
objective level of experience. This is because at this level we experience ourselves, 
not as Cartesian souls in mechanical bodies, but as body-subjects. And we 
experience the world not as completely independent from us, as a totality of objects, 
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but as the horizonal and perspectival phenomenological world of our concrete 
experience – a ‘world-for-us’. Likewise, we do not experience objects as absolute 
and subject-independent things-in-themselves; rather, we experience objects 
perspectivally, as a transcendence in immanence, an ‘in-itself-for-us’60. 
Merleau-Ponty’s references to Hegel do not always make his position 
immediately clear and are written in a way that invites misunderstanding. For 
example, he argues in relation to the opposition of being-for-itself and being-in-itself 
that: 
The synthesis of in itself and for itself which brings Hegelian freedom into 
being has, however, its truth. In a sense, it is the very definition of existence, 
since it is effected at every moment before our eyes in the phenomenon of 
presence, only to be quickly re-enacted, since it does not conjure away our 
finitude61. 
So, for Merleau-Ponty ‘the lived synthesis of subject and object’ is ‘effected every 
moment before our eyes’ in our pre-objective experience precisely because we are an 
‘Ek-stase’, a transcendence toward a world, not a pure subject. But this is also 
because ‘the world’ defies the status of pure object by partaking in a ‘communion’, 
that is in its co-constitutional role with respect to the perceived world. This 
primordial process is ‘the very definition of existence’.   
                                                
60 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.375. 
61 Ibid. p.528 (italics added). 
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Merleau-Ponty’s reference to Hegel here is, however, potentially misleading. 
This is because his talk of ‘the synthesis of in itself and for itself’ ‘having its truth’ 
might be taken to suggest two separate parts that are coming together and being 
synthesised. But this is not what Merleau-Ponty means. The key phrase here is: ‘the 
synthesis of in itself and for itself’ is an idea that ‘has its truth’. By ‘having its truth’ 
Merleau-Ponty means that, in as much as the Hegelian idea of speculative identity 
articulates a theme that his phenomenology more truly captures in its account of the 
body-subject as being-in-the-world, it is approximating to our true ontological 
structure. Being-in-the-world is the fundamental ontological concept for Merleau-
Ponty, expressing a primordial existential unity. There are in actuality no ‘opposites’ 
here because, strictly speaking, the two putative parts (for-itself/in-itself) do not exist. 
They are, in fact, a product of viewing the issue from the perspective of objective 
thought. In reality the terms capture two inseparable moments of a primordial 
existential whole.  
Merleau-Ponty uses the concept of an ‘existential-dialectical unity’ to 
characterise this primordial existential whole. This is because it consists of two 
distinguishable, though ultimately inseparable, aspects. On this view ‘unity’ has to be 
understood in the sense of ‘dialectically dependent’. As Stephen Priest puts it:  
… a and b are dialectically dependent if and only if not a then not b and if not 
b then not a. Then we have the thesis that there is no subject without a world 
and a situation and no world and no situation without a subject. Subject on 
the one hand and world or situation on the other hand are then ‘identical’ in 
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the sense that they are parts of a single existential whole, or primordial 
existential unity62.  
Paradoxical though this is, says Merleau-Ponty, it is precisely what phenomenology 
reveals to us.  
The foregoing discussion has specified two of the three principal senses of 
‘dialectic’ for Merleau-Ponty. The first sense is that of a dialectical form of argument 
that articulates the dialectical relations between Empiricism and Intellectualism, and 
their ‘overcoming’ in the phenomenology of pre-objective lived experience. This is 
Merleau-Ponty’s dialectic of object thought. The role that the term ‘dialectic’ is 
playing here is that it expresses both a) the structure of the argument and b) the 
structure of the relation between subject and object that his argument articulates. 
Basically, if you follow Empiricism through to its conceptual limits then you get 
Intellectualism and vice versa, provided that you are thinking within the framework 
of objective thought. Only by going beyond objective thought are you able to make 
sense of its existential ground. So a ‘dialectic of objective thought’ points us in the 
direction of the existential ground. However, when we arrive at that ground the 
second principal use of ‘dialectic’ serves to characterise the nature of that ground. 
This usage operates in the articulation of the existential-dialectical ‘unities’ of ‘body-
subject’ and ‘being-in-the-world’, beyond the constraints of objective thought. These 
distinct usages, taken together, illustrate how ‘pre-objective being’ functions as both 
mediating term and ground simultaneously. However, in its role as mediator, it is 
emphatically not mediating two genuinely separate individual things (bodies and 
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minds, subjects and objects), rather it appears to be when we approach the issue from 
the perspective of objective thought. And approaching the issue from the perspective 
of objective thought is something that we inevitably have to do because we live in 
the natural attitude. So, in relation to the role of pre-objective being as existential 
ground, it should now be clear that in the formulation of basic ontological categories 
and relations it is the existential mode of interpretation that is the more fundamental 
usage. This is because the existential-dialectical relations that are articulated in the 
ontological terms ‘body-subject’ and ‘being-in-the-world’ provide the conditions of 
possibility for the dialectic of objective thought played out in the contest between 
Empiricism and Intellectualism. Thus, the second principal usage (existential-
dialectical categories) underpins the first (the dialectic of objective thought).   
We are now in a position to see why recent authors have struggled to provide 
an interpretation of Merleau-Ponty that does justice to his conception of existential 
dialectics. Stephen Priest, for example, fails to to present a coherent statement as to 
how Merleau-Ponty understands his use of dialectics to be reconciled with his 
existential ontology. When interpreting the claim that: 
The relationship between subject and object is no longer that relationship of 
knowing postulated by classical idealism, wherein the object always seems 
the construction of the subject, but a relationship of being in which, 
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paradoxically, the subject is his body, his world, and his situation, by a sort of 
exchange63. 
Priest uses the strategy of offering the reader two interpretations. ‘There are at least 
two ways of understanding the prima facie paradoxical ‘relationship of being’ in 
which the subject is his world, and situation’, says Priest. One is ‘quasi 
Heideggerean’, the other ‘quasi Hegelian’, and he goes on to explicate them both. 
Priest’s ‘quasi-Heideggerean’ interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s claim states that:  
I am identified with the totality of my pragmatic interests in a situation, 
including everything that I am confronted with and everything that I try to use 
as a means to an end … On the Heideggerian construal a world or a situation 
is someone’s world or situation … if there is no person without the world that 
is theirs then, plausibly, their world is essentially what they are64.  
His accompanying ‘quasi-Hegelian’ interpretation states that:  
… ‘identical’ has to be understood as ‘dialectically dependent’ such that a 
and b are dialectically dependent if and only if if not a then not b and if not b 
then not a. Then we have the thesis that there is no subject without a world 
and a situation and no world and no situation without a subject. Subject on 
                                                
63 Merleau-Ponty, ‘The Battle over Existentialism’, p.72. cf Merleau-Ponty’s conclusion to his 
introductory statement on the problem of the body in Phenomenology of Perception: ‘And since the 
genesis of the objective body is only a moment in the constitution of the object, the body, by 
withdrawing from the objective world, will carry with it the intentional threads linking it to its 
surrounding and finally reveal to us the perceiving subject as the perceived world’. Merleau-Ponty, 
Phenomenology of Perception, p.83. 
64 Priest, Merleau-Ponty, p.50.  
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the one hand and world or situation on the other hand are then ‘identical’ in 
the sense that they are parts of a single existential whole, or primordial 
existential unity65. 
Priest is certainly on the right track with his double-stranded construal, and his 
definition of dialectical dependence is very helpful. However, he fails to appreciate 
the nature of Merleau-Ponty’s integration of the ‘Hegelian’ within the context of the 
‘Heideggerean’. As we have seen, Merleau-Ponty integrates the two terminologies in 
his ‘existential dialectic’, precisely because his conception of reason and meaning 
dovetails with his desire to be responsive to what he comes to understand as the 
ontological ambiguity in its variety of phenomenological manifestations. You cannot 
make sense of Merleau-Ponty’s claim that ‘the subject is his body, his world, and his 
situation, by a sort of exchange’, or of his talk of revealing ‘the perceiving subject as 
the perceived world’, without understanding the primacy of the perceived world as 
the core of the ‘existential’ that sets out the context in which the ‘dialectical’ 
reasoning operates. It provides it with its frame as well as its constraints.  
 John Russon also fails to grasp this in his claim that ‘the 
Phenomenology of Perception can … with equal legitimacy, be called a book of 
Hegelian or Husserlian (or, for that matter, Heideggerean) phenomenology’66. Now 
despite the fact that Merleau-Ponty views Hegel as an important influence, clearly 
appropriating a conception of dialectical reason that originates with Hegel, Russon’s 
claim is mistaken. The legitimacy here is not equal because, as we have seen, 
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Phenomenology of Perception is first and foremost a work of existential 
phenomenology. And this is the case because Merleau-Ponty consistently follows 
through on the foundational principle of Husserlian phenomenology, the principle of 
evidence, exposing the limits of the Husserlian account in its inability to cope with 
the passive constitution of the background – the world, the body, perception. 
However, in order to account for the fundamentally ambiguous nature of the 
phenomena he encounters, he formulates a conception of reason, meaning and 
ontology as existential – that is, bound by the necessary situatedness of the subject in 
a world. But he also understands this conception of reason as dialectical, not 
constrained by the either/or categorial framework that structures objective thought. 
Merleau-Ponty’s is a view of reason that expresses the subtle mutual dependencies 
between putative opposites: body/mind, subject/object, interior/exterior, 
individual/cultural context.  
I will now link the discussion of ambiguity, which I explored in Chapter 1 
and earlier in this chapter, with my examples of recent discussions of dialectics in 
Phenomenology of Perception. The purpose of this is to indicate the way in which, 
like Priest, these authors fall short of providing a clear account of the core of 
Merleau-Ponty’s existential dialectics. In my discussion of ambiguity I pointed out 
how Merleau-Ponty holds that a central expression of our fundamental ontological 
ambiguity can be seen in our experience of the lived body. The body is lived by me 
as being ambiguous between the notion of a pure ‘subject’ (a pure consciousness) 
and a pure ‘object’ (in the sense of an extended substance). What phenomenological 
investigation reveals is that the body that we live cannot be characterised by either of 
these basic concepts of objective thought. Hence, Merleau-Ponty argues, only an 
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existential dialectic can do that. Thus we have the ontological category – the 
existential-dialectical category – ‘body-subject’ to express the irresolvable ambiguity 
that we live, as we are perceiving/perceived. I phenomenally experience my body as 
I live through it, as that through which there is a perceptual world. And yet in the 
way that others can perceive my body as an exteriority in the world, I am a 
‘perceived’ for others. Thus I am a perceiving/perceived.  
In connection with this is the existential-dialectical structure of the 
body/world relation. As we saw earlier, Moran refers to Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy 
as ‘dialectical’ because Merleau-Ponty ‘sees the relations between humans and the 
world’ as consisting in a complex and inextricable ‘intertwining’ between body and 
world’67. Moran is right to identify this as the foundational locus of Merleau-Ponty’s 
existential dialectic, which is captured in his account of the body-subject as ‘being-
in-the-world’. As we have seen, Merleau-Ponty, on phenomenological grounds, 
rejects the (Cartesian) assumption that the world and the subject are ontologically 
separable. What phenomenological investigation reveals is that all of our experience 
is fundamentally world-oriented, through our pre-reflective intentional relation. 
There can be no objects of experience except through our taking up of those objects 
as figures standing out against a background, or world, which is essential for them 
being the objects that they are. The world for us is ‘always already there’; we are 
consciousness-for-a-world. Likewise there can be no conception of ‘world’ but 
through the body-subject’s capacities for having a world. A world is that which is 
structured in relation to the bodily explorations of a motor-intentional subject. Thus 
                                                
67 Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology, p.404. 
  Chapter 4: Merleau-Ponty and Dialectics 
 
  244  
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical strategy for dealing with the irremovable ambiguity 
of the body/world relation is to conceptualise it, on phenomenological grounds, as 
the existential-dialectical structure ‘being-in-the-world’.    
Helping to fill out the detail of this picture is the ‘dialectic of milieu and 
action’68 that Dreyfus identifies in his discussion of the learning of skilled behaviour. 
In this discussion he emphasises the ‘feedback structure’ by which ‘past experience 
is projected back into the perceptual world of the learner’, showing up as 
‘affordances or solicitations to further action’69. The ambiguity being addressed 
concerns the way that, in perceiving the world in terms of affordances or 
‘solicitations to further action’, perceptual body-subjects are engaged in a process by 
which our phenomenal field is structured in terms of our bodily capacities for 
movement and action. These capacities, in turn, rely on us learning a vast array of 
ways in which we can interact with the world. The acquisition of a skill, such as 
throwing a rock, results in the restructuring of our phenomenal field in terms of our 
new skill. We now see rocks, or rock-like objects, as ‘affording’ picking up and 
throwing. But this process involves a complex ‘feedback structure’ whereby a given 
skill can be modified, refined and even relearned. Think of someone with an 
awkward throwing style learning a more efficient throwing style and thus 
restructuring their perceptual field in terms of their new bodily capacity. This process 
is dialectical because the perceived world is structured in relation to our bodily 
capacities, while our bodily capacities are structured in relation and response to the 
perceived world which solicits them and through which they are exercised. 
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The final example concerns the third of the three principal usages of dialectic 
in Merleau-Ponty: the dialectic at the level of language and culture. It is this dialectic 
that Taylor Carman refers to when he says that for Merleau-Ponty dialectic:  
… seems to consist in a kind of holism, an appreciation of the superficiality 
of familiar dualisms, the mutual dependence of their terms, and the way in 
which new forms of understanding emerge not by direct confirmation or 
refutation of considered judgments, but fluidly and unpredictably through 
transformations in our ways of being in the world70. 
This existential-dialectic addresses an irresolvable ambiguity revealed in the 
phenomenology of cultural experience. Our cultural experience is fundamentally a 
historical experience, and history is also ambiguous between objective and 
subjective. This is because events of the past come to be understood only through 
particular human interpretations, and these interpretations of past events go on to 
influence future events. So while we in a sense ‘receive’ a ‘heritage of ideas’ that are, 
as such, ‘external’ to us, this ‘external’ heritage is only accessible through our 
‘subjective’ interpretations, which necessarily ‘inject’ our ‘own and always different 
way of being into [them]’71. So as Merleau-Ponty puts it, in ‘taking up’ a cultural 
tradition of thought we ‘[transform] it by the very fact that [we] come … to know 
it’72. And so ‘new forms of understanding emerge not by direct confirmation or 
refutation of considered judgments, but fluidly and unpredictably through 
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71 Merleau-Ponty, ‘Man and Adversity’, p. 224.   
72 Ibid.   
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transformations in our ways of being in the world’73. The ‘fluidity’ and 
‘unpredictability’ of cultural change are a function of the intrinsically creative 
process of ‘taking up’ a tradition of thought or cultural practice. Only a dialectical 
existentialism, argues Merleau-Ponty, could possibly do justice to this ambiguous 
structure of our lived experience. This is because it accounts for the way that we, as 
individuals, must make the cultural tradition in which we are raised ‘our own’ 
through the appropriation of its beliefs and practices – by ‘taking them up’ as 
Merleau-Ponty puts it. And because this ‘take up’ occurs at the individual level by an 
active participating subject, as opposed to a subject who is the passive receptacle of 
cultural tradition, it is, as Carman observes, an ‘intrinsically creative process’.  
It is important to note here that when Merleau-Ponty deploys dialectics in 
order to account for cultural change, this dialectical historical change at the level of 
human culture is nevertheless underpinned by his more fundamental ontological 
categories (body-subject, being-in-the-world, also the object as an ‘in-itself-for-
us’74). So, again, the dialectics are constrained by the existential phenomenology, 
forming an existential-dialectical conception of cultural change75. So Carman’s 
characterisation is not strictly speaking mistaken, but it is certainly far from complete 
in not articulating the way that the dialectical structure of cultural change rests on the 
                                                
73 Carman, Merleau-Ponty, p.171. 
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experience into the impersonal structures of collective action and social life’. Carman, Merleau-Ponty, 
p.154  
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more fundamental existential-dialectical structures articulated in the categories of 
body-subject and being-in-the-world.  
By not clearly identifying the three principal senses of ‘dialectic’ in Merleau-
Ponty’s existential dialectic, all of these recent authors (Gardner, Priest, Russon, 
Carman, Dreyfus and Moran) fail to explain what Merleau-Ponty intends by 
employing a dialectical conception of reason and meaning in the service of 
articulating an existential ontology. As I have argued, Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy 
involves three principle uses of ‘dialectic’. The first is his dialectic of objective 
thought which uses a dialectical form of argument to articulate the dialectical relation 
between the antinomial theoretical forms of Empiricism and Intellectualism, and 
their ‘overcoming’ in the phenomenology of pre-objective lived experience. 
Secondly, the exploration of the pre-objective leads to the formulation of existential-
dialectical categories intended to capture the ontological structure of the ‘body-
subject’ as ‘being-in-the-world’. And thirdly, the concrete situatedness of the subject 
in a cultural context is expressed in terms of a dialectic at the level of culture and 
history, a dialectic of cultural transmission and change as individuals modify their 
culture in the very process of reproducing it. 
As we have seen, with respect to method Merleau-Ponty holds that dialectics 
is not only appropriate for phenomenological description but, more generally, a 
dialectical conception is built into an existentialist view of reason that is appropriate 
for ontological theorising. However, in spite of its Hegelian origin and general form, 
it should now be clear that Merleau-Ponty’s existentialist conception of reason is, as 
Herbert Spiegelberg points out, most definitely ‘not that of Hegelian logic which is 
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intelligible through and through and self-sufficient’76. Rather, in line with Merleau-
Ponty’s inversion of priorities, the rational structure of the world, and thus what he 
considers a viable conception of reason, is understood to derive from the order and 
structure encountered in lived perceptual experience. Thus, if applied to Merleau-
Ponty’s account, observes Spiegelberg, Hegel’s famous phrase would need to be 
reworked to read: ‘The real is only part rational and the rational is only part real’77. 
Consistent with Merleau-Ponty’s view that being always exceeds the 
capacities of reason, he speaks of a ‘mystery of reason’ and asserts that: 
Rationality is precisely proportioned to the experiences in which it is 
disclosed. To say that there exists rationality is to say that perspectives blend, 
perceptions confirm each other, a meaning emerges78. 
This is clearly an ‘existentialised’ version of a Hegelian conception of reason. ‘For 
the first time’, Merleau-Ponty asserts, ‘the philosopher’s thinking is sufficiently 
conscious not to anticipate itself and endow its own results with reified form in the 
world’79. The philosopher, on this conception, seeks to ‘conceive the world, others 
and himself and their interrelations’ but he does not ‘rediscover an already given 
rationality’. Rather, the world, others and self, and their interrelations ‘establish 
themselves’, and thus ‘establish rationality’, by: 
 
                                                
76 Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, p.534. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.xxii. 
79 Ibid. 
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… an act of initiative which has no guarantee in being, its justification resting 
entirely on the effective power which it confers on us of taking our own 
history upon ourselves80.  
This helps to bring out the sense of Merleau-Ponty’s prima facie opaque claim in the 
Preface that: 
The phenomenological world is not the bringing to explicit expression of a 
pre-existing being, but the laying down of being. Philosophy is not the 
reflection of a pre-existing truth, but, like art, the act of bringing truth into 
being81. 
So truth is ‘brought into being’ in a similar way that an artwork is created. That is, it 
involves unique historical acts that represent a unique confluence of forces, and that 
is contingent upon the structure of human being and the structure of language and 
culture through which it is articulated. So it is ‘a laying down of being’ in the sense 
that rationality and truth do not simply ‘pre-exist’ our experience – there to be 
discovered. Rather, they are constituted through the subject in his co-constitutive 
relation with being. And if opponents raise the question as to ‘how this creation is 
possible’ and whether it ‘does not recapture in things a pre-existing Reason’, the 
answer is that: 
 
                                                
80 Ibid. cf: ‘Hegel’s Existentialism’ where he praises the Phenomenology of Spirit because it ‘does not 
try to fit all history into a framework of pre-established logic but attempts to bring each doctrine and 
each era back to life and to let itself be guided by their internal logic…’ Merleau-Ponty, ‘Hegel’s 
Existentialism’, p.65. 
81 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.xxii. 
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… the only pre-existent Logos is the world itself, and that the philosophy 
which brings it into visible existence does not begin by being possible; it is 
actual or real like the world of which it is a part82.  
Here we can see Merleau-Ponty’s dialectical conception of reason connect with his 
existentialist emphasis on a ‘phenomenological positivism which bases the possible 
on the real’83. It is this unique combination of views that allows him to declare that: 
Rationality is not a problem. There is behind it no unknown quantity which 
has to be determined by deduction, or, beginning with it, demonstrated 
inductively. We witness every minute the miracle of related experience, and 
yet nobody knows better than we do how this miracle is worked, for we are 
ourselves this network of relationships. The world and reason are not 
problematical. We may say, if we wish, that they are mysterious, but their 
mystery defines them …84 
Reason is not viewed as a problem for Merleau-Ponty precisely because he holds that 
‘the sense of things must emerge from their own dynamism, and cannot be measured 
by some alien, pre-defined, static ‘reason’’85. This dynamic, dialectical conception of 
reason is, in his view, the core of his Hegelian debt. As we have seen, Hegel was the 
first to ‘explore the irrational and integrate it into an expanded reason’ and Merleau-
Ponty ‘takes up’ this new model of ‘Reason, broader than the understanding’ that 
                                                
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. p.xix 
84 Ibid. p.xxiii. 
85 Russon, ‘Dialectic, Difference and the Other’, p.21. 
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provides the philosopher with a rationality capable of respecting ‘the variety and 
singularity of individual consciousnesses, civilizations, ways of thinking, and 
historical contingency’86. This dialectical conception of reason is, he holds, only 
brought to fruition in the context of existential phenomenology. This is because in 
the attempt to do justice to the singularity of nature and of embodied being, in all its 
richness and complexity, we discover that a new type of open-ended dialectic is 
required. This existential dialectic refuses Hegel’s totalising synthesis and, instead, 
centres on the three principal usages that we have identified in this chapter. For only 
this model of rationality is adequate to the task of capturing the dynamic structure of 
the pre-objective body/world relation, as well as the dynamic structure of reciprocal 
constitution between individual and cultural context. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Merleau-Ponty’s use of dialectics is such that the term itself, like that of 
‘transcendentalism’, can be very misleading to interpreters of his position if we fail 
to grasp the way in which his usage is distinct from Hegel’s. The incorporation of 
dialectics as a means to articulate his view of the lived body-subject as finite, 
historical and situated decisively transforms the meaning of dialectics from its 
original Hegelian conception. For Hegel history is understood as the realisation of 
reason, and individual historical events are viewed as expressing logical relations 
between ideas. Merleau-Ponty, by contrast, understands history as an open-ended 
                                                
86 Merleau-Ponty, ‘Hegel’s Existentialism’, p.63. 
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process that is without any intrinsic direction. This is because he understands 
historical events and processes as being grounded in the concrete historicity of lived 
individuals, and those individuals always have the creative capacity to reinterpret 
their history and their present situation and thus the freedom to redirect their future 
course.  
This discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s conception of dialectics has helped to 
form a fuller picture of his philosophical position by distinguishing his conception of 
existential dialectics from Hegel’s idealist dialectics. This has been achieved through 
a reconstruction of the rationale of Merleau-Ponty’s appropriation and by providing 
an account of the three core senses that the term has for him. I have also, by 
identifying the inadequate treatment this aspect of his thought has received in recent 
Anglophone Merleau-Ponty scholarship, suggested the way to avoid potential 
misunderstandings. As we saw, many recent authors have given either inaccurate or 
incomplete accounts as a result of missing the full scope and originality of Merleau-
Ponty’s usage of the term. They failed to articulate 1) the way in which the ‘dialectic 
of objective thought’ relates to his existential-dialectical categories (body-subject, 
being-in-the-world), and 2) the way in which his dialectic at the cultural level 
concerning others and history is distinguishable from, though underpinned by, the 
existential dialectic of ‘consciousness’ and ‘body’ in the ‘body-subject’, and ‘body’ 
and ‘world’ in ‘being-in-the-world’.  
We have now completed the second step of the three-step argumentative 
trajectory of the thesis. The first step consisted of a critical intervention into the 
‘naturalisation of phenomenology’ debate raised by the uses of Merleau-Ponty in 
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‘post-cognitivist’ cognitive science. As we saw in Chapter 2, Merleau-Ponty would 
hold that the scientistic use to which his work has recently been put fails to grasp the 
philosophical significance of his phenomenological account. In attempting, in the 
previous chapter and in the present one, to more accurately articulate this 
philosophical significance I have completed the second step of the argument. This 
step involved a critique of recent claims regarding Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenological method, his transcendentalism and his use of dialectics. In place 
of these mistaken claims I have presented a more accurate, better textually grounded, 
interpretation of his philosophical position and method. As we saw in Chapter 3, 
recent claims that Merleau-Ponty is ‘a new kind of transcendental idealist’ are 
mistaken. This is because his existential phenomenology involves a methodological 
transcendentalism that is anti-realist but not transcendental idealist, due to his 
rejection of metaphysical transcendentalism. In this chapter I have shown how recent 
Merleau-Ponty scholarship has failed to come to grips with his appropriation of the 
concept of dialectics. Critiquing recent inadequate or incomplete interpretations, I 
have pointed out the unique way in which Merleau-Ponty combines the concept of 
‘dialectics’ within the frame of his existential ontology. He does this in order to 
articulate the fundamentally ambiguous nature of the lived world that the 
phenomenology of perceptual experience reveals.  
The general exegesis contained in chapters 1 and 2, coupled with the critique 
and clarificatory interpretation contained mostly in chapters 3 and 4, has placed us in 
a position to address the third step of my argument. This step involves a 
consideration of some problems attending Merleau-Ponty’s central thesis of ‘the 
primacy of perception’. In this last step I point out some serious difficulties with 
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Merleau-Ponty’s thesis of the primacy of perception and suggest a response, in order 
to overcome these difficulties, that retains the core of Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology of the lived body. These problems, and the response to them, will be 
my concern in the final chapter. 
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Chapter 5: A Critical Conclusion 
1. Introduction  
In the previous chapter I completed the second step of my three-step 
argument. In the first step I argued that Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical position 
refuses the possibility of ‘naturalisation’, as conceived in the ‘naturalisation of 
phenomenology’ debate. He does this because that type of ‘naturalisation’ involves 
the explicit or implicit advocacy of a scientific realist ontology – which he holds to 
be premised on a philosophical mistake. Instead, he holds that the true philosophical 
import of the phenomenological study of perception is captured by his existential 
ontology. The second step addressed the question of the correct interpretation of this 
philosophical position, focusing on three key areas of his philosophy that have been 
prone to misunderstandings in the recent literature: his phenomenological method, 
his transcendentalism and his use of dialectics. Critiquing recent claims that have 
fallen short of an accurate account of these themes, I argued that Merleau-Ponty 
holds a unique liberal naturalist position that uses a transcendental methodology to 
articulate a priori structures of being. He expresses the nature of these existential 
structures by appropriating the concept of dialectics for his model of rationality and 
meaning through which he articulates his existential ontology. And he does this in 
order to articulate the fundamentally ambiguous nature of the lived world that the 
phenomenology of perceptual experience reveals. The third and final step of my 
three-step argument is the subject of the present chapter. This step involves a critical 
analysis of Merleau-Ponty’s central thesis of ‘the primacy of perception’. Drawing 
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on lines of critique expressed by Vincent Descombes, Jean Francois Lyotard, 
Michael Kullman and Charles Taylor and, principally, by Joseph Margolis, I will 
point out some serious problems with Merleau-Ponty’s thesis of the primacy of 
perception that are bound up with his conception of the language/perception relation. 
I will go on to suggest their implications for Merleau-Ponty’s theory and, lastly, 
propose a response that would overcome these difficulties and retain the core of 
Merleau-Ponty’s insights into the lived body and the body-world relation.  
In section 2 of the present chapter I discuss Merleau-Ponty’s thesis of the 
primacy of perception in relation to his conception of three levels of experience, 
emphasising the distinction between the ‘pre-predicative world’ of the ‘lived body’ 
and the lived world of everyday experience – the ‘lifeworld’. I also describe his view 
of the language/perception relation. I argue in section 3 that Merleau-Ponty faces a 
significant problem due to his conception of the language/perception relation, which 
is connected to the fact that he does not fully acknowledge the hermeneutic nature of 
his method in Phenomenology of Perception. I go on to explicate Heidegger’s 
conception of the hermeneutic structure of experience in order to suggest the role of 
language in the constitution of meaning. In section 4 I contend that Merleau-Ponty 
does not see the full significance of the deep linguistic context that is the enabling 
and conditioning background through which phenomenological description 
necessarily takes place.  
In section 5 I go on to propose that we can engage in a phenomenology of the 
pre-predicative level in a way that the results of our inquiry can contribute to our 
epistemological and ontological claims. However, the understanding that we achieve 
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of the pre-personal level is not capable of serving as the epistemological foundation 
of the level of both the objective world of scientific discourse and the lifeworld of 
personal thought and action. And so I suggest that Merleau-Ponty is operating with 
an unjustified thesis to the effect that his account of the pre-personal world has a 
distinct and foundational epistemic status, as it is a discourse on the ‘originary’1, as 
opposed to the ‘second order expression’ of scientific discourse. It is exceedingly 
difficult, I argue, to see how it is the pre-predicative world that is being 
characterised, rather than the pre-predicative as pre-interpreted through a 
contextualising linguistic-cultural lifeworld. 
In section 6 I draw out the implications of my critique for Merleau-Ponty’s 
existential ontology. The central consequence being, as Margolis has argued, that 
Merleau-Ponty’s claim regarding the philosophical significance of the pre-
predicative as ‘originary origin’2 is compromised. Attention to the constitutive role 
of language indicates the need for a revised conception of the ‘originary’. This 
revised conception retains the status of an ‘incompletely penetrable precondition’3. 
However, in encountering the pre-objective we are not thereby encountering the pre-
                                                
1 Husserl uses the adjectival ‘originary’ as a modifier for ‘givenness’. In his discussion of perception 
he talks of an ‘originary givenness’ meaning ‘that which is given intuitively, given with intuitive 
content’. Merleau-Ponty talks of the ‘primordial’ or ‘primary’ level. In Phenomenology of Perception 
he advocates ‘a phenomenology of origins’ that, unlike ‘classical science’ which ‘loses sight of its 
origins’, explicates the way in which pre-predicative perception is an ‘original source’, thus making 
clear the nature of this originary level of experience and its philosophical implications. Merleau-
Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.12. 
2 Margolis, ‘Phenomenology and Metaphysics’, p.155. 
3 Ibid. p.155. 
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predicative ‘anterior to all traditions’4 – but rather, encountering ‘a languaged world’ 
via a ‘worlded language’5.  
I also argue that, despite removing the objectivism that grows out of the 
natural attitude, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological reduction does not and cannot 
remove the fact of our necessary situatedness in a received natural language tradition. 
It is the primary status of this ordinary language form of discourse that Merleau-
Ponty overlooks in his view of the discourse of the pre-predicative as first-order. 
Further, I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s concretised plurality of body-subjects, coupled 
with the argument regarding the deep hermeneutic-linguistic context of lived 
experience, undermines the notion of a singular lifeworld that he tacitly assumes in 
Phenomenology of Perception. I contend that, as Margolis observes, this view ought 
to be ‘replaced by plural, variable, historicized, open, potentially incommensurable 
lifeworlds’6.  
I conclude this section by arguing that my critique suggests grounds for 
adopting a revised version of Merleau-Ponty’s position. This revised position 
involves a full acknowledgement of his method as a hermeneutic phenomenology 
and a revision of his claims about the discourse of the pre-predicative as first order. 
Although this revised account retains his insights about the lived body, perception 
and the necessary situatedness of the subject, the problems with his thesis of the 
primacy of perception seem to necessitate the rejection of the idea of an account of 
the pre-predicative as capable of serving as epistemological ground. So I argue that 
                                                
4 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.208. 
5 Margolis, ‘Phenomenology and Metaphysics’, p.155. 
6 Ibid. p. 175. 
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despite the fact that he sees this as central to his conception of existential ontology, it 
is hard to see how Merleau-Ponty can avoid this consequence. 
Finally, in the last section, I provide a conclusory summary of the findings of 
the thesis as a whole and suggest their implications for contemporary epistemology 
and ontology. 
 
2. Merleau-Ponty’s Thesis of the Primacy of Perception 
The general thesis that Merleau-Ponty refers to as the ‘primacy of perception’ 
is the central theoretical claim of Phenomenology of Perception. As we have seen, 
this claim asserts the epistemological primacy of perception – in Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenological sense of perception – and the ontological primacy of phenomena. 
There is an inherent plausibility to the idea that a close examination of the content 
and structure of perception ought to provide the ground for our knowledge claims. 
And, therefore, that a phenomenology that seeks an articulation of the ‘primordial’ 
level of experience will provide us with an epistemic ground from which we will be 
able to go on to articulate a viable ontology.  
The general thesis also contains a semantic dimension that holds that the 
meaning contained in language is ultimately derivative upon the meaning inherent in 
pre-predicative, pre-personal perceptual experience. As Merleau-Ponty puts it:  
… to perceive in the full sense of the word … is not to judge, it is to 
apprehend an immanent sense in the sensible before judgement begins. The 
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phenomenon of true perception offers, therefore, a meaning inherent in the 
signs, and of which judgement is merely the optional expression7.  
So the meaning expressed in any predicative judgement must be derivative upon the 
‘immanent sense in the sensible before judgement begins’. And so it is the case that 
in a predicative judgement: 
… every one of these words, like every equation in physics, presupposes our 
pre-scientific experience of the world, and this reference to the world in 
which we live goes to make up the proposition’s valid meaning8.  
It is this semantic dimension that causes problems at the epistemological level that 
reverberate through all the other dimensions of the primacy of perception thesis.  
In Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty argues that we are open to a 
social world of linguistic and cultural meaning via our embodied perception, and that 
this secondary level of meaning has its roots in the primary level and ultimate source 
of significance, the pre-personal, pre-predicative world of the lived body. Merleau-
Ponty understands three levels of experience, or three ‘worlds’9:  
1. The ‘pre-personal world’ of the ‘lived body’. 
2. The lived world of everyday experience – the ‘lifeworld’. 
                                                
7 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.40. 
8 Ibid. p.502. 
9 To quote the title of an important article by Hubert Dreyfus and Samuel Todes. See: Hubert Dreyfus 
and Samuel Todes, ‘The Three Worlds of Merleau-Ponty’, Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 22 (1962), pp.559-565.  
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3. The objective world of scientific discourse – the ‘universe’.  
Previous chapters have covered what the meaning of 3. The objective world of 
scientific discourse10 is, but a brief clarification of the distinction between 1. and 2. is 
in order.  
By 1. The ‘pre-personal world’ of the ‘lived body’ Merleau-Ponty means the 
most basic level of perceptual meaning. This kind of meaning shows up in the way 
that in moving about in the world one bodily apprehends the meaning of a situation. 
For example, when walking in the woods we pre-reflectively grasp both the 
significance of the general context of our experiential world – the background – as 
well as the distinct figures that come to be determinately foregrounded against this 
background and then recede back into indeterminacy as we continue on our way. 
This bodily apprehension, Merleau-Ponty suggests, is the basis of us ‘having a 
world’, ‘a collection of things which emerge from a background of formlessness by 
presenting themselves to our body as “to be touched”, “to be taken”, “to be climbed 
over”’11. Things, for example, like a rock that we encounter on our path, which we 
pre-reflectively comprehend as something that we have the capacity to pick up and 
throw or to climb over. And if we think about the case of basic motor skill 
acquisition, such as the learned skill of throwing a rock, this motor skill shows up 
perceptually as ‘affordances’, i.e. we don’t just perceive a rock that we encounter as 
an object pure and simple, rather the rock is perceived as affording picking up and 
throwing.  
                                                
10 See: Introduction, pp.2-3, Chapter 1, pp.5-7. 
11 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.512. 
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We can also see this by the way that our apprehension of the world in terms 
of affordances can be interrupted. For example, when our body is surprised by 
certain phenomena that do not cohere with the anticipatory structure contained in the 
pattern of our movement, the way in which we have a tacit understanding of the 
perceptual situation is thereby revealed. As Merleau-Ponty puts it: 
If, on a sunken path, I think I can see, some distance away, a broad, flat stone 
on the ground, which is in reality a patch of sunlight … I see the illusory 
stone in the sense that my whole perceptual and motor field endows the bright 
spot with the significance ‘stone on the path’. And already I prepare to feel 
under my foot this smooth, firm surface12. 
But if our perceptual and motor field apprehends the meaning of the situation as 
‘stone on the path’ right up to the moment when we step on it, then we will stumble, 
be surprised and have to hastily recomport ourself to the situation. This stumbling 
and surprise indicates that at the pre-personal bodily level we grasp the meaning of 
our environmental situation and the objects within it through a basic pre-personal 
understanding, an understanding that we live. 
By 2, The lived world of everyday experience, or ‘lifeworld’, Merleau-Ponty 
means the secondary level of personal meaning of our everyday experience and 
action. This lived world of meaningful personal experience is built upon the pre-
personal meaningful world of the lived body. Meaning at the personal level of the 
lifeworld is understood to feed back into the pre-personal perceptual level shaping 
                                                
12 Ibid. p.346. 
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how things perceptually appear to us. For example, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, our 
‘cultural’ projects ‘polarize the phenomenal field’ with ‘lines of force’. That is, 
complex cultural skill acquisition shows up in the way that we perceive situations in 
terms of our projects. To adapt an example from Jean Paul Sartre, when we are 
expecting to meet a friend in the café and we arrive and they are not there, we don’t 
just see the perceptual scene of the café as raw perceptual experience, rather we 
perceive the café as the café absent our friend. And at the most general level we 
don’t perceive people’s actions as simply a series of sequential occurrences but 
rather as meaningful and purposeful behaviour in the service of individual and social 
ends. 
Connected to the process of having one’s field perceptually shaped by 
cultural projects, indeed that which makes cultural projects possible, is what 
Merleau-Ponty discusses in terms of ‘reflection’. Reflection involves a process of 
linguistic expression that ‘folds back’ onto perception, contributing to a further 
articulation of the pre-reflective lived perceptual meaning. This process of reflection 
facilitates a more coherent, clear and accurate, and thus comprehensive, 
understanding of the phenomena, using language to express its ‘core of primary 
meaning’ – ‘the primary meaning of discourse’ that is ‘found in [the] text of 
experience which it is trying to communicate’13.  
Through the concreteness of its approach, Merleau-Ponty argues, his 
existential phenomenology, even when performing the most abstract of acts of 
thought in seeking ‘essences’ via eidetic reflection, is nevertheless ‘destined to bring 
                                                
13 Ibid. p.393. 
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back all the living relationships of experience’14. This eidetic reflective process has 
its origins in, and concerns the content of, the lifeworld15. However, when theoretical 
thinking is performed within the natural attitude, it ignores its lifeworld basis and 
takes part in an ongoing sedimentation of meaning that is built on attributing to the 
phenomenal contents of experience the ‘absolute existence of the object’16. This 
‘dream of an absolute objectivity’17, a process which ‘congeals the whole of 
existence’18, is what constitutes 3) The objective world of scientific discourse – the 
objectivist ‘universe’ of science.  
When discussing the language/perception relation and its relation to a 
philosophical reflection on essences, Merleau-Ponty says: 
It is the office of language to cause essences to exist in a state of separation 
which is in fact merely apparent, since through language they still rest upon 
the antepredicative life of consciousness. In the silence of primary 
consciousness can be seen appearing not only what words mean, but also 
what things mean: the core of primary meaning round which the acts of 
naming and expression take shape19. 
 
                                                
14 Ibid. p.xvii. 
15 See Chapter 3, p.194 n.71. 
16 Ibid. p.237. And, as we saw in Chapter 1, this is a result of the process intrinsic to perception itself. 
17 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.253. 
18 Ibid. p.82. 
19 Ibid. p.13 (italics added). 
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It is Merleau-Ponty’s view that without the opening of embodied individual 
existence, ‘a first opening upon things’20, the natural and social world simply would 
not appear. And it is the pre-predicative and pre-personal perceived world that 
represents the ‘primordial’ level. Thus, it is through the lived body that the 
meaningful public field of nature and society is opened up for us. It is because of this 
‘two-way’ Fundierung relation (a relation of ‘founding’ to ‘founded’) that Merleau-
Ponty views the ‘acts of naming and expression’ at the cultural-linguistic level of 
discourse as ‘taking shape’ around the ‘core of primary meaning’ that ultimately 
resides in ‘the silence of primary consciousness’, the pre-personal, pre-predicative – 
hence silent – ‘world’ of bodily perception.  
The cultural/linguistic meanings that themselves play a role in shaping the 
meaning of our lived perceptual experience are nevertheless said to have their 
ultimate source in a process that is a sort of linguistic ‘sublimation’21 of our 
embodied perceptual encounter with the world. For Merleau-Ponty holds, as the 
semantic dimension of his thesis of the ‘primacy of perception’, the view that 
linguistic/cultural significations ultimately derive their meaning from the primary 
source of meaning in the concrete situated experience of the lived body: the ‘core of 
primary meaning’ encountered in the ‘antepredicative life of consciousness’. This 
semantic dimension of the primacy of perception thesis is coupled with a view of 
language that holds that it is the role of language to represent, not a subject-
independent objective world, but rather the phenomenological ‘perceived world’.  
                                                
20 Ibid. p.111. 
21 Ibid. p.146. 
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Merleau-Ponty understands the relation between perception and language as 
dialectical in the sense that the constitution of meaning that is initiated in perception 
is a movement that is incomplete unless that meaning is ‘taken up’ in reflection. Thus 
perceptual meaning depends on linguistic meaning in order to be fully realised as 
meaning. And, likewise, reflection can only ‘take up’ its linguistic meanings as 
meanings rooted in perceptual experience, thus linguistic meanings are dependent on 
the perceptual ground to be the kind of meanings that they are. He also views the 
relation in terms of a ‘double envelopment’ model. On this view, perception 
envelops language in the sense that it provides the perceptual field about which 
language speaks, a field that always exceeds the significations of language. Thus it 
‘envelops’ them with an open and horizonal meaningful field that is indeterminate 
yet infinitely determinable. However, language envelops the perceived world in the 
sense that it tries to conceptually ‘envelop’ it in its movement towards the most 
general claims about the essential nature of objects, events and the world in general, 
of which our most basic encounter is perceptual. Thus ‘enveloping’ reflection is vital 
in that through it we grasp the meaning of the perceived more clearly and more fully.  
It is certainly true that, as regards the question of the relationship between 
perception and language, Merleau-Ponty privileges perception through his thesis of 
the primacy of perception (in its epistemological, ontological and semantic 
dimensions). He wants to broadly characterise the language/perception relation on 
his model of the basic structure of perceptual experience as a movement from 
indeterminacy to greater determinacy. Linguistic expression forms part of this 
process as the ‘taking up’ of perceptual meaning explicitly in language furthers the 
movement toward greater determinacy arising out of lesser determinacy. 
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3. The Language/Perception Relation and the Hermeneutic 
Structure of Experience: Heidegger, Gadamer and the Role of 
Language in the Constitution of Meaning  
Despite the many insights to be gleaned in Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenological approach to language he has not fully worked out his theory of 
language in the period under discussion22, and this unclarity leads to some difficulties 
for his position. The problems in the area of a theory of language and of the 
language/ perception relation lead to, and are bound up with, a lack of clarity with 
respect to method in Phenomenology of Perception. Basically, there is insufficient 
acknowledgement of both the general hermeneutic nature of his method and of the 
specific way in which this hermeneutic depth is at work in the text. The problem can 
be seen in the way that Merleau-Ponty’s methodological statements in 
Phenomenology of Perception focus too much on the phenomenological description 
of embodied perception, emphasising both the role of the body schema (the 
perspectivality of perception, its figure/ground structure) and the fundamental role of 
pre-personal bodily meaning in our understanding of the world, whilst downplaying 
the cultural/linguistic context that pervades and shapes our perceptual experience. 
In not satisfactorily working out his position on the perception/language 
relation and operating with a view of discourse as representing lived experience, 
                                                
22 Merleau-Ponty was already moving in the direction of an incorporation of Saussurian linguistics in 
Signs, and developed this further in the work of the College de France period (1952-1961). However, 
this period is outside the scope of my study. 
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Merleau-Ponty failed to make clear how this relates to the structuring role of deep 
linguistic/cultural contexts that shape our perceptual experience – contexts that his 
view of human existence as fundamentally social and historical arguably entail. He 
asserts that the level of the pre-personal and pre-predicative is fundamental, for 
example: 
Our view of man will remain superficial so long as we fail to go back to that 
origin, so long as we fail to find, beneath the chatter of words, the primordial 
silence, and as long as we do not describe the action which breaks this 
silence23.  
But he does not properly explain how this level relates to the deep hermeneutic 
context that shapes our perception as a culturally pre-interpreted ‘seeing as’ – what 
Heidegger called a ‘fore-structure’ of understanding24. Let us explicate Heidegger’s 
concept of the hermeneutic structure of experience. 
There is an essential connection between phenomenology and hermeneutics 
in that both are concerned with describing the process by which meaning emerges. 
And it is Heidegger’s theory of understanding that establishes the basis for a 
‘hermeneutic turn’ in philosophy. This theory greatly influences Merleau-Ponty’s 
account of our basic pre-cognitive, pre-reflective grasp of our meaningful situation. 
In perceptual experience, Merleau-Ponty argues, we encounter the world as always 
already meaningful in a non-explicit and tacit way. This pre-reflective understanding 
                                                
23 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.214. 
24 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.195. 
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and meaning, as we have seen, does not primarily consist of intellectual and 
linguistic acts. Rather, it involves our practical bodily engagement with the world. 
We interactively cope with the objects and situations we encounter in the world 
based on our pre-reflective grasp of their meaning. We show our pre-reflective 
bodily ‘understanding’ by negotiating our way through our environment and using 
objects for purposes in a non-reflective but nonetheless comprehending way. 
Part of the characterisation of pre-reflective intentionality in terms of being-
in-the-world, on Heidegger’s account, involves the incorporation of an explicit 
methodological understanding of phenomenological description as necessarily 
occurring in the context of a hermeneutical analysis that is grounded in our rich, tacit 
‘pre-understanding’ of the world. Heidegger radically reinterprets ‘understanding’ 
from a species of human cognition to the primordial mode of Dasein’s being25. 
Recall that Dasein is Heidegger’s term for the unique kind of being that human 
beings have. Heidegger claims that understanding is a basic mode of Dasein’s being 
and that the traditional conception of ‘the understanding’ is derived from 
understanding as the existential awareness of possibilities. ‘With the term 
‘understanding’, he says: 
… we have in mind a fundamental existentiale, which is neither a definite 
species of cognition distinguished, let us say, from explaining and 
                                                
25 Traditional philosophy takes understanding to be one of the major cognitive abilities of the subject 
and conceives the issue of understanding through the lens of the problem of knowledge – as, for 
example, in Kant’s discussion of ‘the understanding’ in Critique of Pure Reason.  
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conceiving, nor any cognition at all in the sense of grasping something 
thematically26.  
As a core part of this view Heidegger’s method involves what he calls a 
‘hermeneutics of facticity’. This is because in experiencing ourselves as always 
necessarily situated in a concrete situation, we find that if we ask the question about 
the origin of the ‘factical’ situation that we find ourselves in, we need to explore the 
way in which the meaning that we are currently experiencing has developed. And 
this is a process of historical sedimentation that we need an interpretative method to, 
as it were, peel back the layers of meaning that structure what, from a Husserlian 
perspective of ‘pure description’, strikes us as simply there, as simply given. In this 
way hermeneutics displaces phenomenology as the core of his philosophical method. 
Phenomenology as description is not abandoned, however, but rather resituated 
within his interpretative method. 
For Heidegger, hermeneutics deals with human existence as ‘text-analogous’ 
– that is, as ‘a meaningful text for which we uncover its underlying meaning’. Thus, 
Heidegger’s conception of an ‘existential phenomenology’27 is tied to the idea of the 
‘hermeneutic circle’. For Heidegger, all understanding and questioning operates 
within a ‘hermeneutic circle’28. The idea is that it starts with the assumptions of 
everyday understanding and then proceeds to a level of philosophical awareness 
where these tacit assumptions may be made explicit and analysed. His interpretative 
practice is circular because, as Dermot Moran succinctly puts it: 
                                                
26 Heidegger, Being and Time, 182. 
27 A term which, for him, is synonymous with ‘hermeneutic phenomenology’. 
28 Heidegger, Being and Time, pp.194–195. 
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… in order to pose an intelligent question, something about the nature of the 
subject matter of the question must already be understood. There can be no 
questions arising from pure ignorance. But the answers to the questions force 
us to revise the presuppositions with which we began. There is thus a ‘circle’, 
but not a vicious circle29.  
For Heidegger this circle is not a contingent feature of understanding, but is essential 
to human being as being-in-the-world30. So the circle ‘belongs to the structure of 
meaning, and the latter phenomenon is rooted in the existential constitution of 
Dasein’31.  
Heidegger holds that interpretation has a ‘fore-structure’, which involves 
what he calls ‘fore-sight’ – that is, a tentative grasp on the direction of enquiry 
involving a ‘preliminary look’ and a ‘fore-conception’. His theoretical strategy, as 
Robert D’Amico puts it, is that ‘discourse, understood ontologically, makes the fore-
structure explicit and thereby makes explicit the question of Being’32. Though the 
whole effort is reflective and circular, it is not viciously so: 
… the project makes explicit, by this reflective effort, the structure of 
‘making intelligible’. Though admittedly the project is not possible without 
                                                
29 Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology, p.276. 
30 ‘An entity for which, as Being-in-the-world, its Being is itself an issue, has, ontologically, a circular 
structure’. Heidegger, Being and Time, p.195. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Robert D’Amico, Contemporary Continental Philosophy, (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1999), 
p.175. 
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some preliminary projection, this pattern of reflective circularity … serves to 
enrich inquiry …33 
Because all inquiry and justification is contextualised by a pre-understanding rooted 
in tradition and culture, the hermeneutic circle is a fundamental feature of all human 
activities. This is why his ‘circle of human understanding’ is a structural feature of 
human existence and his hermeneutic practice is ontological – seeking to reveal the 
fundamental conditions that underlie the phenomenon of understanding in all its 
modes. Again, the practice of phenomenology is not abandoned in this method. This 
is because it is the best way to properly access and describe the experience of 
understanding itself. 
For Heidegger, Being is ‘disclosed’ through understanding as pre-
philosophical yet pre-interpreted (in Merleau-Ponty’s version of this claim being is 
disclosed through our lived perception). All instances of understanding, including 
perception, are conditioned by a prior projection of definite possibilities upon the 
world. Working out the possibilities projected in understanding is interpretation. So, 
through interpretation, philosophy seeks the intelligibility that is projected in 
understanding, in sharp contrast to the explanatory scope characteristic of the 
sciences. Heideggerean ‘fundamental ontology’, then, involves a back-and-forth 
movement between a pre-understanding of Being and the uncovering of the structural 
features of Dasein. As Hans-Georg Gadamer later characterises it: 
 
                                                
33 Ibid. 
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In contrast to the mere givenness of the phenomena of objective 
consciousness, a givenness in intentional experiences, this reflection 
constitutes a new dimension of research. For there is such a thing as 
givenness that is not itself the object of intentional acts. Every experience has 
implicit horizons of before and after, and finally fuses with the continuum of 
the experiences present in the before and after to form a unified flow of 
experience34.  
This givenness is not an ‘object of intentional acts’ but rather structures those acts as 
enabling and conditioning them, making them possible. It is thus present in each act 
in this sense, the sense of the background, though not in the sense of ‘the mere 
givenness of the phenomena’. 
Unlike the Husserlian attempt to reflect on meaning via an attempted 
suspension of all prejudgement (presuppositionlessness), the interpretative approach 
seeks to defend the priority and irremovability of prejudgment. There is no raw 
uninterpreted given, nothing is ‘there’ without anticipations. So the idea is that any 
experience we have – and this includes perception – is pre-structured as a result of 
the intrinsic fundamentally intersubjective nature of our existence. This is because, as 
Merleau-Ponty argues in Phenomenology of Perception, we are fundamentally social 
beings. And as social beings we are always and irremovably situated as part of a 
                                                
34 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, Second edition, revised. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald 
G. Marshall (trans. & eds.) (New York: Crossroad, 1989). pp.244-245. 
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historical tradition – a tradition that ‘fore-structures’ our basic pre-theoretical grasp 
of the world35. 
Our everyday thinking and action is shaped by these cultural traditions of 
meaning as the basis of our making sense of who we are and what the world is. As 
such, Heidegger argues that a phenomenological approach must inevitably come to 
include a critical analysis of foundational traditional concepts as the logical 
development of a descriptive account of the phenomena and an eidetic reflection on 
its essential structure. This is because our inquiry must inevitably start with our 
traditional understanding of Being, which is structured through the practices and 
language of our culture. In connection with this, Heidegger discusses the category of 
‘discourse’, which he characterises as an existential structure that ‘articulates 
intelligibility’. Discourse articulates ‘whatever is intelligible about the world through 
communication, which, as an ontological concept, is more than the transmission of 
information. Communication is Dasein's being in the world’36. 
Basic empirical statements about the world have this complex fore-structure. 
As a result they contain the possibility of fundamental ontology, that is an 
interpretation as to the Being that makes possible our encounters with everyday 
objects and events in the natural attitude. When phenomenologists perform the 
epoché and reduction – although these are not Heidegger’s terms – they are still, in 
their descriptive discourse, drawing on language that is shaped by this complex fore-
                                                
35 Cf: Gadamer: In fact history does not belong to us; we belong to it. Long before we understand 
ourselves through the process of self-examination, we understand ourselves in a self-evident way in 
the family, society, and state in which we live … That is why the prejudices of the individual, far 
more than his judgements, constitute the historical reality of his being’. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 
pp.276-277. 
36 D’Amico, Contemporary Continental Philosophy, p.175. 
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structure. As Heidegger argues, the way in which a statement points out can only 
function on the basis of ‘what is already disclosed in understanding or discovered 
circumspectively’37. Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty are in agreement that ‘the 
statement is not an unattached kind of behaviour which could of itself primarily 
disclose beings in general’ but rather ‘maintains itself on the basis of being-in-the-
world’38. However, Heidegger is clearer on the role of the fore-conception as 
conditioning any descriptive (or interpretive) statement. As Heidegger argues, the 
fore-conception always contained in the statement ‘remains for the most part 
inconspicuous, because … language already hides in itself a developed way of 
conceiving’ – a developed set of concepts. Like interpretation in general, the 
statement ‘necessarily has a fore-having, a fore-sight, and a fore-conception as its 
existential foundations’39.  
 
4. Merleau-Ponty and the Deep Hermeneutic Context of Perceptual 
Experience 
One way to highlight the closeness of Merleau-Ponty’s view to Heidegger’s 
is by looking at his use of the concept of ‘facticity’40. Merleau-Ponty emphasises the 
importance of ‘facticity’ to his existential phenomenology in Phenomenology of 
Perception. This can be seen, for example, in his general view that one cannot 
‘comprehend man and the world except from the point of view of [the] “facticity”’ in 
                                                
37 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.199. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Recall that facticity refers to the concrete givenness of situations, in contrast to what we can 
voluntarily control or grasp in thought. 
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which human existence is unreflectively caught up41. Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of 
facticity powerfully implicates the role of the cultural and historical in the 
constitution of the factical world in which we are always already situated. Merleau-
Ponty emphasises this from the point of view of bodily perception in Phenomenology 
of Perception but doesn’t articulate the full significance of the culturally and 
historically situated body-subject that follows from his view of the fundamental 
sociality of human existence.  
Merleau-Ponty certainly concurs with Heidegger’s claim that ‘humans are 
essentially involved in the historically situated and finite task of understanding the 
world’ but he does not see the full significance of the way that this world ‘is 
encountered and inhabited in and through language’42. For if language fulfils the 
realisation of meaning – as in the meaningful movement from perceptual 
indeterminacy to relative perceptual determinacy, and through the ‘taking up’ of 
perceptual meaning in language to further express and make explicit the meaning 
contained in the pre-reflective lived – then ‘language is the medium in which 
understanding is realised’43. And so language must in a certain sense ‘both precede 
and encompass human experience’44. 
This language that ‘precedes’ and ‘encompasses’ our lived experience is the 
medium through which human culture finds expression. And so, in Dermot Moran’s 
words, it can: 
                                                
41 cf. his claim that ‘there is not one truth of reason which does not retain its coefficient of facticity’. 
Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.458. 
42 Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology, p.248. 
43 Ibid. p.269. 
44 Ibid. 
  Chapter 5: A Critical Conclusion 
 
  277  
… never be completely neutral, never a simple window on experience. 
Rather, language is already coloured with the value system of the culture 
which supports it and which language in turn vivifies. In that sense, we can 
never see through language or surpass it45.  
Thus any putatively descriptive discourse in a phenomenological investigation 
necessarily brings with it a whole set of cultural assumptions that are built into the 
practitioner’s linguistic inheritance. 
We do not construct the concepts that we employ in a phenomenological 
description; rather, they are inherited within the context of a living historical 
tradition. As Gadamer has observed, ‘philosophizing does not begin at some zero 
point but must think and speak with the language we already possess’46. In this sense: 
… the historicity of our existence entails that prejudices, in the literal sense of 
the word [i.e. prejudgements], constitute the initial directedness of our whole 
ability to experience. Prejudices are biases of our openness to the world. They 
are simply conditions whereby we experience something47. 
As a result, our pre-reflective understanding is ‘essentially enabled and conditioned 
by our prejudgements’ and therefore must be ‘limited by the overall ‘horizons’ of our 
outlook’48. The hermeneutic approach, then, makes explicit and self-conscious the 
                                                
45 Ibid. p.270. 
46 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Apprenticeships, Robert R. Sullivan (trans.) (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1990), p.181. 
47 Hans-Georg Gadamer, ‘The Universality of the Hermeneutic Problem’ in D. Linge (ed.), 
Philosophical Hermeneutics (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1977). p.9. 
48 Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology, p.252. 
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features of interpretative understanding that are normally presupposed and implicit. 
And in the case of perception this means that rather than give a descriptive account 
of the given, it explains the genesis of the phenomenological given as a result of the 
ontological structure of the circle of understanding. 
So, as Gadamer argues, this hermeneutic dimension to both perceptual and 
linguistic experience suggests that ‘the “object” to which we relate, and which we 
seek to know, is always wrapped around by the history of its significance for us’49. 
But if every ‘object’ is wrapped around by the history of its significance for us then 
Merleau-Ponty’s project of ‘re-achiev[ing] a direct and primitive contact with the 
world’, and of ‘endow[ing] that contact with a philosophical status’50, confronts a 
serious difficulty. 
Merleau-Ponty’s rhetoric of the pre-personal processes of the lived body as 
‘primordial’ (‘primary’ ‘primitive’), coupled with his rhetoric of description as the 
heart of his method in the Preface to Phenomenology of Perception, gives the reader 
the impression that he holds that it is the description of pre-reflective perceptual 
experience that is the central philosophical task, and that everything falls out of this 
descriptive process51. This is true in a certain sense, in as much as if you start with 
the descriptive procedure you must logically move to an interpretative procedure if 
you raise the question of being/origin of meaning. However it fails to acknowledge 
what has already fallen out of the phenomenology of embodied perception and what 
Merleau-Ponty is already utilising in Phenomenology of Perception. Namely, the 
                                                
49 What Gadamer terms its ‘history of effect’ or ‘effective history’ (Wirkungsgeschichte). Gadamer, 
Truth and Method, p.xxxiv. 
50 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.vii (italics added). 
51 cf. in this regard his talk of ‘phenomenological positivism’, Ibid. p.xix. 
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deep linguistic contexts (horizons) opened up as the enabling and conditioning 
background through which phenomenological description necessarily takes place, 
and the hermeneutic turn necessitated as the descriptive method hits up against the 
interpretive horizon that makes possible any descriptive claims. 
Now it is certainly the case that Merleau-Ponty’s views profoundly anticipate 
the later interpretive turn in phenomenology as he is already utilising themes that are 
central to it. For example, he emphasises issues of language and intersubjectivity in 
his struggle to reconceive the Husserlian philosophy of transcendental consciousness 
in a way that rejects the view that they are secondary phenomena. And he argues 
instead for their centrality to what it means to be a thinking, personal subject52. 
However, Merleau-Ponty’s ‘rhetoric of description’ coupled with his methodological 
discussion in Phenomenology of Perception53 indicate that he is not fully clear about 
the hermeneutical depth already at work in his philosophical practice, and its 
implications for his account of perception and the ontology that he wishes to build 
from it. 
In the Preface Merleau-Ponty briefly discusses the role of interpretation and 
understanding as part of his method. For example he says that: 
Whether we are concerned with a thing perceived, a historical event or a 
doctrine, to ‘understand’ is to take in the total intention—not only what these 
things are for representation (the ‘properties’ of the thing perceived, the mass 
of ‘historical facts’, the ‘ideas’ introduced by the doctrine)—but the unique 
                                                
52 For a clear discussion of this see: G. B. Madison, ‘The Interpretive Turn in Phenomenology: A 
Philosophical History’, in Symposium, 8 (2) (Summer 2004).  
53 Also in Merleau-Ponty, ‘Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man’. 
  Chapter 5: A Critical Conclusion 
 
  280  
mode of existing expressed in the properties of the pebble, the glass or the 
piece of wax, in all the events of a revolution, in all the thoughts of a 
philosopher54. 
So in ‘understanding’ we ‘take in’ the ‘unique mode of existing’ which we 
apprehend in a ‘total intention’ that is the ground of any predicative ‘representation’ 
that we form of it. 
With respect to ‘the understanding of history’, he asserts, we ‘must seek an 
understanding from [multiple] angles [e.g. ‘ideology’, ‘politics’, ‘religion’, 
‘economics’] simultaneously’. And because ‘… everything has meaning … we shall 
find th[e] same structure of being underlying all relationships’. All of ‘these views’, 
he says, ‘have their truth’ provided that ‘they are not isolated’ and ‘that we delve 
deeply into history and reach the unique core of existential meaning which emerges 
in each perspective’55. However the discussion of his method in the Preface and in 
‘Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man’, as well as his framing of it in terms of 
the phenomenological reduction and eidetic analysis, give the impression that the 
descriptive phenomenology is sufficiently distinct from, and prior to, the existential 
interpretation56. Thus, he suggests a distinction between description and 
interpretation that the actual practice of his existential-hermeneutic performatively 
undermines.  
                                                
54 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.xx (italics added). 
55 Ibid. p.xxi (italics added). 
56 This impression is also contributed to by his sequential presentation, whereby we start with 
‘familiarising of ourselves with the phenomenal field’ and then move to take up a transcendental 
perspective on phenomenological psychology in order to draw out the ontological significance of the 
phenomenology of perceptual experience. 
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Now, if he were simply giving an account of the historical genesis of 
existential interpretation he would be on solid ground. But the problem is that the 
Preface is ambiguous between a description of the genesis of existential 
interpretation and a description of his method in Phenomenology of Perception. In 
the body of the text he performatively undermines his ‘rhetoric of description’ by the 
fact that all the ‘description of experience’ undertaken in Phenomenology of 
Perception is undertaken within an existential-hermeneutic framework indicating 
that the he is closer to Heidegger than his explicit methodological statements 
indicate. His ‘phenomenology’ is already in that sense fully situated within an 
existential-hermeneutic framework. So the problem is that, in incorporating 
Heideggerean existential ontology (e.g. ‘This facticity of the world is what 
constitutes the Weltlichkeit der Welt, what causes the world to be the world’57), 
Merleau-Ponty is also incorporating Heidegger’s ‘hermeneutics of facticity’ without 
fully grasping its implications for a phenomenological account of perception. Thus 
Merleau-Ponty’s methodology in Phenomenology of Perception is not entirely self-
transparent as it does not properly explicate its practice with respect to the 
description-interpretation relation. He has incorporated the core of the ‘hermeneutics 
of facticity’ in his practice of ‘existential interpretation’ in Phenomenology of 
Perception but that results in an inconsistency between Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophical practice in the body of the text and the programmatic and 
methodological Preface in as much as he gives the reader the impression that his 
method is at base descriptive in that text.  
                                                
57 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.xix. 
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In the section where he explicitly discusses his transcendental method in the 
context of a discussion of the phenomenal field (discussed in Chapter 3), as well as 
in the essay ‘Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man’, he is still emphasising the 
description of the content and structures of experience, coupled with an eidetic 
reflection that seeks to articulate the ‘essences’, the essential structures of the 
phenomena. In Phenomenology of Perception he discusses a shift to a perspective 
that seeks to account for ‘the phenomenon of the phenomenon’ (i.e. what makes the 
phenomenal field as such possible), but we don’t get much more detail than that. In 
his discussion of eidetic analysis in ‘Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man’ he 
also emphasises the technique of imaginative variation58. But in neither of those 
accounts does he provide a substantive discussion of the structure and function of the 
interpretative process (and any attendant problems) in relation to the two phases of 
his method (descriptive and ‘eidetic’). 
Overall, Merleau-Ponty fails to account for the way in which description of 
pre-predicative perceptual experience is itself undertaken within a cultural-linguistic 
framework and hence is in no sense a straightforward ‘speaking’ on behalf of ‘dumb 
experience’ in order to bring it to ‘the pure expression of its own meaning’59. Rather, 
the linguistic framework that is necessarily brought to the process of description 
plays not just a passive role of representing – ‘speaking’ on behalf of ‘the silence of 
primary consciousness’; rather, it plays an active and constructive role. This is a role 
where it contributes in principle to the construction of that ‘dumb experience’ in any 
attempt to render its content and structure in language. Any descriptive act is thus, in 
                                                
58 See Chapter 3, pp.159-160 n.13. 
59 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.xix. 
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this sense, an interpretive act because the description-language draws on a linguistic-
cultural framework that pre-interprets the content by shaping the very way that we 
experience that content. And that framework biases us in the direction of the 
assumptions contained within the linguistic framework in which we necessarily 
frame our descriptions from our present cultural and historical location. Thus what 
we take as perceptual givens – to simply be described – are inescapably always 
‘perceivings-as’ that are pre-interpreted. They are pre-interpreted as the ‘perceivings-
as’ that they are as a result of our being raised in, and shaped by, a specific cultural 
tradition.  
So in the case of the lifeworld of everyday experience, the language in which 
we articulate this lifeworld is an historical accumulation (sedimentation) that has 
deep cultural assumptions built into it. Within that framework, these deep cultural 
assumptions function like a second nature that it is easy to take for granted. Thus the 
perceptual experience we seek to describe, and the language that we draw on to 
describe it, are implicated in the deep hermeneutical context of a cultural tradition of 
interpretation that the methodological techniques of the epoché and the reduction are 
powerless to remove. The claim here is not that Merleau-Ponty ever asserted, as 
Husserl did, that the epoché and reduction deliver us a presuppositionless 
perspective, but rather that Merleau-Ponty doesn’t appreciate the full implications of 
Husserl’s failure in this direction. For, as Husserl’s attempt at a reduction to the 
sphere of pure subjectivity threw us back onto our intrinsic and irreducible world-
directedness (the world that is ‘always already there’), so Merleau-Ponty’s attempt to 
recover the basic pre-predicative experience that underpins our world-directedness 
throws us back onto the language on which such a recovery necessarily depends.  
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5. The Problem of the Cognitive Recovery of the Pre-predicative 
The issue of the deep hermeneutical context of descriptive practice ties 
directly into a further problem that has been pointed out by Margolis, Descombes, 
Lyotard, Kullman and Taylor60. As Margolis argues, Merleau-Ponty gives a certain 
‘privilege’ to the phenomenology of the pre-personal, pre-predicative level that the 
issue of the language/perception relation, followed through to its hermeneutical 
consequences, undermines. Merleau-Ponty claims that science is ‘a second-order 
reflection’ whose meaning derives from the foundational first order meaning that 
phenomenology seeks to capture. However, he is ultimately unable to make a 
convincing case for the ‘philosophical status’ he wishes to assign the pre-personal 
experience of embodied perception.  
The particular problem facing Merleau-Ponty concerns the epistemological 
implications that follow from the issue of the language-perception relation. This 
represents a fundamental problem for his theory because of our inability to be sure 
that what we articulate in any given description of the pre-personal, pre-predicative 
level of experience has captured the pre-predicative meaning that Merleau-Ponty 
takes that experience to possess. For, in principle, we are without a method to 
adjudicate our success, epistemologically speaking. To make this point is in no way 
to deny the many important insights that the attempt has brought to light, but it is to 
deny, as Margolis puts it, that ‘the pre-reflective can be cognitively recovered’61; 
thus, it directly challenges Merleau-Ponty’s view that his ‘reawakening of the pre-
                                                
60 See: Margolis, ‘Phenomenology and Metaphysics’; Descombes, Modern French Philosophy; 
Michael Kullman and Charles Taylor, ‘The Pre-Objective World’ in The Review of Metaphysics, 12 
(1) (September, 1958), pp.108-132.  
61 Margolis, ‘Phenomenology and Metaphysics’, p.175. 
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reflective’ has the epistemological implications that he asserts. This criticism 
subverts his thesis of the primacy of perception in the sense that it opens up the 
charge that his methodological discussion, and the claims that he goes on to assert on 
that basis, contain implicit and unargued assumptions about the phenomenologist’s 
capacity to ‘re-achieve a direct and primitive contact with the world’ and to ‘endow 
that contact with a philosophical status’. We certainly can and should follow 
Merleau-Ponty and ‘re-achieve a direct and primitive contact with the world’; 
likewise, we can and should endow the pre-reflective with a philosophical status, but 
it cannot be the one that Merleau-Ponty attributes to it in Phenomenology of 
Perception.  
The very idea of phenomenology as not just description of the lifeworld, but 
as a description of the subtending level of the pre-personal and ‘ante-predicative’ is 
problematised as a result of raising the question of the language/perception relation. 
This is because if the claim is that our task is to reproduce in phenomenological 
discourse the ‘lived meaning’ of the phenomena of the pre-personal ‘perceived 
world’ that necessarily precedes that discourse, then clearly the epoché and reduction 
alone are not sufficient to ensure that this is achievable – despite their being the 
correct method to focus our attention on the phenomena as phenomena. That 
Merleau-Ponty in his methodological presentation holds that this is phenomenology’s 
task can be seen, for example, in his endorsement of Husserl’s phrase that ‘it is that 
as yet dumb experience … which we are concerned to lead to the pure expression of 
its own meaning’62. The idea is that there is a significant aspect of our experience 
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that is ‘as yet’ unexpressed philosophically – not just the ‘pre-objective’ world of 
experience but the foundational pre-personal and pre-predicative world of perceptual 
experience. And the philosopher’s primary task ought to be ‘to go back to that origin 
… beneath the chatter of words’ – that ‘primordial silence’63 – and achieve the 
discursive expression of that ‘dumb’ experience. This view embodies the way in 
which ‘expression’ through discursive meaning, for Merleau-Ponty, is derivative 
upon the meaning of the ‘lived through’ experience which is ‘as yet’ – prior to 
concerted phenomenological description – ‘dumb’, or unarticulated as to its content 
and structure.  
But Merleau-Ponty’s methodological statements, and the subsequent claims 
made in connection with them, express an unjustifiable confidence in the prospects 
of a phenomenological approach being able to cognitively recover the pre-reflective 
perceived world. This illicit confidence can be seen, for example, in his assertion that 
the phenomenologists have a concept of essence that is so concretely grounded that it 
is ‘destined to bring back all the living relationships of experience, as the fisherman’s 
net draws up from the depths of the ocean quivering fish and seaweed’64. Given this, 
it might be argued that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the ‘ante-predicative’ 
perceived world is driven by an unjustifiably optimistic conception of the capacities 
of language. 
As we recall from previous chapters, a key part of Merleau-Ponty’s critique 
of objective thought concerns precisely the limitations of language in relation to the 
perceived world. He argues that ‘the antinomy of objective thought’ 
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(Empiricism/Intellectualism, realism/idealism) rests on the mischaracterising of 
experience in the philosophies of Intellectualism and Empiricism. There he attributes 
the problem to the syllogistic structure underpinning the categories of objective 
thought, and argues that what will rectify the problem is an account of pre-objective, 
pre-reflective experience. But, despite the general success he is entitled to claim for 
the phenomenology of the lifeworld project in overturning this objectivist 
misrepresentation of perceptual experience (a project that is correctly characterised 
as an account of ‘pre-objective’ and ‘pre-reflective’ everyday experience), in 
principle linguistic limitations, and not simply the mismatch of objective thought and 
lived experience, surface in the project of description of the pre-personal level.  
Merleau-Ponty’s move of putting the phenomenology of the pre-personal pre-
predicative perceptual level centre stage is well motivated. It follows through on the 
phenomenological discourse of the ‘originary’ (‘a phenomenology of origins’65) and 
of ‘Fundierung’ (the founding-founded relation), plausibly supposing that the kind of 
relation that holds between the personal level lifeworld and the objective ‘universe’ 
of science – Fundierung – to hold between the personal level lifeworld and the pre-
personal level of active bodily perception. For, if we engage in the phenomenology 
of the lifeworld we most certainly do find that there is a pre-personal 
bodily/perceptual level subtending the level of the personal world of everyday 
thought and action, as Merleau-Ponty amply demonstrates.  
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Margolis specifies precisely the nature of the problem in his characterisation 
of the question as revolving around the problem of ‘cognitive recovery’66. This is an 
epistemic issue in the sense that, although we can engage in a phenomenology of the 
pre-predicative level in a way that the results of our inquiry can contribute to our 
epistemological and ontological claims, the understanding that we achieve of the pre-
personal level is not capable of having the cognitive status that it would have to have 
in order for Merleau-Ponty to substantiate his use of it. For Merleau-Ponty seeks to 
give it the status of the epistemological foundation of the level of both the objective 
world of scientific discourse and the lifeworld of personal thought and action. 
When viewed from the methodological perspective the problem is that the 
phenomenological method, though opening up the phenomenal lifeworld generally, 
as well as the ‘perceived world’ specifically, cannot in principle give any assurances 
about the outcome. Nor can it even provide us with resources that might indicate the 
potential realisability of the concerted attempt to recover the ‘ante-predicative life of 
consciousness’. This is not only for the general reason that, as Merleau-Ponty says, 
the reflecting philosopher who ‘tries to conceive the world, others and himself and 
their interrelations’ is involved in ‘an act of initiative which has no guarantee in 
being’67. But it is also for the specific reason that Merleau-Ponty does not 
successfully demonstrate in Phenomenology of Perception why we should hold that 
the pre-personal world is the kind of ‘thing’ that could actually be cognitively 
recovered in the way that he, in his methodological discussions, indicates it can. In 
this sense the cognitive recoverability of this level is presupposed, and its putative 
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recovery is an exploratory and experimental enterprise prompted by the 
philosophical benefits quite rightly perceived as potentially issuing from a close 
examination of the content and structure of this level of experience.  
However, the actualisation of this potential benefit is precisely what the 
success of phenomenology must rest on. And Merleau-Ponty, in Phenomenology of 
Perception, may be charged with not fully actualising the potential benefit that he 
programmatically spells out in the Preface and assumes throughout the text. Namely, 
that the key to achieving ‘a precise assessment of [the] meaning and scope’ of 
science (‘the second-order expression’ of ‘the world as directly experienced’), and 
the experiential level that has the capacity to ground a new ontology, is uncovered in 
the process of ‘reawakening the basic experience of the world’68. Merleau-Ponty is 
operating here with an unjustified thesis to the effect that his account of the pre-
personal world has a distinct and foundational epistemic status, as it is a discourse on 
the originary, as opposed to the ‘second order expression’ of scientific discourse. 
The view that ‘the whole universe of science’ is a ‘second-order expression’ 
of ‘the world as directly experienced’ and that philosophers ‘must begin by 
reawakening the basic experience of the world’ implies that, by ‘first order 
expression’, Merleau-Ponty tacitly understands a discourse that expresses that basic 
experience – a descriptive account of our pre-predicative lived experience. Thus he 
talks of ‘first-hand speech – that of … the writer and philosopher who reawaken 
primordial experience anterior to all traditions’69. He talks of a ‘second-order world’ 
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– the world ‘elaborated by scientific consciousness’70 – and also a ‘second-order 
perception’ – the ‘empirical perception’ of the natural attitude71. This ‘second-order 
perception’ underpins the ‘second order expression’ that constructs the ‘second-order 
world’, the ‘universe’ of science.  
The fact that Merleau-Ponty holds this conception ties in with the observation 
I made earlier about the improperly acknowledged hermeneutic dimension of his 
method. That is, in seeking the ‘reawakening [of] the basic experience of the world 
of which science is the second order expression’ he tacitly implies a view of 
language that the philosophical practice and the trajectory of theoretical development 
of Phenomenology of Perception actively undermine. Namely, that the overarching 
goal of reflection is to represent the pre-predicative in language. Thus, implying 
enough of a separation between language and perception such that language can be 
said to represent pre-personal lived experience. At the same time he implies that the 
relationship between language and perception, although involving a separation, is 
such that language might be able to recover the structure of the pre-personal 
fundamental level in a way that predicatively captures the essence of its pre-
predicativity, its defining feature. And, by doing this, it will be able to perform the 
founding epistemic role that we have seen Merleau-Ponty construct for it. This view 
entails the claim that we are able to check our representations of pre-personal 
experience against that experience itself. By referring back to its ‘lived meaning’, the 
idea is that we will be able to adjudicate as to the clarity, accuracy and 
comprehensiveness of our representations. However, in light of my earlier 
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discussion, it is exceedingly difficult to see how it is the pre-predicative world that is 
being characterised here, rather than the pre-predicative as pre-interpreted through a 
contextualising linguistic-cultural lifeworld. 
The developmental trajectory that Merleau-Ponty appears to be playing out in 
the pages of Phenomenology Of Perception with regards to his view of language is 
towards a hermeneutic phenomenology where, starting with phenomenological 
description, where ‘the real has to be described, not constructed or formed’72, and by 
addressing the issues of the passive constitution of perception, embodiment and of 
the background, we realise that all description is structured by a deep cultural-
linguistic context. This cultural-linguistic context performs a pre-interpreting 
function with respect to any description of the perceived world undertaken at any 
given cultural and historical location. The realisation of the role of this cultural-
linguistic context is itself an achievement of the phenomenological method, and yet it 
is an achievement that undermines the idea of phenomenology as ‘the demand for a 
pure description’. For it indicates that whatever results may be achieved through this 
method will always rest on a descriptive procedure that consists in the description of 
the contingent, yet relatively stable, structures of ‘an already languaged world’73, to 
use Joseph Margolis’ phrase. Thus, the following through of the descriptive 
procedure leads us on to the fact that the world that is ‘always already there’ is a 
world that is ‘always already’ languaged. And this means that we are not only 
drawing on a cultural-linguistic framework that is not of our creation, and which 
provides the description language in which we discourse on the pre-predicative, but 
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we are also, in discoursing on the pre-personal level, necessarily discoursing in the 
context of an ‘always already’ languaged lifeworld. Thus perceptual experience 
itself, and any attempt to make it speak, is necessarily circumscribed by, and thus 
pre-interpreted through, a cultural-linguistic framework, a ‘fore-structure of 
understanding’.  
 
6. Implications for Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology  
The line of critique that I have been developing in this chapter suggests that 
the thesis of the primacy of perception as expressed in Phenomenology of Perception 
is not convincing as it stands, and is in need of revision. Let us look at the 
implications for Merleau-Ponty’s existential ontology.  
As the previous chapters combine to illustrate, in Phenomenology of 
Perception Merleau-Ponty provides a compelling exploration of the genesis of 
meaning via an exploration of the background of bodily perception and world. As 
this chapter has suggested, however, following through on certain implications of 
Merleau-Ponty’s existential reworking of Husserlian phenomenology for the theory 
of language, and for the language-perception relation, forces us to fully acknowledge 
the contextual depth involved in the hermeneutic circle that structures our experience 
as culturally and linguistically situated body-subjects. Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenological account concretely demonstrates the inextricability of subject and 
world, contra to the Intellectualist bias embedded in Husserl’s phenomenological 
discourse that is centred on the sharp distinction between subject and object, 
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transcendental and empirical. Merleau-Ponty also argues for the fundamentally inter-
subjective nature of human existence, again rooted in our corporeality. However, as I 
have just argued, Merleau-Ponty does not see the full significance of the role of 
language in Phenomenology of Perception. The central consequence of this is that 
the hermeneutic structure of experience obliges us not only to abandon the 
indefensible claims of objectivistic scientism, as well as Husserlian claims for 
‘apodicticity’ via his transcendental-phenomenological science, but also Merleau-
Ponty’s claims regarding the privileged epistemic role of ‘originary origins’74. 
If we take the lessons of the hermeneutic turn as articulated by Heidegger and 
Gadamer seriously then Merleau-Ponty’s claim regarding the philosophical 
significance of the pre-predicative as ‘originary origin’ is compromised. For what 
attention to the constitutive role of language indicates is the need for a revised 
conception of the ‘originary’. Such a conception has been suggested by Jospeh 
Margolis who argues that: 
A languaged world or a worlded language serves us as a convenient epithet to 
fix whatever we may suppose is the originary, incompletely penetrable 
precondition posited from the transient vantage of whatever bifurcated 
[subjective and objective] resources we assign ourselves75.  
This revised conception of the ‘originary’ retains the status, as in Merleau-Ponty’s 
account, of the ‘incompletely penetrable precondition’. However, in encountering the 
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precognitive we are not thereby encountering the ‘pre-predicative’ – ‘anterior to all 
traditions’76 – but rather are encountering ‘a languaged world’.  
The implication of situating Merleau-Ponty’s considerable phenomenological 
insight within the deep hermeneutic-linguistic context of experience is further spelled 
out by Margolis. Margolis argues that such a resituation means that we must treat 
‘eidetic invariances (that we seem able to approach)’ and ‘cognitive privilege’ of any 
kind (e.g. of objectivism, apodictic phenomenology, or a phenomenology of 
‘originary origins’) on the same terms. Namely, ‘as the ineluctably contingent 
functions of an equally contingent preformational world …’77 This ‘preformational 
world’ is ‘tacit, incompletely penetrable, changing, plural, capable of tolerating 
conceptual incommensurabilities’ and ‘itself something of an artefact constructed in 
the process of natural activity and eidetic reflection’78. It is also ‘profoundly 
horizonal as affecting the perception of invariance’ and so comprises an ‘endogenous 
barrier against the discovery of contextless invariance’79.  
Like Merleau-Ponty’s conception, this view is ‘incompatible in an elementary 
way with the notion of a progressive phenomenology ranging over all possible 
reflection’80. And so it is ‘in principle incapable of supporting Husserl’s optimism 
about approximative progress in understanding a uniquely constituted world or 
constituting “I” such that the plural makes no sense applied to either’81. As Margolis 
argues, the ‘recovery of a plural with regard to whatever may be critically posited as 
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the pregiven conditions of natural discourse’82 is the consequence of grasping the full 
significance of the linguistic dimension of our situatedness in a world – the 
fundamentally hermeneutic structure of our situatedness. By the ‘plural’ he is 
referring to Merleau-Ponty’s conception of a concretised plurality of subjects. Such a 
concretised plurality of subjects and their individual and collective histories 
decisively undermine the notion of a singular lifeworld that he tacitly assumes in 
Phenomenology of Perception. 
The realisation that we necessarily encounter a ‘languaged world’ means that 
this natural language that we inherit and ‘live’, as Merleau-Ponty would say, 
comprises a basic, relatively determinate content whose structuring power shapes the 
context of our experience and thus, in this sense, is something that is 
phenomenologically basic. And precisely because it is basic, the phenomenological 
spirit of investigation must lead us to acknowledge the full implications of the 
hermeneutic structure of experience that sustained phenomenological analysis itself 
has enabled us to see. 
If we incorporate these linguistic and hermeneutic corrections to Merleau-
Pontian phenomenology it will be hard to deny that Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenological reduction, while removing the objectivism that grows out of the 
natural attitude, does not and cannot remove the fact of our necessary situatedness in 
a received natural language tradition. And, further, that it is the primary status of this 
ordinary language form of discourse, making our basic experience that of a 
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‘languaged world’ via a ‘worlded language’, that Merleau-Ponty overlooks in his 
view of a discourse of the pre-predicative as first order. 
As we have seen in the preceding chapters, Merleau-Ponty abandons 
Husserl’s privileged claims about phenomenology as a systematic and progressive 
apodictic science. However in his theory of perception, as we discussed earlier, he 
follows through on the phenomenological discourse of the ‘originary’ (‘a 
phenomenology of origins’83). And thus, as Margolis points out, his theory accords 
an unjustifiable ‘cognitive privilege’ to the pre-predicative perceptual level that 
embodies a privilege of ‘originary origins’. However, in revising the language-
perception relation in line with the hermeneutic structure of experience, argues 
Margolis, we now see that Merleau-Ponty’s ‘pre-reflective world of perception’ can 
be ‘introduced only … to orient our critical examination of an already thoroughly 
languaged world’84. So that: 
… wherever the … ‘real’, ‘perceived’, precognitive, unthematized … world 
is “described, and not constructed or constituted” … the critical … recovery 
of that primary world is never more than…a second-order posit (in spite of 
Merleau-Ponty’s own usage) …85  
Margolis observes that first-order discourse centres on the historically received 
assertoric discourse of natural languages, and second-order discourse (‘scientific or 
critical or transcendental or legitimative discourse’) critically reflects upon this 
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primary discourse. This view of language illustrates how, if the phenomenological 
description of the pre-reflective is to link up with the distributed reference of 
ordinary enunciative discourse, and thus perform the critical function with respect to 
that discourse that it is supposed to perform, then it can only be a ‘second-order 
posit’. As a ‘second-order posit’ it certainly has the capacity to ‘affect and alter’ our 
philosophical claims. However, despite the fact that pre-predicative experience is 
first-order experience, the discourse of the pre-predicative cannot achieve first-order 
status because it cannot go underneath first-order ordinary enunciative discourse and 
perform the fundamental grounding function that Merleau-Ponty takes his ‘authentic 
speech, which formulates for the first time’86, his discourse on the ‘originary’, to be 
doing. Put succinctly, his discourse on first-order experience cannot be first-order 
discourse. 
Part of the way that the discourse of the pre-predicative functions for 
Merleau-Ponty can be seen if we reflect on the way in which it is bound up with talk 
of a singular lifeworld, thus demonstrating its derivation from the Husserlian 
presupposition of constituting subject and constituted lifeworld, even as Merleau-
Ponty rejects Husserl’s characterisation of both. It follows from the argument 
regarding the deep hermeneutic-linguistic context of lived experience, Margolis 
observes, that ‘the Husserlian lifeworld – to which no number, no singular or plural 
attaches – must be replaced by plural, variable, historicized, open, potentially 
incommensurable lifeworlds’87. Merleau-Ponty’s statements about science being a 
‘second-order expression’ of the lifeworld’ indicate his view that, in giving an 
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account of the lifeworld, we are articulating the lifeworld shared by all humans in 
virtue of the fact that they share the same bodily and perceptual structures. But the 
thrust of his phenomenology actually serves to undermine this view because by 
sticking close to the details of the situatedness of the concrete body-subject, he 
serves to emphasise the cultural and historical situatedness of body-subjects. And a 
concrete exploration of this reveals them as situated in relatively stable though 
contingent cultural lifeworlds that, being hermeneutically structured through 
linguistic/cultural traditions, are not subsumable into a single lifeworld (or pre-
predicative perceived world ‘anterior to all traditions’). And so, as Margolis points 
out, this ‘subverts altogether the intended force of Merleau-Ponty’s remark that 
science is the ‘second-order’ expression of the lifeworld’88. 
Taken together, the critical points I have raised regarding: 
1. the perception/language relation and the hermeneutic structure of 
experience; 
2. the problem of trying to cognitively recover the pre-predicative; 
and 
3. the status of the discourse of the pre-predicative as first-order;  
add up to a compelling argument that Merleau-Ponty’s thesis of the primacy of 
perception is not maintainable in its original form, and that therefore we should adopt 
a revised version of his position. As we have seen, the key problem area centres 
around the epistemological and semantic dimensions of the thesis. But, as we have 
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also seen, Merleau-Ponty’s position is largely recoverable here via a full 
acknowledgement of his method as hermeneutic phenomenology and by a revision of 
his claims about the discourse of the pre-predicative as first order. 
The incorporation of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological insights about 
bodily perception and the body-world relation with the corrections in the areas of 
language and interpretation that I have been suggesting in this chapter, results in a 
position that coherently and consistently manages to overcome the dualism built into 
the Cartesian assumptions that underpin the modern tradition from Descartes to 
Husserl. They suggest a compelling way to overcome the dualism with respect to the 
distinctions of mind-body and subject-world by appreciating the irreducibility of the 
intentional body-subject/world relation, as well as the irreducible relation between a 
‘languaged world’ and a ‘worlded language’.  
It might be argued that the critique of Merleau-Ponty’s view on language and 
of the language/perception has more serious implications, and that what is exposed is 
a fundamental incoherence at the heart of his theory. Vincent Descombes, for 
example, has argued that, if ‘to speak is … to give a voice to that which does not 
know how to speak’, then Merleau-Ponty’s is ‘a hopeless enterprise in some 
respects’. This is because ‘discourse may well adhere to experience, but it will 
always be discourse upon experience, or, speech following on, with what Derrida 
calls an ‘originary delay’’89. Thus he concludes that Husserl’s characterisation of 
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phenomenology as embarking on an ‘infinite task’ is ‘a discrete way of saying that it 
is unrealisable, for a promised land which we will reach at the cost of an ‘infinite 
journey’ is indistinguishable from a land which is eternally prohibited’90. 
Descombes goes on to enlist Jean Francois Lyotard to further this criticism. 
Lyotard makes the following argument against the coherence of a descriptive 
phenomenology of the pre-personal pre-predicative level of experience: 
In so far as this life-originating world is antepredicative, all predication, all 
discourse, undoubtedly implies it, yet is wide of it, and properly speaking 
nothing may be said of it … [phenomenological description] … is a struggle 
of language against itself to attain the originary … In this struggle, the defeat 
of the philosopher, of the logos, is assured, since the originary, once 
described, is thereby no longer originary91. 
Summing up, Descombes argues that in seeking to ‘found the “I think” on the “I 
perceive”, and understand the cogito in accordance with the most classical tradition, 
in the sense of an “I judge”, or a predicative enunciation’, phenomenology aims to 
‘found predicative activity on an “ante-predicative’ activity”’. However, given that 
‘the means to this end is to relate in discourse that which precedes the discourse, the 
ante-predicative can never be reconstructed as it was, in its dumb purity, before being 
made explicit’92.  
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In response to this I would argue that, firstly, there is a confusion in 
Descombes’ critique that we can sort out by distinguishing between the pre-personal 
and lifeworld levels of the ‘pre-objective’ or ‘pre-reflective’. The claim that 
‘discourse may well adhere to experience’ but will always irremediably be ‘discourse 
upon experience, or, speech following on, with … an “originary delay”’ does not 
need to lead to the conclusion that the phenomenology of the lifeworld is 
‘unrealisable’ in Merleau-Ponty’s, as opposed to Husserl’s, version. Descombes’ 
characterisation of phenomenology as a philosophy of ‘infinite tasks’ seeking a 
‘promised land which we will reach at the cost of an “infinite journey”’ and from 
which, therefore, we are ‘eternally prohibited’ misunderstands the way in which 
Merleau-Ponty’s inquiry might be read, à la Margolis, as yielding stable and 
relatively invariant, though ultimately contingent, results. On this reading, Merleau-
Ponty’s concept of ‘essence’ must be taken to mean long-range ‘invariants’ of a 
nonetheless ultimately contingent character due to the nature of the deep hermeneutic 
structure of experience.  
The presupposition in Descombes’ metaphor of an in principle 
completablility as ‘realising’ the project is a criticism of the goals of Husserl’s 
phenomenological science not of Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology or the 
hermeneutic-phenomenological variant I have sketched above. It also confuses the 
problem of the possibility of a ‘cognitive recovery’ of the pre-predicative with the 
issue of the possibility of the cognitive recovery of the pre-objective lifeworld. The 
serious problem Merleau-Ponty has with the former need not be a problem for the 
latter, provided a Merleau-Pontian approach modifies its view on the 
perception/language relation, the first-order status of the discourse of the pre-
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predicative, and embraces the full implications of the hermeneutic dimension of the 
descriptive project. With such a modification in place it will then be consistently able 
to claim that the phenomenological account of the lifeworld (now necessarily 
pluralised) is hermeneutic with the goal of laying bare the deep fore-structures of 
interpretation. If this move is performed then the unrealisablility claim can be 
deprived of its force. The meaning of phenomenology as ‘infinite task’ simply means 
that there is no in principle completion or finality to any account of the lifeworld(s); 
there is always scope for further exploration and potential revision. Thus there is a 
constant and ongoing role for an, in principle, uncompletable phenomenological 
description. There is no ‘eternal prohibition’ here for Merleau-Ponty, as opposed to 
Husserl, for there is no ‘eternal’.  
However, the sense in which the unrealisablilty claim will stick is precisely 
with the attempt to go beneath the level of the personal lifeworld and give a central 
‘philosophical status’ to the pre-personal pre-predicative world of perceptual 
experience. Lyotard makes the right distinction when he says, ‘in so far as this life-
originating world is antepredicative’ then ‘all predication, all discourse, undoubtedly 
implies it, yet is wide of it’93. And so he adds, ‘… properly speaking nothing may be 
said of it’94. However, the claim that ‘properly speaking nothing may be said of [the 
antepredicative]’ is too strong. Something certainly may be phenomenologically said 
of it and, further, what is said of it can be of philosophical consequence. Merleau-
Ponty’s discussions in Phenomenology of Perception are clear evidence of this. 
However, it is the general philosophical consequences that Merleau-Ponty wishes to 
                                                
93 Lyotard quoted in Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, p.61 (italics added). 
94 Ibid. 
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draw that are subverted by the ‘struggle of language against itself to attain the 
originary’ that is integral to his phenomenology of the pre-personal level.  
Part of what this means is that the phenomenology of the lifeworld can 
legitimately lay claim to the epistemic function that Merleau-Ponty attempts to 
attribute to the pre-personal level, in his attempt to situate it as not just the basic level 
of experience but as a level which can fulfil the role of epistemic foundation. This is 
because, unlike the discourse of the pre-predicative, the discourse of the lifeworld 
can legitimately claim to function as the clarification and articulation of the structure 
and limits of our ‘always already’ languaged lifeworld. Thus this avoids the problem 
of the cognitive recovery of the pre-predicative by accepting the deep hermeneutic 
context that necessarily forms the context of any descriptive procedure. By rejecting 
the epistemological claim of the pre-personal level as originary ground of the 
lifeworld, on grounds of the cognitive unrecoverability of the pre-personal, this move 
avoids the problem that attends Merleau-Ponty’s insistence that the claim for a 
distinct and foundational epistemic status for this level can be made defensible. 
As we have seen, the attempt to address the question of the meaning of being 
is the original goal that drives Heidegger’s formulation of his existential ontology in 
Being and Time. He does this through his ‘existential analytic’ of Dasein, and it is 
this ontological approach that Merleau-Ponty appropriates in Phenomenology of 
Perception, theorising the existential structures that underpin propositional 
theoretical thinking: human being as ‘being-in-the-world’ and as an ‘Ek-stase’. It is 
precisely this existential-phenomenological approach that uncovers the hermeneutic 
circle that structures our understanding. The ontological implication here is that what 
  Chapter 5: A Critical Conclusion 
 
  304  
is now exposed is the way in which different metaphysical systems, despite being 
relatively invariant over long periods, are nevertheless ultimately contingent. And so, 
arguably, it is the intrinsic contingency of metaphysics that Being and Time and 
Phenomenology of Perception combine to illustrate. They do this in several ways. 
Firstly, they do this through their ‘displacing’ of ‘the cognitive’ with ‘the 
precognitively and existentially active’95. By grounding claims regarding knowledge 
and being in the ‘precognitively and existentially active’ they reconfigure them in 
terms of what it is that structures this dimension of worldly lived experience. And 
secondly, they do so ‘by construing the articulation of the categories as conditioned 
in a radically contingent way by the preformative power of ulterior categories 
historically already in place in a world into which we are “thrown”’96. This is the 
hermeneutic dimension which Heidegger lays out in Being and Time and which 
Merleau-Ponty only partially acknowledges in Phenomenology of Perception. This 
dimension of existential ontology is ‘critical’ in the sense that it articulates the 
conditions of possibility for a given metaphysic through a genealogy of the 
categories operative in a preformative fore-structuring way.  
The intrinsic contingency of metaphysics is also demonstrated in the way that 
‘the fixity of given categories is radically risked’ on the Heideggerean conception, in 
that he construes ‘the seeming system of the diachronic history of sets of categories 
as phenomenologically open to transformation due to different but utterly 
                                                
95 Margolis, ‘Phenomenology and Metaphysics’ p.162. 
96 Ibid. ‘Thrown’ is Heidegger’s term intended to capture the brute facticity of our situatedness, the 
fact that we simply ‘find’ ourselves in a world that is ‘always already there’. 
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unpredictable, utterly unsystematisable, disclosures of Sein and Dasein’97. Adapted 
to a Merleau-Pontian idiom, this indicates that no matter how rock solid and 
entrenched a given framework appears, it is always capable of modification in ways 
that we cannot foresee. This is because of the inexhaustible nature of the perceived 
world in which our framework engages in a process of ‘co-constitution’ that 
discloses meaning without the type of guarantees that are built into Husserl’s 
conception of an eidetic phenomenological science making systematic progress 
toward grasping a uniquely constituted world and its constituting ego. 
 
7. Conclusory Summary of Thesis Findings  
The challenge that I set myself in this thesis was to explicate Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophical position on its own terms in order to explore the full significance of its 
challenge to scientistic naturalists– a group that, even when interested in his 
phenomenology of embodiment, stand in either explicit or implicit opposition to his 
existential ontology. The first step in the three-step argumentative trajectory of the 
thesis involved a critical intervention into the ‘naturalisation of phenomenology’ 
question. My critical target here comprised a set of theorists who use Merleau-Ponty 
to argue for an embodied approach to cognitive science, and who see recent work in 
the cognitive sciences as standing in a relationship of convergence and 
complementarity with Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological work. What I argued 
against these theorists was that their usage involves a tacit ‘scientisation’ of Merleau-
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Ponty’s phenomenology. That is, they tacitly morph Merleau-Ponty’s view to fit 
within the objectivist framework that necessarily underpins their project for an 
embodied cognitive science. As a result of this they miss the philosophical 
significance of his phenomenological claims. This significance, as we have seen, 
indicates that: 
1. Rather than being convergent with ‘scientistic’ forms of naturalism, his 
position is in fact explicitly and deeply critical of the philosophical 
presuppositions of the general program of the cognitive sciences and 
scientistic philosophy of mind.  
2. Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy shows us that there is another way to realise a 
naturalistic turn than the scientistic approach that underpins the recent inter-
disciplinary program of the cognitive sciences, as well as cognitive science 
inspired philosophy of mind (the attempt to bridge the ‘explanatory gap’ that 
exists between phenomenological accounts and scientific models of 
consciousness). 
3. Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical position refuses the possibility of 
‘naturalisation’, as conceived in the ‘naturalisation of phenomenology’ 
debate, because ‘naturalisation’ here involves the explicit or implicit 
advocacy of a scientific realist ontology – which he holds as being premised 
on a philosophical mistake.  
4. It is Merleau-Ponty’s objective in Phenomenology of Perception to 
convince his reader of the conceptual confusion at the core of the scientistic 
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project. And to argue in favour of a methodology that is both 
phenomenological and transcendental, and for an ontology that is 
‘existential’, as the appropriate way to clear up this confusion. 
The philosophical confusions contained in the recent ‘scientising’ of 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology provide a powerful motivation to put Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology back into the context of his philosophy proper. As we have 
seen, a close reading of Merleau-Ponty showed that he uses a methodological 
phenomenology in the context of an existential ontology. This existential 
phenomenology draws its inspiration from Heidegger’s conception of ‘fundamental 
ontology’ and the ‘existential analytic of Dasein in Being and Time.  
Articulating Merleau-Ponty’s position drew me into an engagement with my 
second critical target. This target comprised a set of recent readings of Merleau-
Ponty that, while understanding that he is explicitly and deeply critical of the 
philosophical presuppositions of the cognitive sciences and that instead he offers a 
transcendental philosophical account, nevertheless misunderstand key aspects of this 
account.  
On the issue of the phenomenological reduction I argued, contra the views of 
Stephen Priest and Taylor Carman, that a close reading of Merleau-Ponty indicates 
that he does not hold that the epoché is inconsistent with being-in-the-world but 
rather reconceives it and advances his own modified version. This version holds that 
the reduction reveals the subject’s essential inherence in a concrete situation via his 
necessary embodiment. 
  Chapter 5: A Critical Conclusion 
 
  308  
The fact that we cannot achieve Husserl’s complete reduction to the ‘sphere 
of the transcendental ego’ and its ‘meant contents’, but rather find ourselves 
confronting the ‘unmotivated upsurge of the world’, means that in our 
phenomenological description we simply fail to locate Husserl’s transcendental ego – 
a pure ego that transcends the world – and the putatively self-sufficient sphere of 
meaning that Husserl understands this ego to inhabit. Instead, what we locate is 
Merleau-Ponty’s lived ‘body-subject’. To have a body is to automatically have an 
anchor point, a location in space and time, and so he argues that our ‘lived body’ is a 
pre-personal, ‘natural self’ that is necessarily and intimately tied to a world. Thus the 
meaningful contents and structures of experience that the phenomenologist seeks to 
capture are only articulable in reference to the environment in which the body-
subject is necessarily immersed. Merleau-Ponty appropriates the Heideggerean 
ontological term ‘being-in-the-world’ to capture the fundamental phenomenological 
and ontological structure of world-relatedness. His conception asserts that the subject 
is so ‘tightly held’ in his relation to the world that there is no sharp line between 
‘inner’ and ‘outer’, ‘interior’ and ‘exterior’. Rather, the subject is ‘through and 
through relation to the world’98. 
The reduction facilitates phenomenological descriptions which reveal that 
‘ambiguity is of the essence of human existence’99. There are two central 
manifestations of this ontological ambiguity. Firstly, that objects are ambiguous 
because their interpretation is never definitively settled for all time. They are a 
movement between determinacy and indeterminacy, never fully determinate but 
                                                
98 Merleau-Ponty, ‘What is Phenomenology?’ p.61. 
99 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.196. 
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never simply indeterminate. And secondly, in his account of humans as ‘body-
subjects’ we are fundamentally ambiguous between ‘mind’ and ‘body’. In our 
experience the body is never fully ‘object’ or fully ‘subject’ and, by connection, our 
experience is never fully ‘inner’ experience or fully ‘outer’ experience. We live an 
ambiguity that defies the traditional dualistic categories: a pure ego outside space 
(Intellectualism) or a pure object like any other object (Empiricism).  
Contra Joel Smith and Stephen Priest, I argued that Merleau-Ponty holds that, 
although the ‘putting in abeyance’ of ‘the assertions arising out of the natural 
attitude’ is a necessary condition for overturning the natural attitude, it is not a 
sufficient one. This is because this approach alone does not identify the unique status 
of our natural attitude as a ‘kind of “faith”’ – a kind of primitive perceptual 
understanding that is so fundamental that it is the condition of the possibility for us 
either holding, denying or bracketing any of our propositional beliefs, including the 
‘general thesis of the natural attitude’. Further, due to its perceptual rootedness, it is 
not overturnable via purely propositional means as it is, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, a 
perceptual ‘faith’ – our fundamental pre-predicative ‘faith’ in the world that is there 
for us. It therefore cannot simply be an issue of asserting, denying or bracketing a 
proposition because the possibility of such propositional contents rest on a 
background context of the ‘always already there’ ‘world’, which rests on, and takes 
shape for us through, the process of embodied lived perception. Only by identifying 
perception’s role in encouraging the ‘mistake of objective thought’ via its natural 
movement from indeterminacy to determinacy can we truly perform an epoché and 
phenomenological reduction: an overturning of the natural attitude at its source in the 
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structure of perception itself, bracketing objectivism in the interest of non-dogmatic 
philosophical theorising. 
On the issue of his transcendentalism, we saw that Sebastian Gardner and 
Thomas Baldwin misconstrue Merleau-Ponty’s use of a transcendental method as 
necessitating ‘a new kind of transcendental idealism’. Counter to this, I argued that 
existential phenomenology is in fact a transcendental anti-realism that rejects the 
Kantian epistemological problematic that gives rise to the traditional the realism-
idealism debate. Gardner and Baldwin misread Merleau-Ponty because they bring 
him too close to Kant, overlooking the significance of the existential dimension of 
his thought.  
My account of Merleau-Ponty as a transcendental philosopher, by contrast, 
illustrated the way in which Merleau-Ponty’s is an original existentialist position that 
uses a transcendental methodology. My discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s critique of 
Kant and Husserl, and his scaled down use of transcendental theorising, served to 
mark out his distance from their transcendental idealism. In using the ‘principle of 
evidence’ against Husserl, Merleau-Ponty argues that his phenomenology of 
perception shows something that Husserl, due to his ‘Intellectualist’ bias, could not 
see. This is the primacy of pre-objective embodied perception, the complex, 
ambiguous nature of this perceptual experience, and the basic role of ‘motor-
intentional’ bodily perception in the co-constitution of the meaningful world that we 
experience. This phenomenologically based realisation helps us to grasp the 
inseparable and intricate connection between subjectivity and embodied action. And, 
as a direct result of this, it serves to severely constrain the kind of account of 
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transcendental subjectivity that can be formulated in this new context. This is 
because Merleau-Ponty has blocked Husserl’s ‘Intellectualist’ move, which 
emphasises ‘the properly philosophical task of universal constitution’ for which the 
return to the lifeworld is understood to be a ‘preparatory step’100.  
Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the ‘transcendental subject’ is that of a ‘body-
subject’ of always world-directed and historically and socially situated lived 
experience. As a result, the kinds of claims that he thinks the transcendental 
philosopher can make are very limited when viewed in contrast to Husserl’s 
expansive conception of philosophy as a universal and rigorous transcendental 
science. In contrast to Husserl, his scaled-down and reformed conception of 
transcendental subjectivity sticks closer to the phenomena of bodily experience. We 
saw this, for example, in his ‘retreat’ to making claims regarding the transcendental 
conditions that underpin the lived experience of the body-subject in terms of his a 
priori ‘body schema’.  
On the issue of his conception of an ‘existential dialectics’ I argued that the 
sense in which his philosophy is dialectical is either misconstrued or incompletely 
construed: misconstrued, as a result of reading him too closely to Hegel; 
incompletely construed, as a result of focusing on one aspect of his use of dialectics 
without properly relating it to others. Either way, the authors I considered fail to 
capture the full originality of Merleau-Ponty’s view. Both of these problems result 
from their failing to fully appreciate the way in which the universal 
phenomenological constraint on Merleau-Ponty’s dialectical thinking makes it an 
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‘existential dialectic’ – a dialectic within the bounds of ‘the principle of 
phenomenology’. 
As we saw, the term ‘dialectic’ is substantially reconfigured in the process of 
its importation into Merleau-Ponty’s ‘existential dialectics’. His conception is all too 
easily misunderstood if the language of dialectics that he uses is interpreted through 
the lens of its traditional meaning in Hegelian phenomenology, and not properly 
situated in the framework of existential ontology. This confusion is dispelled by 
realising that Merleau-Ponty has three dominant senses of dialectic. The first sense 
refers to the methodological structure of his critique of Intellectualism and 
Empiricism in Phenomenology of Perception, a dialectic of ‘objective thought’. The 
second, ontological, usage of the term dialectics refers to the model of reason and 
meaning appropriate to the ontological level, providing the ‘logical structure’ of his 
‘existential-dialectical’ categories (‘body-subject’ and ‘being-in the-world’). The 
third usage expresses the reciprocal nature of the relationship between the individual 
and their cultural and historical context. 
Moving on from the question of the correct interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophical position and method, I addressed the third step in my three-step 
argument: problems attending Merleau-Ponty’s central thesis of the primacy of 
perception. As I argued earlier in this chapter, Merleau-Ponty’s thesis faces a 
significant problem due to his conception of the language/perception relation. 
Merleau-Ponty does not see the full significance of the way that our world ‘is 
encountered and inhabited in and through language’101, and fails to acknowledge the 
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deep linguistic context that is the enabling and conditioning background through 
which phenomenological description necessarily takes place. Despite the fact that we 
can engage in a phenomenology of the pre-predicative level in a way that the results 
of our inquiry can contribute to our epistemological and ontological claims, the 
understanding that we achieve of the pre-personal level is not capable of serving as 
the epistemological foundation of the level of both the objective world of scientific 
discourse and the lifeworld of personal thought and action. As such, Merleau-Ponty 
operates with an unjustified thesis to the effect that his account of the pre-personal 
world has a distinct and foundational epistemic status, because it is a discourse on the 
‘originary’ as opposed to the ‘second order expression’ of scientific discourse. It is 
exceedingly difficult, I concluded, to see how it is the pre-predicative world that is 
being characterised, rather than the pre-predicative as pre-interpreted through a 
contextualising linguistic-cultural lifeworld. 
The central consequence of this is, as Margolis has argued, that Merleau-
Ponty’s claim regarding the philosophical significance of the pre-predicative as 
‘originary origin’102 is compromised. Attention to the constitutive role of language 
indicates the need for a revised conception of the ‘originary’. This revised conception 
retains the status of an ‘incompletely penetrable precondition’103. However, in 
encountering the pre-objective we are not thereby encountering the pre-predicative 
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103 Ibid. 
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‘anterior to all traditions’104 – but rather encountering ‘a languaged world’ via a 
‘worlded language’105.  
Furthermore, despite removing the objectivism that grows out of the natural 
attitude, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological reduction does not and cannot remove 
the fact of our necessary situatedness in a received natural language tradition. And it 
is the primary status of this ordinary language form of discourse that Merleau-Ponty 
overlooks in his view of the discourse of the pre-predicative as first-order. As such, I 
argued that Merleau-Ponty’s concretised plurality of body-subjects, coupled with the 
argument regarding the deep hermeneutic-linguistic context of lived experience, 
undermines the notion of a singular lifeworld that he tacitly assumes in 
Phenomenology of Perception. As Margolis observes, this view ought to be ‘replaced 
by plural, variable, historicized, open, potentially incommensurable lifeworlds’106.  
This critique suggests grounds for adopting a revised version of Merleau-
Ponty’s position. This revised position involves a full acknowledgement of his 
method as a hermeneutic phenomenology and a revision of his claims about the 
discourse of the pre-predicative as first-order. Although this revised account retains 
his insights about the lived body, perception and the necessary situatedness of the 
subject, the problems that I raised with the thesis of the primacy of perception seem 
to necessitate the rejection of the idea of an account of the pre-predicative as capable 
of serving as epistemological ground. As I argued, it is hard to see how Merleau-
                                                
104 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.208. 
105 Margolis, ‘Phenomenology and Metaphysics’ p.155. 
106 Ibid. p.175. 
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Ponty can avoid this revision to the epistemological dimension of the primacy of 
perception thesis.  
Finally, in relation to contemporary debates in the area of epistemology and 
ontology, my exegetical and critical work, by contributing to a fuller understanding 
of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, therefore contributes to a clearer understanding of 
the nature of his deep challenge to scientistic naturalism. In explicating the 
uniqueness of Merleau-Ponty’s position (a liberal naturalism that nevertheless 
utilises a transcendental method) in relation to other key figures in the tradition, the 
challenge that he represents to scientistic naturalism is likewise shown to be unique. 
Merleau-Ponty’s liberal naturalist position represents a powerful critique of the 
scientistic naturalism that underpins the cognitive sciences program. It follows from 
this that, at the least, any would-be naturaliser of phenomenology ought to consider 
deeply Merleau-Ponty’s criticisms of the cognitive scientific thinkers of his day and 
the general critique of objectivism on which it relies. More radically, his 
phenomenology of the lived body and critique of objective thought suggests that the 
project of the cognitive sciences rests on a foundational philosophical mistake. This 
claim represents a profound challenge to the philosophical underpinnings of 
scientistic naturalism that contemporary philosophers ought to take very seriously. 
They should do this because Merleau-Ponty’s liberal naturalist alternative, through 
its powerful critique of the Intellectualism of Kant and Husserl, coupled with its 
equally powerful critique of scientism, presents a philosophy capable of doing justice 
to the claims of the sciences by resituating them within an existential-hermeneutic 
framework that fully acknowledges and values their explanatory and predictive 
power, but which also articulates their limits with respect to ontology. And it does 
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this while ‘maintaining the sharpest sense of subjectivity’107 – something that 
scientism has always failed to do. 
 
                                                
107 Merleau-Ponty, ‘Hegel’s Existentialism’, p.63. 
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